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PREFACE
The U.S. progress towards a complete space transportation system (STS) for the
exploration and exploitation of space achieved an important milestone when the
Space Shuttle became operational. Other elements of the system, such as the
Payload Assist Modules, Inertial Upper Stage, Spacelab, Extra Vehicular
Maneuvering System, and the Shuttle-Centaur Upper Stage are either in use or
under development. However, there are other important STS elements that still
require definition and development - the major new element being a manned
Space Station in low earth orbit. When available, a manned Space Station,
plus the elements listed above, will provide the capability for a permanent
manned presence in space.
The availability of a manned Space Station will:
a. Provide a versatile space system for an active space science program.
b. Stimulate developmnt of advanced technologies.
c. Provide continuity to the civilian space program.
d. Stimulate commercial activities in space.
e. Enhance national security.
Through these, U.S. leadership in space will be maintained and our image
abroad will be enhanced. The Space Station will provide:
a. A permanent manned presence.
b. Improved upper stage operations.
c. Maintenance of space systems through on-orbit checkout and repair.
d. Assembly and construction of large space elements.
It will also enhance Space Shuttle utilization as a transportation vehicle by
releasing it from sortie missions that currently substitute for Space Station
missions.
The Space Station will be a facility having the following general
characteristics:
a. Support manned and unmanned elements.
b. User friendly.
c. Evolutionary in nature for size, capability, and technology.
d. High level of autonomous operations.
e. Shuttle compatible.
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The primary purpose of this study was to further identify, collect, and
analyze the science, applications, commercial, technology, U.S. national
security, and space operations missions that require or that will be materi-
ally benefited by the availability of a permanent manned Space Station and to
identify and characterize the Space Station attributes and capabilities that
will be necessary to satisfy those mission requirements."
NASA intends to integrate these data, recommendations, and insights developed
under this contracted effort with those developed from in-house activities and
other sources and then synthesize from this information a set of mission
objectives and corresponding Space Station requirements that will be used in
future phases of study and Space Station definition.
The study objectives as defined in the Request for Proposal (RFP) are:
a. Identify, collect, and analyze missions that require, or will materially
benefit from, the availability of a Space Station:
• Science
• Applications
• Commercial
• Technology
• Space operations
• U.S. national security
b. Identify and characterize the Space Station attributes and capabilities
that are necessary to meet these requirements.
c. Recommend mission implementation approaches and architectural options.
d. Recommend time phasing of implementation concepts.
e. Define the rough order of magnitude programmatic/cost implications.
Book 1 will address the first objective and provide the realistic, time-phased
set of mission requirements upon which the balance of the study was based.
Accomplishments of objectives b, c, and d are documented in Book 2, and objec-
tive e is addressed in Book 3. Book 4 contains a definition and an analysis
of .national security missions (classified).
vi
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FOREWORD
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Space Station Economic Benefits, Costs and Programmatics is the third volume
of General Dynamics Convair (GDC) Division's Study of Space Station Needs,
Attributes and Architectural Options, and documents Task 3.3 of the study.
The principal tasks addressed during this study are summarized in Table 1-1.
The title of this volume was carefully selected, and reflects the emphasis of
this study on the economic benefits of the Space Station.
Section 2, "Economic Benefits," provides an in-depth analysis of the economic
value of the Space Station. Of particular interest is the space-based orbital
transfer vehicle (OTV), which distinguishes itself as the most economically
attractive of all the Space Station functions. It should be emphasized,
however, that other Space Station activities, most notably materials pro-
cessing in space (MPS), have substantial economic potential, although their
future benefits are currently very difficult to credibly quantify and are not
included in the economic benefits profile. The economic benefit estimates of
this study, projected at nearly $1.7 billion per year by the mid-1990s, must
be considered conservative if for no other reason than because they do not
include any significant benefits from MPS.
Table 1-1. Task Objectives and Approach
Economic benefits
• Parametric analysis of significant cost elements of alternative
approaches & identify cost drivers & sensitivities
— Research & production
— Space-based OTV
— Satellite servicing
Programmatic comparisons
• Generate alternate program costs with a parametric cost model
(element level) & a phased funding model
— Mission payload costs
^- Architectural options
— Evolutionary options
Business opportunity assessment
• Examine alternate approaches to industry involvement for
financing, developing, marketing & operating space station
resources
— Business assessment (Space Station Propectus)
— Government/industry options (i.e., SDC)
21033258-50
266.592-300
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Section 3 of this volume, "Program Costs," provides estimates of Space Station
development and production costs, and also of the costs of the candidate mis-
sions that have been identified during this study. Since this was not a
design study, these cost projections are presented in limited detail. The key
cost relationships among major Space Station systems, elements and missions,
however, are readily evident. The total cost of establishing the Space
Station functions discussed in Section 2, at $6-10 billion, are consistent
with the estimates of previous studies. The benefits data of the Section 2
are integrated into the Section 3 in cash-flow analyses, which show a payback
period of 10 to 15 years from the initiation of Space Station operations.
The fourth and final section, "Programmatics," discusses the basic criteria
used in the evaluation of the economic benefits of a Space Station program.
Emphasis is given to private industry investment considerations and their
relevance to the Space Station. A major objective of this study was to
identify the requirements for private-sector participation in a Space Station
enterprise, and the Section 4 focuses on this issue as it explores the dif-
ferent ways in which the government can structure a Space Station program to
encourage private investment. Several different government-industry partner-
ship options are developed and evaluated, with the suggested organization of a
Space Development Corporation to combine the most favorable aspects of each of
these programmatic alternatives.
As a supplement to this study, GDC has provided (Appendix I) a Space Station
Prospectus to show how an alternative Space Station program, based on private-
sector initiative, might be established. The prospectus is a fictitious stock
offering for Consolidated Space Enterprises (a fictitious company), which
would organize and retain partnership in 10 subsidiary Space Station com-
panies, each of which would develop a particular Space Staton capability.
Interested readers of this volume are encouraged to obtain copies of the pro-
spectus from the Advanced Space Programs Office of General Dynamics Convair
Division. It is hoped that this study volume and the Space Station Prospectus
will enhance government and industry capabilities for developing the economic
potential of the Space Station.
The principal contributers to this volume were: M.C. Simon - Economic
Benefits (Section 2) and Programmatic and Business Opportunity Assessment
(Section 4); and S.L. Wagner and R.E. Bradley - Program Cost Estimates
(Section 3).
1-2
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SECTION 2
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A detailed economic benefits analysis (see Figure 2-1) was performed for the
three Space Station functions studied: the space-based orbital transfer
vehicle (OTV), satellite servicing, and research and production. Midterm
conclusions gave a preliminary indication that the OTV function would provide
the greatest economic benefit, and analyses conducted during the second half
of the study supported these findings, as shown in Figure 2-2. Final results
also supported the initial conclusion that national security, commercial
communications, and commercial materials processing in space users would
derive the greatest economic benefit from the Space Station.
The principal findings of the economic benefits analysis documented in this
volume are summarized in Table 2-1 and Figure 2-3.
2.2 SPACE-BASED OTV
2.2.1 OVERVIEW OF OTV BENEFITS. The space-based orbital transfer vehicle
(OTV) represents one of the most economically attractive functions of a manned
Space Station. The primary purpose of the OTV will be to deliver payloads
from low earth-orbit (LEO) to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and other high energy
orbits beyond the range of the Space Shuttle. Payloads will first be
delivered to the Space Station via Shuttle, and then processed at the Space
Station for boost to higher orbit on the next scheduled OTV mission. The
traffic model defined by this study indicates that OTV missions would probably
be carried out an average of once or twice per month.
Objective: Provide an initial assess-
ment of economic benefits (both
cost reduction & value added)
associated with each of the
station's unique functional
capabilities
Economic benefits, cost &
programmatic analysis
(Task 3.3)
Economic benefits
• LCC & programmatic
comparisons
• Programmatics/business
opportunity assessment
Approach: Conduct parametric
analyses of significant cost
elements of alternate approaches &
identify cost drivers & sensitivities
Tasks:
• Research & production function
• Satellite servicing &
maintenance
• Space-based OTV
30033258-99
266.592-301
Figure 2-1. Economic Benefits Studies
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Space Station Capability
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Figure 2-2. Economic Benefits Overview
Table 2-1. Economic Benefits Summary
Research & Production
• Near-term benefits to commercial, science & applications users
• Long-term benefits in materials processing & space
industrialization
Space-based OTV
• Significant reduction in cost to GEO
• Benefits to shuttle users
• "ET tanker" concept
Satellite servicing
• Developed servicing benefits model in conjunction with GSFC
• 80% reduction in IMS servicing costs
30033258-100
266.592-303
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Space-
based
OTV
(69%)
Research
&
production
(17%)
Satellite
servicing
(14%)
$1.16 billion/year
^_ . $285 million/year
$240 million/year
Total economic benefit: $1.685 billion
Figure 2-3. Space Station Economic Benefits (1984 $)
21033258-11
266.592-304
The economic viability of the OTV will depend primarily on three major
factors. These are:
a. Reusability of the vehicles
b. Efficiency in propelIant delivery to LEO
c. Reduction in Shuttle charge factors for payload delivery to LEO
2.2.1.1 Reusability. As a reusable upper stage, the space-based OTV will
have a distinct economic advantage over all other expendable boosters. The
total hardware and operations cost of an OTV mission, excluding propellant
costs, is estimated at about $4 million, the majority of which is related to
flight operations and OTV maintenance costs. The OTV production costs and the
cost of initial delivery of the space vehicle to LEO will be amortized over as
many as 240 flights and will represent a relatively small fraction of the cost
of a typical OTV mission.
Table 2-2 summarizes OTV missions costs, based on the following ground rules
and assumptions: 1) spare parts and refurbished OTV engines are delivered via
Shuttle to LEO in a special OTV resupply module for every 20 OTV missions, at
a total cost of $15 million, or $750,000 per OTV mission; 2) refurbishment of
the OTV advanced space engine is included in this total; 3) Manpower costs per
mission of $1.2 million include 2000 hours of ground support (at $100/hour)
and 200 hours of Space Station crew time (at $10,000/hour).
2-3
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Table 2-2. OTV Mission Cost (Excluding Propellant Costs) (1984 $M)
Unit
• OTV Unit Cost " $120 M
OTV Delivery Cost to LEO $120 M
Unit Subtotal $240 M
+ 240 Flights (OTV Lifetime) = Amortized Cost/Flight ($1.00 M)
Spares
Engine: Refurbished every 20 flights
at $2 million; cost/flight $0.10 M
Avionics: $1 million for 20 flights $0.05 M
RCS: $1 million for 20 flights $0.05 M
Miscellaneous: $1 million for 20 flights $0.05 M
Transportation of Spares: $10 million
for 20 flights; cost/flight $0.50 M
Spares Subtotal: $15 million for 20 flights; cost/flight ($0.75 M)
Manpower
Ground Support: 2000 hours at $100/hour $0.20 M
Space Station Crew Time: 200 hours at $10,000/hour $2.00 M
Manpower Subtotal ($2.20 M)
Total Cost Per OTV Flight (Excluding Propellants) $3.95 M
Since the OTV would have a payload capacity of 11,000 pounds to GEO,
$4 million would represent a large cost advantage over the alternative means
of attaining a similar launch capability with expendable vehicles. Table 2-3
compares the reusable OTV mission cost with the hardware costs of several
expendable upper stages. Total mission costs of these systems (including STS
and related costs) are shown graphically in Figure 2-4.
The OTV mission cost as described so far, however, represents only part of the
total cost of an OTV mission, just as the upper-stage hardware costs in
Table 2-3 are not the total costs that users of those vehicles must assume.
The total cost of a PAM-D mission, for example, would be much higher than the
$6 million indicated, with the inclusion of Shuttle and payload integration
costs. The total cost of an OTV mission would exceed the $4 million in
hardware and operations costs, due primarily to the cost of delivering OTV
propellant to LEO. If OTV propellants are shipped to the Space Station via
conventional means in the Space Shuttle cargo bay, then the total cost of an
OTV mission rises by about $40 million, diminishing the economic benefit of
the space-based system. Hence, efficiency in propellant delivery to LEO will
be an important factor in developing a cost-effective space-based OTV.
2-4
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Table 2-3. Upper-Stage Cost Comparison (Hardware Only) (1984$)
P/L Capacity
to GEO
Cost Per
Vehicle
Cost Per Pound
to GEO
PAM-D
PAM-D II
PAM-A
IUS
IUS First Stage
Shuttle-Centaur
Space-Based OTV
1,300
1,600
2,000
5,000
6,700
14,000
11,000
$ 6
9
8
60
22
40
4
$ 4,615
5,625
4,000
12,000
3,284
2,857
364
Cost/lb
to GEO
(1984 $)
$20,000-
$15,000-
$30,000
$10,000
$5,000-
^^* •«
/ Average
/ competitor
/ cost
OTV
benefit
/'
PAM-D PAM-DII PAM-A IUS Shuttle/ Shuttle- Space-
Centaur based based 2
OTV OTV 2
Potential
1033258-7
66.592-305
Figure 2-4. Upper-Stage Transportation Cost (1984 $/LB to GEO)
2.2.1.2 Efficiency in Propellant Delivery. Several possibilities exist for
low-cost propellant delivery to LEO. From an OTV economics standpoint, the
ideal solution would be to make use of the residual propellant that remains in
the Shuttle external fuel tank (ET) after the Orbiter has achieved orbital
velocity and its main engines are cut off. Although some cost would be
involved in the recovery of the propellant and its subsequent transportation
2-5
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to the Space Station, delivery of the fuel from Earth to LEO would be essen-
tially free. This propellant could then be purchased from NASA by an OTV
Operating Authority at a price that would cover the cost of the recovery
operation, plus yield a profit that could then benefit the STS users.
Based on an overall judgment of the OTV operating scenario, it appears that a
purchase price of $500 per pound of net propellant recovered would be appro-
priate. With an average net recovery of 11,600 pounds of propellant per
Shuttle mission, NASA could generate up to $5.8 million in revenue, depending
on the cost of the recovery operation. Since fight operations and refurbish-
ing costs for the propellant recovery missions would probably be very small as
compared with the $4 million cost of high-orbit payload delivery flights,
NASA's income from the sale of recovered propellant would in all likelihood be
fairly close to the $5.8 million per Shuttle flight figure.
The Honeybee propellant recovery scenario described in Volume II would be an
ideal solution if not for two major drawbacks. First, there are significant
technological uncertainties involved in executing rapid rendezvous operations
with the Shuttle and extracting propellant during the critical moments follow-
ing Shuttle main engine cut-off. Second, the amount of propellant that can be
recovered from the external tank is limited by several factors, such as
Orbiter payload, propellant boil-off rate, and transfer efficiency. The
amount of recoverable propellant available for use as OTV fuel would be
further limited by the number of Shuttle flights from which propellant could
be derived, i.e., those flights going to orbit at the same inclination (28.5
degrees) as the OTV space base. Although the technical problems of the
Honeybee concept can probably be overcome, it seems likely that, at least at
some point in time, demand for OTV traffic will exceed capabilities for ET
propellant recovery.
Consequently, an alternative means of providing low-cost propellant has been
suggested (see Book 2): the dedicated ET tanker. This Shuttle-derived
vehicle could deliver adequate amounts of propellant to the Space Station on a
relatively small number of missions. Although propellant delivery via ET
tanker would by no means be free, it is estimated that propellant could still
be provided for OTV operations at a price of $500 per pound. Since an ET
tanker flight would cost less than a typical Shuttle mission (see Table 2-4),
this arrangement could also generate profits from the sale of propellant that
might benefit all STS users. Throughout the 1990s, 2 to 3 ET tanker flights
per year could probably provide all the propellant required for space-based
OTV operations.
A flight rate of three ET tankers per year would generate $120 million in
annual profits for NASA. If spread over 24 Shuttle flights per year, this
could permit a $5-million reduction in the cost of every Shuttle mission, very
similar to the benefit achieved with ET propellant recovery in the Honeybee
scenario. Since in either case propellant would be provided at $500 per
pound, a nominal OTV mission delivering 10,000 pounds of payload to GEO and
requiring 27,000 pounds of propellant would incur a cost of about $13.5
million in addition to the $4 million in hardware and operations costs
presented in Table 2-2. Total OTV costs per mission, excluding payload
delivery costs to LEO, would then be approximately $17.5 million.
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Table 2-4. ET Tanker Operations Costs (1984 $)
Shuttle Cost1 ET Tanker Cost2
Cost Component ($M) ($M)
SRB 24 29
ET 19 19
Launch Operations 19 13
Flight Operations 15 5
Main Engine 3 1
All Other 26 8
Total 106 75
'•Estimates for 1990, based on 24 flights per year.
2ET Tanker Calculations:
ET Tanker Propellant Delivery: 230,000 Ib
Cost/lb = $75M/230,000 Ib
= $326/lb
NASA Profit: $174 x 230,000 = $40M
2.2.1.3 Reduction in Shuttle Charge Factors. A space-based OTV that could
transfer a nominal load of 10,000 pounds from LEO to GEO for $17.5 million
would represent a significant improvement in the economics of near-earth
spaceflight. To take full advantage of the economic benefits of the OTV,
however, it will be necessary to achieve new efficiencies in payload delivery
from Earth to LEO. The major economic advantage of the space-based OTV lies
neither in its reusability nor its use of propellant delivered to LEO at low
cost. The greatest benefit is the space-basing of the launch vehicle itself;
OTV users pay only a small fraction of the cost of lifting the upper stage to
LEO, the equivalent of about $0.5 million per OTV mission (see Table 2-2). By
contrast, the user of an expendable upper stage must pay the full cost of
lifting the upper stage to LEO, which could range from $17 million for a PAM-D
(based on its use of about 10 feet of Shuttle cargo bay length) to over $80
million for a fully-fueled Shuttle-Centaur, which requires a dedicated Shuttle
flight. Even if the weight-dominated upper stages could be launched to LEO
and fueled in orbit with low-cost propellant, the cost of launching the dry
upper stage to LEO would still be high. An unfueled Centaur G would consume
19.5 feet in cargo bay length and cost $36 million to launch; the longer
Centaur G', at 29.1 feet, would cost over $53 million.
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Although the propsect of paying only $0.5 million of the OTV delivery cost to
LEO seems attractive, the OTV user would still need to pay the cost of having
his payload delivered to LEO, which could easily exceed that of the OTV
mission itself. Geosynchronous payloads have always been designed to be
stowed in a long and thin envelope for compatibility with expandable launch
vehicles such as the Delta and Atlas-Centaur. If these payloads are rede-
signed to make efficient use of STS cargo bay space, then the full benefit of
space-basing the upper stage can be realized.
An an example, consider the inertial upper stage (IUS), which weighs approxi-
mately 45,000 pounds, and is used to launch payloads such as the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellites (TDRS), which weight about 5,000 pounds. Eliminating
the IUS vehicle from the cargo bay through space-basing of OTVs can reduce the
total Shuttle payload weight from 50,000 to 5000 pounds. This is a reduction
in weight load factor from 0.77 to 0.07, a potential savings in Shuttle costs
of nearly $75 million. The TDRS spacecraft, however, occupies nearly 18 feet
of cargo bay length, creating a length load factor of 0.3, four times as great
as the reduced weight load factor.
After removing the IUS upper stage, the TDRS would become a length-critical
payload, meaning the Shuttle charge would be based on its length rather than
its weight. Rather than a Shuttle price of $8.5 million (for a 5,000-pound
payload that is weight-critical, i.e., not exceeding 4.6 feet in length) the
TDRS would incur a charge of over $33 million, based on its 18-foot length.
The potential j>75 million benefit of space-basing the TDRS upper stage is
reduced by $25 million, due to the satellite's length.
This still represents a net saving of $50 million in Shuttle charges, made
possible by the fact that TDRS is, by communications satellite standards, a
relatively length-efficient payload. Most spacecraft are even less length-
efficient, to the point at which space-basing of the upper stage provides
little or no economic benefit. Table 2-5 lists four of the most common satel-
lites and launch carriers, and compares their launch costs with space-based
OTV cost estimates. The space-based OTV is tremendously cost-effective for
launching very large satellites such as TDRS and INTELSAT VI, but is less
competitive in delivering the smaller Hughes 376 and INTELSAT V-A spacecraft.
2.2.2 BENEFITS TO OTV USERS
2.2.2.1 OTV Benefit to Commercial Users. Table 2-5 brings together all the
elements of OTV launchcostsand clearly shows the: potential benefits of a
space-based OTV in launching commercial communications satellites. It also
demonstrates the importance of developing more length-efficient satellites for
reduction of Shuttle charges. The "OTV Specifications" columns provide the
approximate length and weight data that would determine the cost of delivering
these payloads to GEO via space-based OTV. The length.data reflect the amount
of Shuttle cargo bay space these satellites would consume if designed for
Shuttle launch to LEO and subsequent transfer to GEO via OTV. The cargo bay
length of the INTELSAT VI spacecraft, for example, which would require 28 feet
if launched via Shuttle, could be reduced to about 20 feet with removal of the
perigee upper stage, which would not be required if an OTV were available.
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Table 2-5. OTV Cost Comparison (1984 $)
Satellite
Current
Costs ($M)
Possible/
Present Hard-
Carrier ware STS Total
OTV
Specifications
Payload Payload
Length Weight
(ft) (Ib)
OTV
Costs ($M)
OTV
Benefit
STS OTV Total ($M)
INTELSAT V-A Atlas- 55 - 55 21 2000 39 4 43 12
Centaur
INTELSAT VI Titan 90 - 90 20* 4000 37 7 44 46
Hughes 376 PAM-D 6 17 23 9 1300 17 4 21 2
TDRS IUS 55 90 145 18 4700 33 " 8 41 104
*Would be 28 feet with perigee stage used for STS launch
The weight data influence the OTV transfer cost, and this charge is calculated
as
OTV Charge = (Satellite weight - 10,000 Ib) x $17.5 million
where the quantity in parentheses represents the percent of OTV lift capacity
used (assuming a nominal total load of 10,000 pounds) and $17.5 million is the
OTV mission cost (derived earlier). It is assumed that the OTV will never
carry more than four separate payloads at once, hence the minimum OTV charge
is 1/4 x $17.5 million or approximately $4 million, even if each satellite's
weight is under 2500 pounds. By adding the STS cost to LEO to this OTV
charge, we get the total cost to GEO.
The OTV is less competitive with the Atlas-Centaur and PAM-D, not because
these launch systems are particularly inexpensive, but because payloads that
use these systems are not ideally configured for space-basing of their upper
stages. The INTELSAT V-A spacecraft, for example, is actually longer than the
much heavier (and more capable) INTELSAT VI satellite, because INTELSAT V-A
was not designed for Shuttle launch.
Similarly, the very popular Hughes 376 satellite, although comparatively light
in weight, is not designed to minimize its use of Shuttle cargo bay space, but
to utilize the 10 feet of cargo bay space used by the PAM-D upper stage. The
Hughes 376 is presently mounted atop the PAM-D in its stowed configuration,
and hence there is no economic incentive for reducing its length to less than
the 10 feet that it and the PAM-D presently consume.
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Removal of INTELSAT VI's built-in upper-stage boost capability is a key to
making it a more length-efficient payload. A more dramatic example of
potential OTV benefits, however, is provided by the TDRS, which, without a
built-in upper stage, relies on the IUS. Not only does the IUS add nearly fe50
million to the STS cost for TDRS, but the IUS stage itself costs about $55
million, making the TDRS the most expensive civilian satellite to launch via
Shuttle. A space-based OTV could hence reduce TDRS launch costs by over
two-thirds, a total economic benefit of greater than $100 million per
satellite.
Figure 2-5 illustrates the criticality of the length-efficiency of payloads in
achieving the economic potential of a space-based OTV. The costs of launching
2500-, 5000-, and 10,000-pound satellites via OTV are given as functions of
the cargo bay length they require for Shuttle launch to LEO. The impact of
the cargo bay length of payloads delivered to LEO on OTV economics is analyzed
further in Section 2.2.3.
For comparison, launch costs for the PAM-D, PAM-A, and various expendable
launch vehicles (with their payload capacities to GEO, in parentheses) are
provided. From this graph a number of important conclusions about OTV
operating costs can be drawn.
Total
cost
to
GEO
(1984 $)
S100M
90M
80M
70M
60M
50M
40M
30M
20M
10M
10,000lb
Titan 34-D (5000 Ib
payload capacity to GEO) 5,000 Ib OTVcosts
2,500 Ib
Atlas/Centaur (2500)
PAM-A (2000)
PAM-D (1300)
10 20 30 40
Payload length in shuttle cargo bay (ft)
50 60
21033258-9
266.592-306
Figure 2-5. Cost to GEO as a Function of Payload Length
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Most obvious is the sensitivity of OTV cost to the amount of Shuttle space
required for delivery of OTV payloads to the Space Station. The cost of
launching a 2500-pound payload to GEO, for example, can range from about fclO
million to nearly $90 million, depending on its Shuttle load factor. (In
Figure 2-5, it is assumed that all payloads are length-dominated, i.e.,
consuming a greater fraction of Shuttle length capacity than weight capacity.
Virtually all geosynchronous communication satellites fit in this category.)
It is also evident from Figure 2-5 that the OTV can have a substantial cost
advantage over all of its present-day competitors, as long as its payloads use
Shuttle space efficiently. This benefit is greatest and easiest to obtain for
heavier payloads; 10,000-pound satellites (which would require the equivalent
of two Titan or Ariane launches) are at most half as expensive to launch via
OTV, even if they require entire Shuttle flights for delivery to LEO.
Achieving large benefits with smaller payloads is a greater challenge, but
still possible. The OTV becomes competitive with the PAM-D for payloads that
require less than 10 feet of cargo bay length and with the PAM-A and Atlas-
Centaur for payloads under 20 feet. Payloads in the 5,000-pound class can be
launched more cheaply via OTV if they remain under 40 feet in length.
As illustrated in Table 2-5, heavier communications satellites such as
INTELSAT VI and TORS are sufficiently length-efficient for economical OTV
delivery. The OTV has little or no benefit, however, in launching lighter
satellites such as the Hughes 376, because of their high length-to-weight
ratio. Since the majority of communications satellites launched today are in
this latter class of lighter spacecraft, the economic viability of the OTV for
commercial users will, to some degree, be dependent upon changing the present
design philosophy of the space communications industry.
An intermediate solution to the problem of maximizing the benefits of the OTV
is to reduce the length of present satellites by removing propulsion stages
and deployment apparata that would not be required if a Space Station and OTV
were available. The Hughes 376, for example, could be modified to reduce its
Shuttle charge factor from 0.21 (with the PAM-D upper stage) to about 0.16.
The economic impact of this would be a reduction in Shuttle costs of about
$4 million per satellite launched. The total cost to GEO for such a satellite
would be less than $18 million.
Modification of existing satellites in this manner may be a relatively inex-
pensive way to reduce communications satellite launch costs. To take full
advantage of the benefits of the Space Station in launching communications
satellites, however, an entirely new design strategy should be employed.
Communications satellites of the Space Station era should be delivered to the
Space Station in containers especially designed for efficient Shuttle mani-
festing, and should be assembled and reverified in LEO. In support of this
study, the conceptual design of a new satellite, the SX, was developed as a
means of meeting these requirements.*
*The SX satellite design is SPACECOM proprietary information, so illustrations
of SX design were not available for publication in this document.
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The SX concept was developed by Spacecom, as a subcontract task for GDC's
Space Station study, and represents a potential breakthrough in the reduction
of satellite launch costs. The SX satellite is packaged for Shuttle launch as
modular components to be assembled in LEO, and requires less than 5% of the
Shuttle's load capacity. In its special containers, the SX consumes less than
half of the Shuttle cargo bay cross-sectional area and less than six feet of
cargo bay length. Hence two satellites could be launched and jointly require
less than one-tenth of the available cargo bay space.
In the SX launch configuration, solar power arrays are stored in containers
beside the boxes housing the major electronics components of the spacecraft.
Despite the minimal volume required, the 2500-pound SX would have a high
communications capacity, roughly 4 times the capacity of present-day communi-
cations satellites. This means the SX has about twice the capacity of the
INTELSAT VI spacecraft, the most capable and advanced commercial communica-
tions satellite currently under development. The economic significance of the
SX is substantial. The Shuttle charge factor for the SX, as long as at least
two are launched on any Shuttle flight, is 0.067, for a Shuttle charge of
under $6 million. The total cost to GEO for the SX is less than $10 million,
about one-fifth to one-tenth of what it costs to launch a satellite of similar
capability today. Table 2-6 compares the SX launch cost with those of other
satellites, including a modified Hughes 376, to show the great potential
economic benefits of utilizng the space-based OTV t'o launch a new class of
communications satellites.
2.2.3 OTV BENEFITS ANALYSIS. To analyze the economic benefits of the space-
based OTV, it is desirable to have these benefits calculated on a "per-OTV
mission" basis. Having benefits established on a per-satellite basis, as in
the preceeding parts of this section, is useful in quantifying the potential
benefit to a particular user. To determine the sensitivities of these bene-
fits to OTV cost factors, however, the per-OTV mission basis is more valuable
because the OTV costs are calculated on a per-OTV mission basis as well. A
change in any OTV cost variable, such as propellant delivery cost, can then be
evaluated in terms of its impact on OTV benefits.
Table 2-6. Satellite Launch Cost Comparison (1984 $)
Satellite
TORS
INTELSAT VI
INTELSAT V-A
Hughes Leasat
Hughes 376
Modified 376
SX
Lower Stage
Shuttle
Shuttle
Atlas
Shuttle
Shuttle
Shuttle
Shuttle
Shuttle/
Lower Stage
Cost
$ 90M
55M
55M
28M
17M
14M
6M
Upper Stage
IUS
I US 1st stage
Centaur
Unique
PAM-D
OTV
OTV
Upper
Stage
Cost
$ 55M
15M
' Included
Included
6M
4M
4M
Total Cost
to GEO
$ 145M
70M
55M
28M
23M
18M
10M
21033258-8
266.592-307
2-12
GDC-ASP-83-004
Finally, by using a mission model that projects the number of OTV missions per
year, estimates of annual OTV benefits, and their sensitivity to OTV costs,
can be extrapolated from the permission data.
2.2.3.1 OTV Benefits Per Mission. Calculation of economic benefits per OTV
mission requires an understanding of what payloads an OTV will typically
deliver, and how these payloads would normally be transported if an OTV were
not available. Communications satellites provide a good basis for an OTV
payload analysis, because: 1) a large portion of OTV traffic will be devoted
to launch of communications satellites, and 2) more information is available
regarding communications satellite payloads than other candidate OTV payloads.
Communications satellites of the Space Station era can be classified into
three weight categories: small (under 1800 pounds), medium (1800-4500
pounds), and large (over 4500 pounds). It is assumed that one OTV mission
will be capable of delivering up to four small satellites, three medium
satellites, and two large satellites, or some combination of the three types,
with a nominal payload weight total of 10,000 pounds. As discussed earlier in
this section, a large fraction of OTV delivery costs will be attributed to the
costs of launching OTV payloads to LEO via Shuttle. Since these payloads are
nearly always length-critical in determining their Shuttle charges, it is
important to specify not only the weights of these satellites, but their
likely lengths. Table 2-7 shows approximate high, baseline, and low length
estimates for the three types of satellites and the Shuttle charges associated
with these lengths.
Table 2-7. Estimated Length and Transportation Changes for 1990s
Communication Satellites
HIGH
STS*
Length Charge
(m)
BASELINE LOW
STS* STS* OTV
Length Charge Length Charge Charge
(m) (JM) (m) (tlO ($M)
Small (<1800 Ib)
Medium (1800-4500 Ib)
Large (4500-6000 Ib)
3
5
7
18
30
42
2
4
5
12
24
30
1
1.5
2
6
9
12
4
6
12
*Per satellite, millions 1984 dollars
Table 2-7 also shows approximate OTV charges, based on each satellite's share
of OTV capability and the OTV cost of $17.5 million per mission. It is
assumed that a nominal OTV load would consist of four small satellites, three
medium satellites, or either one or two large satellites. Based on this last
consideration, the OTV charge for large satellites is based on an "average"
load of 1.5 satellites per OTV mission.
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In Table 2-8, these data are integrated into a total picture of costs per OTV.
mission, which are then compared with the costs of accomplishing the same
mission objectives without a space-based OTV. The OTV costs shown are on a
per-OTV mission basis; for small satellites, the costs shown include Shuttle
launch of four satellites to LEO, plus the OTV mission cost of $17.5 million
for transfer of the four satellites to GEO, and for medium and large satel-
lites the costs are for launch of three and one and a half satellites, respec-
tively. The OTV competitor costs shown are for accomplishment of the same
mission objectives (e.g., launch of four small satellites to GEO), with the
competitive system shown in parentheses. By including high, baseline, and low
cases for OTV and competitor costs, Table 2-8 provides a comparison of OTV
costs with the costs of eight different potential competitors, including
several that will not be available for several years, such as the Shuttle-
Centaur and the IUS first-stage derivative transfer orbit stage (TOS).
For small satellites, the low cost case is based on the SX satellite design,
which optimizes the use of Shuttle cargo-bay space and, as discussed earlier,
permits a total launch cost per satellite of $10 million. Restricting the
benefits of this satellite design to the category of small satellites repre-
sents a conservation assumption, since the SX could weigh up to 2500 pounds
and have a greater communications capacity than even the largest satellites
used today.
2.2.3.2 OTV Annual Economic Benefits. Table 2-9 presents a mission model for
commercial communications satellites developed by SPACECOM in support of this
study. Launch projections are given for the three weight classes used in this
benefits analysis, and provide the mission model used in this study. The pro-
jections in the last three columns are the average figures that constitute
this baseline traffic model.
The data from Table 2-8 and 2-9 are combined in Table 2-10 to show the total
annual benefit of the OTV in launching commercial communications satellites.
In columns 1 and 2, the best-case and worst-case OTV benefit values are
shown. These quantities are derived from Table 2-8 as the differences between
the lowest OTV cost and the highest competitor cost, and the highest OTV cost
and the lowest competitor cost, respectively. The next column in Table 2-10
gives the differences between the baseline cost estimates for the OTV and
completitors and in the fourth column the averages of these three quantities
are shown.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 2-10 show the average annual numbers of satellites
launched and OTV missions required for these launches, based on data from the
years 1994-2000 in the baseline mission model and the OTV capabilities des-
cribed earlier. The last column shows the annual economic benefit of the OTV
for each weight class, based on the average benefit per mission (column 4) and
average number of annual missions (column 6). Combining the benefits of the
three weight classes yields a total annual economic benefit in OTV launch of
commercial communications satellite of $720 million.
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Table 2-8. OTV Mission Costs vs Competitor Costs (1984 fc)
Average
Number Cost Per OTV or OTV-Equivalent Mission ($M)
Launched
Satellite Class Per OTV High Baseline Low
Small Satellites
OTV
Competitor
Medium Satellites
OTV
Competitor
Large Satellites
90
136
(PAM-DII)
66
112
(LEASAT)
109 90
165 123
(Atlas/Centaur) (Shuttle-Centaur)
40
92
(PAM-D)
45
114
(PAM-A)
OTV
Competitor
1.5 81
145
(Shuttle-Based
OTV)
63
143
(TOS)
36
92
(Shuttle/Centaur)
Although an annual benefit of $720 million from OTV operations is significant
in itself, this represents only part of the economic potential of the OTV.
Launch of DoD and science and applications payloads, which are not included
in this mission model, could increase OTV traffic substantialy beyond what
would be required for launch of commercial communications satellites. Based
on requirements data developed for this study, it can be estimated that these
other users will roughly double the commercial mission model. Assuming all.
users derive a similar economic benefit per OTV mission, the total annual
economic benefit from space-based OTV operations, as illustrated in
Table 2-11, could be as high as $1.62 billion, with an expected benefit of
Jl._44 billion per year.
The total OTV mission model for achieving this $1.44 billion per year benefit
calls for 162 missions between 1994 and 2000, an average of about 23 OTV
flights per year. The total potential previous benefit of OTV operations over
this period is $10 billion. A reasonable estimate of actual OTV benefits,
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however, must take into account market capture considerations. Technically,
all 162 missions in the OTV mission model are compatible with the OTV, but for
various logistical and political reasons, many will not be carried out with
the OTV, regardless of the cost effectiveness and performance of the space-
based system. For the purposes of this analysis, it is .estimated that the OTV
will actually capture three-fourths of these potential missions. This 75%
market share translates into a potential OTV economic benefit of
0.75 x $1.44 billion = $1.08 billion
annually, or
0.75 x 162 missions x $62.6 million = $7.5 billion
for the period 1994 to 2000.
Table 2-10. Annual Economic Benefits of OTV in Launching Commercial
Communications Satellites (1984 $)
Satellite
Weight
Small
Medium
. Large
Totals
1
OTV
Best
Case
96
120
109
«
2 3 4
Benefits Over Competitor
(Per OTV Mission) ($M)
Worst Baseline
Case Comparison Average
2 46 48
5 33 53
11 80 67
62.6*
5
Satellites
Launched /Yr
(Average,
1994-2000)
7.3
3.1
12.8
23.2
6
OTV
Missions
Required
1.8
1.2
8.5
11.5
7
Annual
Economic
Benefit
($M)
86
64
570
720
*Weighted average benefit per OTV mission
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Table 2-11. Total Annual OTV Economic Benefit (1984 $)
DoD,
Science
and
Applica-
tions
Increase
in
Mission
Model
75%
100%
125%
Benefit
Per OTV
Mission
(*M)
62.6
62.6
62.6
OTV
Missions:
Commercial
Communica-
tions
(Annual)
11.5
11.5
11.5
Annual
Benefit:
Commercial
Communica-
tions
<*M)
720
720
720
OTV
Missions
DoD,
Science
and
Applica-
tions
8.6
11.5
14.4
Annual
Benefit:
DoD,
Science
and
Applica-
tions
<*M)
540
720
900
Total
Annual
Benefit
(*B)
1.26
1.44
1.62
2.2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis. Although these data reflect a very favorable
view of potential OTV benefits, it should be noted that this analysis is based
on a large number of assumptions with wide ranges of uncertainty. The key
assumptions, and their high, low, and assumed values, are listed in Table 2-12a.
To establish the sensitivity of OTV benefits to these variables,
following equation using the variables in Tables 2-12 and 2-rl2a.
we set up the
B = m x [c-((u+d)/f + (s/20) + (t
' 1 X C 1 L) + a*2 X °i ) + (Pl x p )
+ (t x p x _ x ))]
60 0.75
where B is the total annual benefit from OTV operations. The underlined
portion of the equation represents the average cost of an OTV mission, which
is $62.9 million in the baseline case, and can be derived independently from
the data in Tables 2-8 and 2-10. The average competitor cost per mission
of $125.5 million was similarly obtained from the competitor cost data in
Tables 2-8 and 2-10.
Table 2-12. OTV Benefits Analysis: Definition of Key Variables
Variable
Code Variable
Variable
Code Variable
u
d
f
s
h2
cl
OTV unit cost
OTV delivery cost
OTV lifetime (flights)
Spares cost (per 20 flights)
Crew hours per mission - ground
Pi
P2
Crew hours per mission - ground c
Cost of crew time - space m
2-18
Cost of crew time - ground
Propellants required - per
mission
Propellant cost (per pound)
Shuttle: dedicated price
Shuttle: payload length
(average)
Competitor cost per mission
OTV missions per year
(average)
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Table 2-12a. OTV Benefits Analysis: Key Assumptions (1984 $)
Variable
OTV unit cost
OTV delivery cost
OTV lifetime (flights)
Spares cost (per 20
flights)
Crew hours per mis-
sion — space
Crew hours per mis-
sion — ground
Cost of crew time —
space
Cost of crew title —
ground
Propellants required —
per mission
Propellants cost
Shuttle: dedicated
price
Shuttle: payload
length (average)
Competitor cost per
mission
OTV missions per year
(average)
Low
Value
S60M
S60M
60
$10M
50
500
$5,000/hr
$50/hr
20,000/lb
$250/lb
S70M
12 ft
S75M
10
High
Value
S180M
S180M
480
$30M
500
5000
$25,000/hr
$250/hr
35,000/lb
$1500/lb
S100M
40ft
S200M
25
Assumed
Value
S120M
S120M
240
$15M
200
2000
$10,000/hr
$100/hr
27,000/lb
$500/lb
$83. 3M
24.5 ft
$125. 5M
17.3*
OTV Annual Benefit
Worst Case
$1.08B
S1.08B
$1.03B
$1.07B
$1.03B
$1.08B
$1.03B
$1.08B
S1.02B
S618M
$927M
S588M
$211 M
$627M
Best Case
S1.09B
S1.09B
$1.098
S1.09B
$1.11B
$1.09B
$1.10B
$1.09B
$1.1 SB'
$1.208
$1.21B
$1.48B
$2.37B
$1.57B
Sensitivity
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
High
'Assumes 75% market share of 23 OTV-equivalent missions per year 21033258-6266.592-308
Figures 2-6 through 2-11 graphically illustrate the sensitivity of OTV econ-
omic benefits to all of the preceding variables. Figure 2-6 (a through d)
shows that the OTV benefit is not at all sensitive to OTV unit cost, delivery
cost to LEO, or spares, and is only sensitive to the OTV lifetime if the OTV
lasts for fewer than 20 missions (the expected life is 240 missions). Figure
2-7 (a through d) shows OTV benefits to be similarly insensitive to operation
costs related to Space Station crew time and ground support labor. This
result is somewhat surprising and highly significant. If for example, the
amount of Space Station crew time for OTV turnaround were to double (from the
assumed 200 man-hours to 400 man-hours), annual OTV benefits would decline by
only 4%.
Figure 2-8 (a and b) demonstrates a low to moderate sensitivity of OTV
benefits to propellant requirements and delivery cost. The sensitivity to
propellant requirements is low, due to this variable's narrow range of
uncertainty, but propellant delivery costs could be as great as $1500 per
pound (with conventional Shuttle cargo-bay delivery) and hence can influence
OTV benefits more significantly. It is important to note, however, that even
with propellants costing $1500/pound, the OTV is highly cost-effective, with
an annual benefit of over $600 million.
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Shuttle-related costs are in fact the greatest determinant of OTV benefits;
Figure 2-9 (a and b) shows that OTV benefits are most sensitive to the cost of
delivering OTV payloads to LEO via Shuttle, which is a function of the Shuttle
price (Figure 2-9a) and the amount of cargo bay space used by the payload
(Figure 2-9b). The baseline assumption of 24.5 feet of cargo bay space
required for an average OTV mission payload represents dnly half the length-
efficiency of the advanced SX satellite. One OTV load of four SX satellites
would require only 12 feet of cargo bay space and if all OTV payloads were
this length-efficient the annual benefit of the OTV would rise by nearly 40%
over the baseline. It should be noted that an increase in Shuttle price,
however, would also increase the costs of most OTV competitors, so the sen-
sitivity of OTV benefits to changes in Shuttle price is probably not nearly as
great as indicated in the worst-case (Figure 2-9a).
Figures 2-10 and 2-11 show OTV economic benefits to be highly sensitive to
competitor costs and to the OTV mission model. In no circumstance, however,
do the OTV benefits drop below $200 million per year. Table 2-13 summarizes
the sensitivities, showing that only four variables, propellant delivery cost,
Shuttle payload length, competitor cost, and OTV missions per year, have a
high impact on OTV economic benefits.
2.2.3.4 Summary of OTV Economic Benefits. The baseline OTV economic benefit
of $1.08 billion per year represents a great potential advantage over all
other methods of payload delivery to GEO (Figures 2-12 and 2-13). The OTV is
the most economically attractive use of a manned Space Station, and its poten-
tial benefits do not appear to be dependent on OTV cost or performance
factors. A worst-case analysis with all 10 OTV cost variables set at their
worst-case levels shows the OTV to maintain an economic benefit of over $100
million per year. The OTV loses its benefit only in two extreme cases: if
OTV payloads require very large amounts of Shuttle cargo by length for
delivery to LEO, or if OTV competition costs drop well below the costs of any
presently envisioned alternative.
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Figure 2-6. OTV Sensitivity Analysis: Vehicle Production
and Maintenance (1984 $)
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Figure 2-7. OTV Sensitivity Analysis: Crew Operations Costs (1984 $)
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Figure 2-8. OTV Sensitivity Analysis: Propellant Requirements
and Costs (1984 fc)
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Figure 2-9. OTV Sensitivity Analysis: Shuttle-Related Costs (1984 $)
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Figure 2-10. OTV Sensitivity Analysis: Competitor Price (1984 $)
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Figure 2-11. OTV Sensitivity Analysis.: Number of OTV
Missions per Year (Average)
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Table 2-13. Summary of Sensitivities - OTV Benefits
OTV Annual Benefit
Variable Worst-Case Best-Case Sensitivity
OTV Unit Cost
OTV Delivery Cost
OTV Lifetime
Spares Cost
Crew Hours per Mission: Space
Crew Hours per Mission: Group
Cost of Crew Time: Space
Cost of Crew Time: Ground
Propel lants Required
Propellant Delivery Cost
Shuttle: Dedicated Price
Shuttle: Pay load Length
Competition Cost per Mission
OTV Missions per Year
$1.08B
$1.08B
$1.03B
$1.07B
$1.038
$1.08B
$1.03B
$1.08B
$1.02B
&618M
$927M
S588M
$211M
&627M
$1.09B
$1.09B
$1.09B
$1.09B
$1.11B
$1.09B
$1.10B
fcl.09B
$1.15B
$1.20B
$1.21B
&1.48B
$2.37B
$1.57B
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
High
Sale of OTV propellant, recovered from the Shuttle external tank or delivered
via ET tanker, represents an additional potential benefit of OTV operations.
If the ET tanker is used as a baseline scenario, the expected profit of $80
million from two ET tanker flights annually would raise total economic bene-
fits of OTV operations to $1.16 billion annually. As suggested earlier, this
profit from propellant sale for OTV operations could be used to help reduce
Shuttle prices, a potential benefit to all STS users. If the OTV is in fact
as economically attractive as it appears, NASA might consider selling propel-
lant at an even higher price than the assumed $500 per pound to increase the
benefit to STS users. At a price of $1000 per pound, NASA could generate $310
million in profit from ET tanker operations, with only a 20% reduction in OTV
benefits caused by the higher propellant price. This profit could permit an
STS price reduction of nearly $13 million per Shuttle flight, based on 24
Shuttle flights per year.
Since Space Station and OTV research and development costs were_not included
in this analysis, the economic benefits of the OTV should be viewed with some
moderation. With a net operating benefit of $1.16 billion per year, however,
it can be seen that even a very substantial investment in development of an
OTV, OTV base, and ET tanker could be repaid in a relatively short period of
time. In private industry, an annual profit of $1.16 would represent a good
return on any investment of up to $7 billion, which is roughly commensurate
with the expected cost of developing a Space Station OTV capability. Space
Station costs will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this volume.
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Cost Factor
(per 10,000 Ib of pay load)
Upper stage cost
Upper stage delivery to LEO
Payload delivery to LEO ]
Operations/spares costs I OTV only
Propellant delivery to LEO J
Total
Mission Cost
OTV
$ 0.5M
$ 0.5M
$45. 4M
$ 3.0M
$13. 5M
$62. 9M
Competitor
Average*
$ 17.0M
$108. 5M
0
0
0
$125.5M
* PAM-D. PAM-D II. Leasat, PAM-A. Atlas/Centaur. Shuffle/Centaur. TOS. shuttle-based OTV
Economic benefit per OTV mission = S125.5M - $62.9M = $62.6M
Average number of OTV missions per year (1994-2000) = .75 X 23 = 17.3
OTV economic benefit per year = S62.6M x 17.3 = $1.08 billion
Figure 2-12. OTV Economic Benefits Analysis (1984
30033258-75
266.592-316
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Figure 2-13. Economic Benefits: Space-Based OTV
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2.3 SATELLITE SERVICING
2.3.1 OVERVIEW OF SATELLITE SERVICING BENEFITS. As described in Volume II of
this report, the Space Station will be utilized for the servicing of satel-
lites in two distinct ways. It will play a support role in the "in-situ"
servicing of satellites that can be repaired, refurbished, or upgraded at
their orbital locations, and a more prominent role in the complex servicing
tasks that require satellites to be brought to the Space Station for ser-
vicing. For both of these types of servicing activities, the Space Station
should provide substantial economic benefits.
One way to evaluate the economic benefits of satellite servicing would be to
compare the cost of performing Space Station servicing oprations with the cost
of satellite servicing by alternate means. This was the methodology used in
the OTV benefits analysis, where estimated OTV mission costs were contrasted
with the launch costs of various potential competitors, such as expendable
launch vehicles and Shuttle upper-stage boosters. This cost-based analytical
approach was more appropriate than a revenue or value-based method because the
value of the satellites launched, although easily exceeding the OTV launch
costs, would have given little insight into the competition-sensitive market
value of the OTV service.
In assessing the benefits of satellite servicing, however, the cost-comparison
approach has important shortcomings. Whereas there exist many alternatives
for launching satellites, thus providing a broad base for comparison in the
calculation of OTV launch cost benefits, the only competition in the satellite
servicing business would be the Space Shuttle. Moreover, the cost of satellite
servicing, by Shuttle or Space Station based means, is not as obviously domi-
nated by servicing value. Successful launch of a new satellite may promise
revenue far in excess of nearly any associated launch costs, but servicing of
an existing satellite can be economical only in certain special circum-
stances. The satellite must first be servicable; it cannot be too old,
obsolete, or inaccessible for effective servicing, and the value of the
serviced satellite's remaining operations must exceed the servicing and
subsequent operations costs.
As a result, the value of satellite servicing can best be estimated by a
value-based, rather than a cost-based technique. The cost of a servicing
mission is first compared with the expected value of the servicing operation,
based on the satellite's lifetime, value, and the portion of its lifetime and
value res?tpred by the servicing. This quantity is basecLon such factors as
the criticality of the situation requiring servicing and the expected life of
the satellite after servicing. Once these relationships are identified, a
cursory cost-based analysis can be performed to ensure that Shuttle-servicing
is not more cost-effective (than utilizing the Space Station) in meeting the
servicing objectives.
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2.3.1.1 Value-Based Estimating for Satellite Servicing Benefits. During the
Space Station era, three different types of servicing missions are likely to
be performed: scheduled maintenance, unscheduled maintenance, and unscheduled
upgrading. Nearly all servicing operations should fit within the first two
classifications where satellites are restored to their intended capabilities
at planned intervals after certain mission objectives have been met (scheduled
maintenance) or at random intervals after unplanned malfunctions (unscheduled
maintenance). Since it is difficult to predict when upgrading services will
be scheduled and performed, and since these activities may be very rare, an
economic analysis based on scheduled and unscheduled maintenance provides suf-
ficient data for the purposes of this study. An approximation of the economic
benefit of a satellite servicing mission is provided by the equation:
b = [m x (e/d) x (1 + u)] - c
The mission criticality factor, m, refers to that portion of the satellite's
capabilities that are being restored. Although this term is generally used in
reference to unplanned malfunctions of science and applications satellites'-,
its definition is broadened here to include scheduled and unscheduled mainte-
nance on all types of spacecraft. In the servicing benefits equation, a mis-
sion criticality factor of 0.3, for example, means that 30% of the satellites
total mission capabilities are restored by the servicing operation.
The life extension factor, e, represents the number of years of operations
added to the spacecraft's life by the servicing mission.
This number is then divided by the design life, d, to obtain a time-related
function of the value of the servicing operation. The design life is the
total number of years of operations over which the investment in the satellite
is considered repaid. The expected life of a certain satellite might actually
exceed its design life, but the design life function retains its usefulness as
a measure of the relative value of e, the number of spacecraft operating years
provided by the servicing mission.
As an example, a satellite of a certain given value, v,- and given a design
life of 10 years would provide v/10 units of value per year. If e were equal
to 4, then the value of the servicing mission would be e/d = (4/10)v, multi-
plied by the mission criticality factor m. If m remained 0.3, then the actual
value of servicing would be 0.3 x (4/10)v or 0.12 v.
The next terms in the benefits equation, 1 and u, are intended to provide an
approximation of this v function, the satellite value. The launch cost, 1,
plus the 'unit cost of the satellite, u, is used as a measure of the minimum
vaue of the satellite. Unit cost is the recurring (production) cost of
the satellite, plus that portion of nonrecurring (development) costs attribut-
able to that unit. In the example cited above, if the launch cost were $100
million and the unit cost were i>100 million, then the satellite lifetime value
v would be $200 million, and the economic benefit of the servicing mission
would be
b = [(0.3 x (4/10) x (fclOOM + SlOOM] - c
A.R., "A Study of Total Space Life Performance of GSFC Spacecraft,"
NASA Technical Note TN d-8017: Goddard Space Flight Center, July 1975.
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or $24 million minus c, the cost of the servicing mission. It is in the
reduction of this final variable, c, the cost of satellite servicing, that
the Space Station would have its economic value in satellite servicing.
2.3.1.2 Cost of Space Station Satellite Servicing. Satellite servicing from
a Space Station will have three basic cost elements, which can be classified
as capital, consumables, and labor. Capital costs include the cost of operat-
ing the "common" servicing equipment that is used repeatedly over the course
of many different servicing missions. The OTV and Tele-Operator Maneuvering
System (IMS) are the prime examples of common servicing equipment; capital
costs are those costs involved in producing and operating these systems. An
unmanned servicing module, which can be used in conjunction with the OTV
and/or IMS, is another key capital good.
Consumables are the supplies and parts that are devoted to single missions,
and must be completely replenished or replaced for subsequent servicing
tasks. Examples of consumables are propelIant for the OTV and IMS, and those
spare parts that are substituted for failed or worn parts in serviced satel-
lites such as avionics, batteries, RCS (reaction-control system) units, etc.
The major costs involved in the provision of consumables will be in their
transportation to the Space Station. These transportation costs should in
most cases exceed the costs of the supplies themselves, since, utilizng the
Space Shuttle for delivery to LEO, transportation costs in the $1200 to $2000
per pound range can be expected. Delivery of OTV and TMS propellant to the
Space Station should represent a large portion of these consumable costs.
Labor costs are the manpower costs for Space Station crewtime and ground sup-
port for servicing missions, and is of course a direct function of mission
duration and complexity. As will be the case with all Space Station missions,
the amount of on-orbit crew time will be minimized in favor of automation and
ground support, since on orbit manpower will, in all likelihood, cost a mini-
mum of two orders of magnitude more than ground support manpower.
The particular mix of capital, consumables, and labor costs associated with
any servicing mission will be influenced primarily by the proximity of the
serviced asset to the Space Station. For this reason above all others, as
many satellites as possible will be orbiting with the Space Station, at the
same inclination and at altitudes that will permit servicing at desired inter-
vals. For the servicing of satellites and/or free flyers in LEO or HEO, OTV
operations will not be required, sparing a major element of servicing costs.
The means of transportation to these_satellites will be the TMS, which can
make orbit plane changes of up to 8 degrees, and altitude changes of up to
600 miles, depending on mission parameters such as payload weight.
Servicing missions to orbits and inclinations beyond the range of the TMS,
however, will require the use of the OTV. Whenever possible, servicing tasks
will be performed in situ, because return of satellites to the Space Station
for servicing, and subsequent replacement in orbit, would require two round-
trip OTV missions, at considerable cost. For in-situ servicing, the OTV will
utilize an unmanned servicing module as will the TMS. For servicing missions
beyond the range of the TMS, OTV transportation costs will probably be the
greatest single satellite servicing cost factor.
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Table 2-14 summarizes the major components of satellite servicing mission
costs. It is assumed that a IMS supply module will be delivered to the Space
Station via Shuttle after every 20 TMS missions, just as an OTV supply module
will carry one refurbished OTV engine, plus RCS, avionics, and other spares
sufficient for 20 missions. These costs are detailed in Section 3, but are
presented below for reference. As these estimates are somewhat speculative,
for convenience they are summarized by assessing the total cost of a TMS
servicing mission at about $5 million and an OTV servicing mission at
million.
Table 2-14. TMS/OTV Mission Cost Summary
TMS OTV
Capital
Unit $160M/240 fits = $0.67M - $120M/240 fits = $0.50M
Transportation $6M/240 fits = $0.025M - $120M/240 fits = $0.50M
Consumables
Engine - $2M/20 fits = $0.05M • $0.10M
Avionics - $1M/20 fits = $0.05M $0.05M
RCS - $1M/20 fits = $0.05M $0.05M
Misc - UM/20 fits = $0.05M $0.05M
Transportation - $10M/20 Fits = $0.50M $0.50M
Propellant - 1500 Ib @ $500/lb = &0.75M - 12,000 Ib @ fc500/lb = $6.0 M
, MPE/S* $0.50M $0.50M
Labor
Ground - 2000 hr @ $100/hr. = $0.20M $0.20M
Space - 200 hr @ $104/hr = $2.0 M $2.0 M
Total $4.9 M $10.5 M
*MPE/S = Mission Peculiar Equipment and Structures
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It is important to note at this point that these servicing mission costs are
dramatically lower than the costs of TMS or OTV servicing from the Space
Shuttle. In the case of the TMS, Shuttle servicing would save about $3.25
million in transportation of consumables and labor on-board the Space Station,
but would add about $16.5 million in Shuttle-related mission costs. Use of
the Space Station as a TMS base hence saves $13.25 million per servicing mis-
sion as compared with using the Shuttle for TMS servicing. The Space Station
advantage in OTV servicing is even more obvious, since a Shuttle-OTV servicing
mission (if at all possible) would require a dedicated Shuttle flight and
hence cost in the neighborhood of $100 million. These relationships, which
are discussed in greater detail in Section 3, verify the applicability of a
value-based analytical method to the assessment of Space Station satellite
servicing benefits.
2.3.2 BENEFITS TO SATELLITE SERVICING USERS
2.3.2.1 Satellite Servicing Benefits to Commercial Users. Evaluating the
economic benefits of satellite servicing to commercial users is a particularly
difficult task. Commercial communications satellites would appear logical
candidates for servicing, due to their large numbers (an estimated 200 to 300
will be launched during the 1990s) and great revenue-producing capability ($50
to fclSO million annually per satellite, depending on number of transponders).
Upon closer examination, however, the issue becomes more clouded.
Commercial communications satellites are among the most reliable spacecraft
launched, so most will probably rarely need emergency servicing. Communica-
tions satellites are also less expensive to replace than most other satel-
lites, which reduces the attractiveness of servicing those that do break
down. The potential benefits of unscheduled and scheduled maintenance are
further diminished by the rapid rate of obsolescence of communications satel-
lites. Finally, the great distance of most communications satellites (in GEO)
from a low-orbit Space Station will raise the cost of servicing missions
considerably.
Commercial materials processing in space (CMPS) may benefit from satellite
servicing by the use of the TMS for product change-out on co-orbiting free-
flyers. Resupply modules containing finished products can be replaced on the
free-flyers with modules containing raw material to be processed, but since
Shuttle flights would be required for transport of the resupply modules
between Earth and the Space Station, it is difficult to envision significant
cost sayings by involving the Space Station and TMS in this process. One
potential benefit is in integration of raw materials with reusable resupply
modules at the Space Station, thereby reducing the Shuttle costs involved in
transport of raw material to LEO. Finished products would be extracted from
the resupply modules after harvesting by TMS, and returned to Earth via
Shuttle in the same .lightweight containers used for shipment of raw material
to LEO.
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Remote-sensing satellites could benefit from OTV or TMS servicing, but such
benefits are as difficult to predict as those for other commercial users. As
in materials processing, the nature of commercial involvement in the remote-
sensing field during the 1990s is a key uncertainty. It is therefore diffi-
cult to draw conclusions about satellite servicing requirements for commerical
Space Station and satellite users, and nearly impossible to quantify what
economic benefits, if any, would result from such activity.
2.3.2.2 Satellite Servicing Benefits to Science and Applications Users. The
science and applications user community provides a much better basis for he
evaluation of satellite servicing benefits than do commercial users. Science
and applications satellites and platforms generally are far more expensive and
difficult to replace than commercial satellites, and usually are more complex
and prone to malfunctions that make them candidates for servicing. Many will
also be designed for periodic maintenance, and will be within a serviceable
proximity to the Space Station and its servicing capabilities. Servicing of
science and applications satellites also lends itself well to the type of
value-based benefits analysis described earlier in this section. They are not
revenue-producing assets per se, but their value can be taken as a direct
function of their cost. By combining historical data on satellite cost and
performance with projection of future (Space Station era) satellite charac-
teristics, we can examine the equation
b = [m x (e/d) x (1+u)] - c
and develop first-order estimates of satellite servicing benefits.
Substantial data exist on mission criticality factors of malfunctions among
science and applications satellites. A study of 57 NASA satellites by Goddard
Spaceflight Center2 provides a breakdown of malfunctions according to
frequency and severity. Of 513 malfunctions recorded over a three-year
period, 85% were considered minor, with less than a 10% loss of spacecraft
capability. For such minor malfunctions (m < 0.10), satellite servicing would
usually not be economical.
As an initial ground rule, then, it is assumed that satellite servicing will
be considered only for those satellites with malfunctions causing greater than
a 10% loss in mission capability (0.10 < m < 1). Of the satellites studied by
GSFC, the typical satellite experienced a malfunction in this severity range
once every two years. The expected mission criticality of these losses was
0^ 44. Although this study is spmewhat_dated,^experience with more modern
satellites has supported these early findings.-* Reasons for this are not
fully understood, but apparently advances in subsystem reliability have been
offset by increases in spacecraft complexity.
Assuming this trend continues into the 1990s, we can make two important con-
clusions regarding the satellite servicing benefits equation. First, the mis-
sion criticality factor can be assigned a nominal value of 0.44, for those
malfunctions that require servicing.
2See footnote 1.
^Shockey, Edward F, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, personal communica-
tion, 2 February 1983.
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Second, the mean time between servicing missions for any science and applica-
tions satellite can be estimated at two years, meaning the value e in the
benefits equation equals 2. A typical servicing mission, then, would be
expected to restore 44% of a satellite's full capability, for a period of two
years.
The satellite design life, d, is more difficult to project from the Goddard
data. Most satellites of that era (1960-1975) were designed for very short
lives - often one to two years or less. Science and applications satel-
lites today, however, are typically designed for longer lives, often in the
three-to seven-year range. The highly specialized scientific experiments
planned for operations in the 1990s have an average expected life of about
five years. The less advanced applications satellites of the Space Station
era may have even longer design lives; five to ten years might be considered
average for a weather or remote-sensing satellite. Based on these data, a
typical design life for Space Station-serviceable satellites can be estimated
roughly at about seven years.
Launch and unit costs of satellites, the next two elements of the benefits
equation, are similarly difficult to predict. Launch costs for relatively
small applications satellites can be as low as $20 to $30 million, but the
large scientific instruments planned for Shuttle launch over the next two
decades could cost as much as $100 million to deploy. An example of the
latter class of payload is the Large Deployable Reflector, which weighs 25,000
kg and will consume an entire Shuttle flight. Based on the information avail-
able, an average launch cost of $40 million would be a reasonable expectation
for the 1990s time-frame. A rough projection of average stellite unit cost
(development plus production) for the same time period would be about $100
million. The typical applications satellite might cost in the $40 to $60
million range, while the average advanced experiement might carry a $140 to
$160 million price tag.
Integrating the data into the satellite servicing benefits equation yields the
expression:
b = [0.44 x (2/7) x ($40+100M)] - C
= $17.6 million - c.
The average value of a servicing mission during the Space Station era,
according to this calculation, is $17.6 million, minus the cost of the
servicing mission. Using the satellite servicing mission costs presented
earlier ( and described more thoroughly in the following chapter), we arrive
at a net economic benefit of:
$17.6 million-$5 million = $12.6 million
for a TMS mission, and
$17.6 million-$ll million = $6.6 million
for an OTV mission.
^Shockey, Edward F., "A Study of the Longevity and Operational Reliability
of Goddard Spacecraft - 1960-1980," NASA Techncial Memorandum TM-82178:
Goddard Space Flight Center, August 1981.
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As evident from the cost data presented in Table 2-7, the key difference
between IMS and OTV servicing costs is the cost of propellants. It is assumed
that both TMS and OTV propellants will be recovered from the Shuttle or
delivered to LEO by dedicated tanker, at a cost per pound of $500. The TMS,
however, requires an average of only 1500 pounds of propellant, based on an
average servicing payload of 5700 pounds and servicing altitude of 300 miles,
while the OTV uses 12,000 pounds of propellants for its typical geosynchronous
servicing mission. Since the vast majority of science and applications pay-
loads will be serviced by the TMS, however, the OTV servicing costs are less
significant. Based on our estimate (*see Section 2.3.3) that 90% of servicing
missions will be performed by the TMS, and 10% by OTV, then the average bene-
fit of a servicing mission is projected to be:
0.9 x $12.6 million +0.1 x $6.6 million = $12.0 million.
2.3.3 SATELLITE SERVICING BENEFITS ANALYSIS. Assessing the potential
economic benefits of satellite servicing is complicated by uncertainty over
the number of servicing missions that will be performed. For the space-based
OTV function, considerable data are available regarding satellite launch
requirements, which provide a sound basis for development of an OTV mission
model. The satellite servicing function, however, represents a new use of
space, rather than an improved method of performing current space activities,
so its level of use is more difficult to estimate.
The mission models developed for this study reflect more about what is not
known about satellite servicing requirements than what is actually known.
Since we do not yet know which of the proposed satellites and experiments will
ultimately be operational by the 1990s, nor how frequently they will require
servicing, it is difficult to accurately predict servicing requirements. We
expect relatively few OTV servicing missions, due to the factors discussed
earlier in this section, and hence a fairly high reliance on the TMS for
servicing.
Our mission requirements data suggest an average of seven planned servicing
missions per year during the 1990s, including an average of one OTV servicing
mission and six TMS missions annually. Our mission requirements data are not
particularly helpful in predicting unplanned servicing requirements, since
payload planners are reluctant to plan for malfunctions. Of the 57 satellites
studied by NASA for operational reliability (see Section 2.3.2), malfunctions
of significant mission criticality (m > 0.10) occurred an average of 26 times
per year.^ This would represent a high satellite servicing rate for
unplanned Space Station era servicing missions, since the tendency through the
1990s will probably be to rely on small numbers of large and complex satel-
lites rather than large numbers of small ones. Half the GSFC total, or about
13 missions per year, is our conservative baseline estimate of 1990s unplanned
servicing requirements, including 12 TMS missions and 1 OTV mission per year.
This is roughly consistent with repair and servicing data from Skylab mis-
sions, which show unplanned servicing tasks to be about twice as frequent as
planned maintenance.
footnote 1.
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Total satellite servicing requirements come to an average of 20 missions per
year, including 18 with the TMS and 2 via OTV. By setting a high mission
model case at 30 servicing missions per year and a low estimate at 10 per
year, and assigning high and low values to the other satellite servicing
variables, we can set up a table of key assumptions to be used in the satel-
lite servicing benenfits analysis (see Table 2-15).
Table 2-15. Satellite Servicing Benefits Analysis: Key Assumptions (1984 $)
Variable
Mission Criticality Factor
Life Extension Factor
Design Life
Launch Cost
Unit Cost
Cost of Servicing Mission
Number of Servicing Miss ions /Yr
Low
Value
0.2
1
3
$25M
$50M
$3M
10
High
Value
0.6
4
10
$75M
$150M
$10M
30
Assumed Variable
Value Code
0.44
2
7
$40M
$100M
$5.6M
20
m
e
d
1
u
c
n
When modified to calculate annual economic benefits as a function of these
variables, the satellite servicing benefit equation becomes
B = n x [(m x e/d x (1+u)) - c]
where B is the annual economic benefit of satellite servicing. With all vari-
ables set at their baseline values, the expected annual value of satellite
servicing becomes:
B = 20 X [(0.44 x 2/7 x ($40 M + $100M)) - $5.6M]
= 20 x $12M = $240 million
It can be seen that the $12 million benefit per mission in this equation
corresponds with the average benefit per mission derived earlier in
Section 2.3.2. T^ is worked put because the assumed average cost of a
servicing mission, $5.6 million, is based on the same breakdown between TMS
and OTV missions (i.e., 90% and 10%, respectively) used previously.
2.3.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis. The sensitivities of satellite servicing
benefits to the variables in Table 2-15 are illustrated in Figure 2-14 and
2-15. Economic benefits are most sensitive to the effectiveness of the
servicing missions in enhancing the satellite's capabilities (mission
criticality factor, Figure 2-14a) and life extension factor (Figure 2-14b),
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and to the design life of the satellite (Figure 2-l4c). Benefits are not
quite as sensitive to, but are still strongly influenced by the unit cost of
the serviced satellite (Figure 2-15b) and the number of servicing missions
performed (Figure 2-15d), and are moderately sensitive to the satellite's
initial launch cost (Figure 2-15a) and the average cost of the servicing
missions (Figure 2-15c). These sensitivities are summarized in Table 2-16.
2.3.3.2 Summary of Satellite Servicing Economic Benefits. The potential
economic benefits of satellite servicing are not as great as the potential
value of providing launch services via space-based OTV, but are nonetheless
significant. These benefits are summarized in Figure 2-16. A nominal
servicing benefit of $240 million per year represents about 15% of the total
expected economic value of the Space Station, and these benefits could
increase substantially if satellites are designed to maximize the advantages
of Space Station servicing capabilites. Potential benefits of reduced
spacecraft design costs due to the availability of servicing have also been
omitted from this analysis, since they are very difficult to predict.
Annual
Benefit
(SM)
500
400
300
200
100
0
Annual
Benefit
<$M)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Mission Criticality Factor
500
400
300
200
10
0
500
400
300
200
100
0
b.
i i
" 0 2 4 6 8 1 0
Life Extension Factor (yr)
Annual
Benefit
(SM)
2 4 6 8 10
Design Life (yr)
21033258-42
266.592-318
Figure 2-14. Satellite Servicing Sensitivity Analysis: Mission Criticality
and Satellite Lifetime Factors (1984 $)
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Figure 2-15. Satellite Servicing Sensitivity Analysis:
Mission Model Factors (1984 $)
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Table 2-16. Space Station Economics Benefits:
Sensitivity Analysis (1984 $)
Satellite Servicing
VARIABLE
MISSION CRITICALITY FACTOR
LIFE EXTENSION FACTOR
DESIGN LIFE
LAUNCH COST
UNIT COST
COST OF SERVICING MISSION
NUMBER OF SERVICING MISSIONS/YR
LOW
VALUE
0.2
1
3
S25M
$50M
$ 3M
10
HIGH
VALUE
0.6
4
10
$ 75M
S150M
$ 10M
30
EXPECTED
VALUE
0.44
2
7
$ 40M
$100M
S5-6M
20
WORST-
CASE
BENEFIT
'$ 48M
$ 64M
S134M
$202M
S114M
S152M
$120M
BEST-
CASE
BENEFIT
S368M
S592M
S709M
S328M
S366M
S292M
$360M
SENSITIVITY
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
MODERATE
HIGH
MODERATE
HIGH
266.592-320
These satellite servicing benefits appear highly sensitive to many of the
variables used in this analysis, and hence should be regarded as preliminary.
Owing to these sensitivities, the unpredictability of these variables, and the
difficulty in quantifying the economic benefits of servicing, further study is
required to determined whether Space Station satellite servicing can be eco-
nomically viable. A worst-case analysis with all variables set at their
worst-cost levels results in a net loss in satellite servicing of $8.5 million
per servicing mission.
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Average satellite servicing cost/value (per mission)*
S18.2M I — Cost of servicing from
space shuttle
S17.6M I — Value of satellite servicing
S4.9M | — Cost of servicing from space station
*Using IMS & unmanned servicing module
Annual
benefit
SSOOM
S400M
S300M
S200M
S100M
Satellite servicing annual benefit
10 20 30
Satellite servicing missions per year
Space Station Satellite Servicing
• Satellite servicing from space station expected to
cost 75% less than servicing from space shuttle
• Results of satellite servicing (per mission, average)
— From shuttle: $600,000 loss
— From space station: $12 million benefit
• Expected annual benefit: $240 million
• Significant parameters
— Satellite capabilities restored by servicing
— Value of satellite
— Satellite servicing mission model
21033258-21
266.592-321
Figure 2-16. Economic Benefits: Satellite Servicing
Conversely, satellite servicing could turn out to be far more profitable
than indicated in this analysis. Of particular concern is the average
satellite unit value, which for the purposes of this study was estimated at
$100 million. Since the current trend seems to be toward development of
extremely large and sophisticated experimental facilities, such as the
billion-dollar space telescope, the typical Space Station era asset might in
fact have a much higher value. This would greatly enhance the cost effec-
tiveness of servicing both from the Shuttle and the Space Station.
With potential economic benefits in the hundreds of millions of dollars
annually, plus other benefits that are difficult to quantify in economic
terms, satellite servicing shows promise as a valuable Space Station
function. Determination of whether this function will be justifiable, and
whether this justification will be basedon an economic or noneconomic basis,
requires further study.
2.4 RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION
2.4.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION BENEFITS. One of the great para-
doxes of Space Station economics is that the Space Station function that is
perceived to hold the greatest promise for long-term economic benefits is also
the most difficult to fit into an economic model. This is the role of the
Space Station in research and production, those activities that are carried
out by the Space Station crew on board the facility.
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The Space Station functions discussed in the two previous sections, OTV launch
operations and satellite servicing, both involve the transportation and opera
tion of existing or planned space assets. These assets, such as communica-
tions satellites and space-based observatories, have quantifiable economic
values, based on either their revenue potential or cost. As a transportation
and servicing nodal point, the Space Station has a clear role in enhancing the
ability of these assets to achieve their mission objectives, through improve-
ment of performance and/or reduction of costs, and many of these benefits are
quantifiable.
The research and production function, however, is more difficult to evaluate.
As a research facility, the Space Station will almost certainly yield economic
benefits through the enhancement of our understanding of how the space envi-
ronment affects both living systems and the man-made systems that we as humans
can operate in space. As a production facility, the Space Station will ulti-
mately lead to the establishment of factories and construction facilities in
space, whose products will provide economic and social benefits for many
people. Taken together, these research and production activities represent
the true beginnings of space industrialization. Modeling the economic bene-
fits of space industrialization today, however, is analogous to having asked
King George II of England in 1776 to predict the future $2 trillion GNP of his
rebellious American colonies.
Research and production in space will provide economic benefits long before
the establishment of multibillion dollar space factories, but it is important
to keep in mind that this Space Station function may have a much longer eco-
nomic payback horizon (see Section 3) than the other Space Station functions.
The near-term economic benefits of research and production will most likely be
in the form of cost savings for science and applications users who would
otherwise depend on Space Shuttle accommodations, and for commercial users who
would use the Space Station as a "test bed" for development of new products
and services.
The nature of Space Station research and production benefits raises a key
issue in Space Station planning. For a variety of reasons, general thinking
has been that the research and production function would dominate early Space
station activities. The most direct explanation for this is that in a
budget-constrained evolutionary Space Station program scenario, the research
and production capability requires the least development time, and at a lower
cost than the other Space Station functions. Despite their near-term economic
potential, OTV operations and^satellite servicing have traditionally been
viewed as later, lower-priority Space Station developments due to their tech-
nological complexity and expense.
As long as Space Station planning criteria have focused on achievability and
cost, this viewpoint has endured. But with the recent emphasis on commercial
involvement and economic return, Space Station supply and demand expectations
have diverged. The near-term economic advantages of the OTV and satellite
servicing are now very much in demand, because they relate well to the cur-
rent, payback-oriented Space Station program orientation. But the supply side
budget constraints remain, so the research and production function remains
attractive as an initial Space Station capability. For these reasons, it is
important to at least attempt an evaluation of near-term research and
production benefits.
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2.4.2 RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION BENEFITS TO COMMERICAL USERS. As evident from
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, the commercial user group most likely to benefit from
the Space Station is the communications satellite industry. Since space
communications is now the only mature commercial industry in space, this is
not an unexpected conclusion. The communications industry should benefit
economically from the research and production function, as well as the OTV and
satellite servicing activities.
One immediate potential benefit to the communications industry is in the use
of the Space Station for testing and checkout of satellites prior to transfer
to geosynchronous orbit. This capability is present to some degree with the
Space Shuttle, but certainly not to the extent possible on a manned Space
Station. A. much wider variety of test equipment could be made available on
the Space Station, and crew members would have greater access to, and more
time to inspect the payload. Most important, the satellite could be repaired
on board the Space Station, rather than having to be returned to Earth. In
addition to the launch cost savings of having LEO repair capability, two less
obvious economic benefits could accrue from this LEO checkout capability.
The first of these is insurance. Communications satellites are typically
insured against revenue loss from operating failure, at a rate of 1 to 2% of
stated value per year. For a 24-channel satellite that rents for $6 to 8
million per month, the insurance premium could be as high as $120 to $160
thousand per month, or $1.4 to $1.9 million per year. Predeployment checkout
in LEO could diminish the risk of spacecraft failure, and hence result in
lower insurance premiums. A reduction in premium rates of only 10% would
result in a savings of up to $140,000 to $190,000 per satellite per year in
insurance costs, with potentially greater benefits for larger satellites.
A second potential economic benefit of LEO checkout is reduction in spacecraft
redundancy. About 8 to 10% of communications satellite nonfuel and nonstruc-
tural weight is for redundant systems, which add about $3 million to satellite
cost.^ If the availability of satellite checkout at the Space Station could
significantly reduce the amount of redundancy required on communications
spacecraft, a potential .savings in the hundreds of thousands of dollars per
unit could be realized.
The research and production function of the Space Station will also provide
economic benefits to commercial communications users through technology
development activities. These will lead to the development of such systems as
Jjrge jleployable antennas and laser cpmmunications, with immediate applica-
tions in areas such as Land Mobile Satellite Service, Direct Broadcast
Satellites, and RFI measurements. On the longer term horizon, a Space Station
could play a key role in the development of large communications platforms,
whose potential applications include futuristic communications devices such as
wristwatch telephones. The potential economic benefits of these developments
are impossible to calculate, but could easily be in the billions of dollars.
Spacecom, "Space Station Study-Needs, Attributes and Architectural
Options: Commercial Communications Satellies," Final Subcontract Report to
General Dynamics, February 1983.
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A wristwatch telephone concept cited by The Aerospace Corp. nearly a decade
ago, for example, would serve 25 million users. Based on a user charge of $50
per month, this represents a total market potential of 25 million x 12 x $50 =
$15 billion per year. The cost of such a program was estimated at about $4.3
billion (1984$).'
A second commercial benefit from the Space Station research and production
function will be in the emerging field of materials processing in space
(MPS). Commerical interest in MPS to date has been limited by lack of long-
term access to the space environment and excessive space transportation costs,
but the Space Shuttle is expected to provide an interim solution to both of
these problems. The long-term growth of commerical MPS, however, can be
accomplished only by the establishment of permanent space facilities such as
the Space Station and free-flying platforms.
Up until now, the total time of MPS experimentation performed in space by the
U.S. numbers fewer than 100 hours. Consequently, MPS remains an infant
science, and no commerically viable space processes have been positively
identified. It is known that zero gravity has potential benefits in the
production of biological materials, crystals, alloys, and ceramics, but our
experience with such phenomena is limited. The Space Shuttle, particularly in
its Spacelab mission role, will provide a much needed opportunity to carry out
the basic research necessary for the identification of commercial opportuni-
ties in MPS.
Owing to limitations on Shuttle performance, however, particularly with regard
to power availability and mission duration, the maturation of MPS as a science
and an industry may ultimately depend on Space Station research and production
capabilities. Pharmaceutical materials appear to be the most likely candi-
dates for near-term commercial space processing, with a McDonnell-Douglas/
Johnson & Johnson joint-endeavor with NASA aiming at commercial production by
the late 1980s. It is important to note that all participants in this
project consider the establishment of free-flyers to be a prerequisite for the
commercial success of the venture. If this program is successful, deployment
of commercial MPS free-flying platforms may actually precede establishment of
the Space Station.
When the Space Station becomes available, servicing and maintenance of such
MPS free-flyers may be accomplished more efficiently and cheaply than with the
Shuttle. The basis for these improvements was discussed in the section of
this ^ report dealing with satellite servicing benefits. As^pointed out in that
section, however, the Space Station may not offer much benefit in the trans-
port of materials between Earth and the free-flyers. Since Shuttle flights
The Aerospace Corporation, "Study of the Commonality of Space Vehicle
Applications to Future National Needs," NASA Contract NASW-2727,
24 March 1975.
"Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company for a Joint-Endeavor in Materials
Processing in Space, January 1980.
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will be required for delivery of raw materials to LEO and return of finished
products to Earth, it may be more practical to perform this operation
directly, without involvement of the Space Station. One exception (as dis-
cussed previously) would be if Shuttle costs could be reduced by transporting
the materials in small lightweight containers, which can be replaced with the
production cannisters at the Space Station.
The greatest performance benefit of the Space Shuttle for MPS will be in those
processes requiring or benefiting from manned interaction. This will almost
certainly represent a benefit in the precotnmercial development phase of MPS
activities, where man's role in observing and modifying new processes will be
valuable. For commercial processes, however, automation may serve effectively
in many cases. These trade-offs between manned interaction and automation are
difficult to perform now, since we do not yet know which processes will be
shown to be commercially viable. Hence, we will be in a much better position
to assess the economic benefits of a Space Station for commercial MPS in a few
years, when we are closer to understanding which MPS activities have
commercial potential.
Aside from communications and materials processing, the Space Station research
and production function may ultimately benefit commercial applications of
technology development activities in such areas as energy conversion and
transmission. These technologies are so far from commercialization, however,
that it is too early to evaluate the economic benefits of the Space Station in
such endeavors. Other commercial pportunities in such areas as acquisition
and processing of nonterrestrial materials may also evolve from Space Station
research and production, but these activities are beyond the scope of this
study. In planning a Space Station for the 1990s, however, these possibili-
ties should be considered, to maximize Space Station utilization options for
the post-2000 time period.
2.4.3 RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION BENEFITS TO SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS USERS.
Although the commercial benefits of Space Station research and production are
difficult to evaluate, the science and applications activities that will
precede commercial production do promise some quantifiable benefits. In
materials processing, for example, even though no commercial processes have
yet been identified, we can be reasonably certain that precommercial research
will benefit from Space Station improvements in manned interaction, power
availability, and mission duration.
Our approach to evaluate Space Station benefits in MPS was to derive a special
function that describes certain mission capabilities and their related costs.
One interesting approach is to calculate the "cost per kilogram-hour" of Space
Station MPS accommodations. The cost/kg-hr would equal:
Total Cost 1
Number of hours Number of kg
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for the various mission alternatives for MPS. By using the maximum number of
hours and kilograms of weight capability available with any given system, we
can determine the minimum cost/kg-hr for these alternatives. The cost/kg-hr
provides a means of assessing the costs of space processing based on two of
the most critical attributes required for MPS: weight capability in orbit and
mission duration.
Table 2-17 shows the costs, mission duration, and payload capabilities of
various systems, ranging from the SPAR Rocket to a two-year Space Station
processing capability. Cost/kg-hr declines dramatically as mission capabili-
ties improve, even though in the Space Station cases general housekeeping
costs have been added to transportation costs. These housekeeping costs have
been estimated at $100,000 per day; this corresponds to one man-day of support
for a processing facility at $10,00/hr, or $80,000/day, plus a 25% contingency
charge.
Table 2-17. Cost/kg-hr for MPS (1984 $)
Mission
Capability
SPAR Rocket
KC-135 Aircraft
Space
Space
Space
Shuttle
Station
Station
(90-day)
(2-year)
Hours
0.083
0.014
168
2,160
17,520
kg
454
7,600
19,500
14,125
14,125
Trans-
portation
(*M)
500,000
6,000
83.3
53.1
127.4
Cost
House-
keeping
(*M)
N/A
N/A
N/A
9
73
Total
UM)
500,000
6,000
83.3
62.1
200.4
Cost
kg-hr
(*>
13,270
56.80
16.80
2.04
.81
In the final case (Space Station two-year mission), periodic resupply missions
are included in the transportation costs. Every 90 days, new raw materials
are delivered to the Space Station via Shuttle for processing, and finished
products are brought back to Earth on the return flight. As an initial
estimate, each resupply mission is calculated to require delivery of 20% of
the total MPS system weight to LEO. These additional transportation costs,
however, are outweighed by the benefits of mission continuity over a two-year
period. For two-year missions, the Space Station, at 81^ per kilogram-hour,
is over 20 times as cost effective as the Space Shuttle.
These economic benefits will certainly enhance commercial MPS opportunities,
but since no commercially viable processes have been positively identified,
the reduction in cost/kg-hr is presently accounted for as a benefit to science
and applications users. Once commercial products with known values can be
identified, the cost/kg-hr will have greater value as a measure of commercial
MPS benefits.
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The cost/kg-hr can also be used to quantify benefits to other science and
applications users. Consider, for example, the Upper Atmosphere Research
Payload, which can fly either in the Shuttle cargo bay or on a Space Station
pallet. With a Shuttle charge factor of 0.11 (based on its 2-meter length),
the 2500-pound payload would cost about $12 million to fly in the Shuttle,
with a cost/kg-hr of $28.81. As illustrated in Table 2-18, the Space Station
reduces this to $3.07/kg-hr for a 90-day mission, and $l.ll/kg-hr for a two
year mission, despite the very conservative assumption of i>50,000/day in Space
Station housekeeping costs for this payload.
Table 2-18. Cost/kg-hr for Upper Atmosphere Research (1984 $)
Mission
Capability
Space Shuttle
Space Station (90-day)
Space Station (2-year)
Hours
168
2,160
17,520
.kg
25,500
25,500
25,500
Trans-
portation
<*M)
12.1
12.1
12.1
Cost
House-
keeping
<$M>
N/A
4.5
36.5
Total(too
12. 1M
16. 6M
48. 6M
Cost/
kg-hr
(t)
23.81
3.07
1.11
A more general way to assess Space Station research and production benefits in
science and applications is to use the known costs of Spacelab as a basis for
comparison. Table 2-19 shows the costs of a one-week Spacelab mission and
compares them with estimates of the costs of using for one week a Spacelab-
type module permanently docked to a Space Station. The key assumption in this
analysis is that Space Shuttle transportation costs are reduced by permanently
basing the Spacelab at the Space Station. Instead of launching the entire
Spacelab module, only experiment racks are brought to LEO, in specially
designed cargo bay structures or containers. These racks are then integrated
with the Spacelab module in space. This would be more complex than payload
integration on the ground and is accounted for in the 50% higher "Optional
Services" cost for Space Station utilization. Transportation costs, however,
are much lower; in this case it is assumed that only one-third of the
Shuttle1s capacity^ is_ required for delivery of the experiment racks to LEO.
When contrasted with the requirement for a dedicated Shuttle flight (for
Shuttle-Spacelab missions), this represents a cost saving of t>46.6 million in
space transportation charges. The net result is a 37%, $37 million benefit
per one-week Spacelab mission.
It should be noted that the Space Station's capability for long duration
missions is not reflected in this benefit. Even though the Space Station is
cost effective for one-week missions, its most dramatic advantage is in
performing, without resupply, missions that would require multiple Spacelab
missions. This is the basis for the Space Station's order of magnitude
improvement over the Space Shuttle in cost per kilogram-hour.
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Table 2-19. Spacelab Accommodation Cost Comparison (1984 $)
P/L
Transportation Integration Housekeeping Total
Space Shuttle
Space Station
83.3
36.7
16.7
25.0
N/A
1.4
100
63.1
Table 2-20 returns to the cost/kg-hr analysis in showing the large economic
benefit of using the Space Station for 90-day science and applications
missions. The only increase in cost over the one-week Space Station mission
is in Housekeeping; this cost is assumed to be $200,000/day for two dedicated
crew members. When used for one-week missions, the Space Station cost/kg-hr
is 37% less expensive than the Shuttle-Spacelab, corresponding to the benefit
shown in Table 2-20. When used for 90 days, however, this cost reduction
increases to 94%, since at least 12 Shuttle flights would be required to
achieve this mission duration. This represents a theoretical benefit of over
fcl billion for one 90-day mission, but since the Shuttle would never be used
in this manner, the previous analyses are more realistic indications of Space
Station benefits.
Table 2-20. Cost/kg-hr for Spacelab-Equivalent Missions (1984 $)
Mission
Capability Cost
Transpor- Optional House- Cost
Hours kg tation Services keeping Total kg-hr
(tlO ($M) (toO (toO (t)
Space
Space
Space
Shuttle
Station -
Station -
1 week
90 days
168
168
2160
29,500
29,500
29,500
83.
36.
36.
3
7
7
16.
25.
25.
7
0
0
N/A
1.41
19.0
100
63.1
79.7
20.18
12.73
1.25
2.4.4 RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION BENEFITS ANALYSIS. Analysis of the economic
benefits of Space Station research and production must proceed with the under-
standing that this is the Space Station function whose economic value is most
difficult to quantify. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical economic value
of research and production could exceed $1 billion per year by the 1990s, but
the ultimate value of these activities is not likely to be reflected in mate-
rial benefits until after the turn of the century. Until these long-term
benefits are accrued, the research and production function should be recog-
nized as that aspect of Space Station activity most devoted to the less
tangible benefit of space development: advancement of knowledge.
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The billion-dollar economic benefit figure, however, is arrived at rather
simply. In order to perform 90 days worth of scientific research and develop-
ment in space with the STS/Spacelab configuration, about 13 Shuttle flights
would be required, based on the Shuttle's one-week limitation on orbital
duration. At $100 million per Spacelab mission, the cost of this activity
would be approximately $1.3 billion. The cost of 90 days of research on the
Space Station, however, is estimated at about $80 million, a cost advantage of
$1.2 billion over using the Shuttle/Spacelab.
As already point out, this analysis lacks realism in that the Shuttle and
Spacelab would never be used 13 times a year, much less within a 90-day
period. The Spacelab was originally envisioned for use 10 times per year, but
a more realistic projection of Spacelab utilization is about half this total.
This presents a more moderate view of Space Station research and production
benefits, as illustrated in Table 2-21. Based on the costs developed earlier
for one week-equivalent Spacelab missions, the annual benefit of the Space
Station over Spacelab is about $185 million.
This represents a conservative approximation of the Space Station economic
advantage over Spacelab, since the $315 million Space Station cost estimate
includes five separate Shuttle missions to the Space Station for experiment
changes and resupply. If the experiments for five Spacelab-equivalent mis-
sions could be delivered to the Space Station laboratories on a single Shuttle
mission, the total cost of performing the missions could decline by up to $200
million, resulting in a net benefit of $185 million + $200 million = $385
million. This additional benefit is arrived at in the following manner:
Cost of five partial Shuttle missions for Space Station experiment resupply:
5 x $36.7 million = $183.5 million (transportation)
+ 5 x $25.0 million = $125.0 million (payload integration)
$308.5 million
Table 2-21. Research and Production Annual Benefits
Mission Cost ($M) Misson Rate Annual Cost ($M)
Space Shuttle/Spacelab
Space Station
100
63.1
5/yr
5/yr
500
315
Cost of one dedicated Shuttle mission for Space Station experiment resupply:
1 x $83.3 million = $83.3 million (transportation)
+ 1 x $25.0 million = $25.0 million (payload integration)
= $108.3 million
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Additional benefit of Space Station based on lower resupply requirement:
$308.5 million
- 108.3 million
= $200.3 million
The actual benefit would probably fall somewhere between $185 million and $385
million, since the number of Shuttle resupply missions required for Space
Station resupply (in support of five Spacelab-equivalent missions) would
probably be greater than one and fewer than five. A median baseline estimate
of Space Station economic benefits in improvement in Spacelab efficiency is
then:
($385 million + $185 million)/2 = $285 million
2.4.5 RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ECONOMICS BENEFITS SUMMARY. The benefits for
this area of analysis are summarized in Figure 2-17.
Cost per kilogram-hour for materials processing
in space
$13,270
_> — SPAR
rocket
L $57 — KC-135 aircraft
| $17 | _ Space shuttle
$2 — Space station (90-day production cycle)
Annual space station benefit over shuttle/spacelab
benefit r
$1B
S800M
$600M
$400M
$200M
High
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
Spacelab-equivalent (1-week) missions per year
Space station research & production
Research & production has great long-term potential,
but near-term economic benefits are difficult
to quantify
Greatest economic benefits in
— Materials processing in space
— Life sciences
— Astrophysics
Expected'annual benefit
— 1990-2000: $285 million
— 2000- : unlimited
Evolution to permanent industrial base in space,
utilizing nonterrestrial sources for raw materials
21033258-22
266.592-322
Figure 2-17. Economic Benefits: Research and Production
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2.4.6 A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS. While a baseline economic
benefit of $285 million is reasonable estimate of the Space Station's cost
advantage over other means of performing similar research and production
activities (i.e; Spacelab), it should be viewed only as that part of the
near-term economic benefit that is quantifiable. In both the near and long
term, the Space Station should have two classes of research and production
benefits whose economic impact are impossible to quantify at the present. One
type of benefit will be improvements in the cost effectiveness of performing
scientific research and technology development in space, which are not
accounted for in the Spacelab mission-equivalent cost comparison. These will
result primarily from the ability of the Space Station to support scientific
missions of greater duration and complexity than could be accomplished without
a Space Station. Although economic returns are likely to accrue from these
advantages, such advancements are more accurately characterized as performance
benefits, and are not appropriate for detailed analysis in this economic
volume. The other type of economic benefit that cannot yet be assigned a
dollar value is related to the role of the Space Station in creating new goods
and services. The two disciplines that should contribute most heavily to the
development of new space processes and products are life sciences and mate-
rials processing in space. By providing an opportunity to study the long-term
effects of the space environment on living systems and physical processes,
with a high degree of manned interaction, the Space Station may lead to the
discovery of many ways in which living and working in space can materially
benefit mankind.
In the area of life sciences, many of the benefits will be related to the
enhancement of human performance in space, but applications in the advancement
of earth medicine appear possible. By observing the effects of zero-gravity
on the human skeletal, vestibular, and cardiovascular systems, we may find
ways to improve our treatment of people of earth who have medical problems
related to these areas. Any significant improvements in the field of medicine
are likely to have considerable economic benefits.
In materials processing in space, the potential exists for the creation of
high-value products in space that cannot be produced under Earth-normal
gravity conditions. As discussed earlier in this section, MPS appears to have
its greatest potential in the production of biological and electronics mate-
rials, although other applications have promise as well. The market for
space-processed pharmaceuticals has been estimated at up to $6 billion
annually by the early 1990s. Such products could provide social and economic
benefits in the treatment of kidney disease, dwarfism, diabetes, and many
other ailments.
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Although the current emphasis appears to be on near-term economic benefits in
areas such as life sciences and MPS, the ultimate economic value of space
research and production will not be realized until well beyond the 1990s.
There is literally not a single long-term use of space that could not benefit
in some manner from the existence of a Space Station in low earth-orbit, and
the potential economic value of these longer-term developments is unlimited.
The Space Station could play a pivotal role in the development of a vast space
manufacturing system utilizing lunar and asteroidal resources and producing
such outputs as solar power satellites and permanent space settlements. A
space manufacturing system spanning the Earth-moon system and making use of
unique space resources (Figure 2-18) could be established in as few as 15
years, and might be financed largely from revenue generated by the Space
Station during the 1990s.
Establishment of a space manufacturing system may be beyond the scope of this
study, but a 1990s Space Station should be designed with such future develop-
ments taken into consideration. The economic value of a Space Station must
also be taken to include these types of activities, although their dollar
value is difficult to predict. The Space Station, like the Space Shuttle,
should be viewed not as an end in itself, but as a means to opening up the
frontier of space for uses that have significant social and economic benefits
for mankind.
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SECTION 3
PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES
This section documents the analysis conducted to determine the cost of the
Space Station program options investigated. An overview of this task is shown
in Figure 3-1. The subsequent discussion includes the general methodology,
development, production, and operations cost estimates and annual program
funding requirements.
Objective: Provide relative Space
Station program ROM costs for the
architecture & evolutionary scenario
options identified for comparisons &
determine implications
Economic benefits, cost &
programmatic analysis
(Task 3.3)
Economic benefits
LCC & programmatic
comparisons
• Programmatics/business
opportunity assessment
Approach: Generate alternate pro-
gram costs with a parametric cost
model (element level) & a phased
funding model
Tasks:
• Mission payload set
• Research station cost
• SBOTV & research station cost
• Annual funding requirements
Figure 3-1. LCC and Programmatic Comparisons
30033258-104
266.592-324
3.1 GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The conceptual phase of program development requires that total system cost be
determined in an expedient and timely manner for trade studies and for concept
evaluation and selection. It is seldom possible from the standpoint of either
cost or time to engage in the detailed cost-estimation process used to
establish firm program bid estimates. This detailed approach is prohibitive
primarily because of the many concept variations to be estimated and the
limited time available for the estimates themselves. A parametric cost model
is. therefore generally used to develop cost data in an efficient manner, yet
with acceptable overall accuracy and realism representative of the program
under study. It was decided at the outset of the Space Station study that a
model, developed specifically for this type of vehicle, would be used through-
out the study as the basic tool for generating Space Station system costs.
This model provides the principal framework for the final cost estimates of
the baseline and options and is supplemented by point estimates, where avail-
able (Table 3-1).
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Table 3-1. Space Station Program Cost Estimates
Approach
• Determine relative program ROM LCC costs for the defined
options of:
— Architecture (hardware)
— Evolutionary scenarios (programmatic)
• Including:
— Space stations & mission equipment
— Free-flyers/platforms & their mission equipment
— Transportation system
 t
• And use annual funding requirements as a measure of program
reasonableness
Methodology
• Use a cost model tailored to the module level to estimate LCC
(RDT&E, production & operations) & annual funding
requirements
• Calibrate to JSC SOC, Boeing SOC, McDonnell Douglas MSP, etc.
30033258-106
266.592-325
3.1.1 PARAMETRIC COST MODEL. The principal tool for generating cost infor-
mation for trade studies during the study and for the final project cost
estimate is a parametric cost model. This cost model, developed specifically
for large spacecraft vehicles, generates cost parametrically at the subsystem
level, from vehicle and program definition input data. For the final project
cost estimate, the model accepts direct inputs of point estimates at the
desired level of detail as may be available.
This cost analysis approach is illustrated in Figure 3-2. The Space Station
system work breakdown structure (WBS) provides the overall cost format and is
used as a basis to identify cost elements to cover all costs expected to be
incurred during the program. The WBS also sets the requirements for cost
estimating relationships (CERs), cost factors, or point estimates. These CERs
are then derived, based on an analysis of historical cost data and an analysis
of cost driving parameters, for the range of technical approaches and
performance parameters encountered in the program.
The model itself first derives a unit hardware cost or first unit cost. This
unit hardware cost is then employed where necessary during the derivation of
nonreciirring (development) costs, and recurring (production and operation)
costs. These are then accumulated as desired to provide the required total
program cost and the required levels of summarization.
Nonrecurring, or development, cost consists of the one-time cost of designing,
developing, testing, and evaluating an end item. Specifically, it includes
development engineering and development support (design and analysis), test
hardware, ground testing and evaluation, ground and flight support equipment
(GSE and FSE), tooling and special test equipment, facilities and facility
activation, and other program peculiar costs not associated with production.
It includes all the elements of cost (resources) such as labor (engineering,
production, tooling, etc.), materials, subcontracts, general and administra-
tive (G&A) expenses as well as the subdivision of effort such as management,
design and tooling production necessary for the development of the program.
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The recurring production category includes the costs associated with the
production of all flight hardware articles through acceptance of the hardware
by the customer, including all costs associated with the fabrication,
assembly, ground test, and checkout of flight articles, as well as associated
sustaining engineering and tool sustaining and maintenance. As discussed
above, this category includes all elements of cost and subdivisions of work
necessary for production of these articles.
Recurring operations includes the costs incurred after customer acceptance and
for the remaining life of the system. It includes the ground operations and
integraton preceding launch, flight operations, and mission operations during
the operating life of the system or the specified time period. It also
includes all maintenance and refurbishment hardware, including update or
replacement equipment.
CERs or cost factors are derived for each of the cost elements by the
following approach. A survey and collection of available cost and technical
data is undertaken from available sources, including historical hardware
program costs, study programs, and available detailed estimates. The data
obtained are then subjected to a thorough analysis to determine validity and
confidence level, and are normalized to standard ground rules to provide for
varying raw data inclusions and exclusions and for inflation effects. The
data are then analyzed to establish technological families (groupings of
subsystems based on hardware type, complexity, and state of the art) and to
select an appropriate parameter (performance or sizing) that shows good
correlation with cost for use as a driver in a relationship for cost
prediction of new systems. Valid high confidence data-point families
resulting from this anlysis are used to derive the cost relationship equation
from a graphical presentation of these data points using standard regressing
curve fitting techniques.
The high degree of commonality necessitates the use of development factors for
the appropriate adjustment of the CERs to obtain a proper relation to the
historical data from which it was derived. The factor includes: 1) an
assessment of design complexity, 2) a commonality factor to establish the
previous applicable development, and 3) the degree of new development
required, which relates to component availability (off-the-shelf, etc.).
Recurring production hardware CERs also require a complexity factor associated
with type of materials, technology, or manufacturing methods to provide for a
proper relation to available historical data.
Point estimates used in the final cost estimate in certain cases are generally
estimated in greater detail, Level 6 (assembly level) or Level 7 (component
level). These are determined by either a detailed estimating approach or a
more summary method, including comparative techniques with current ongoing
hardware or study programs, analysis of historical costs, and vendor estimates.
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3.1.2 COST ANALYSIS GROUND RULES. The following is a listing of the ground
rules and assumptions that were followed in estimating the Space Station
system costs reported herein.
a. Costs are estimated in constant FY 1984 dollars. .
b. This study is a requirements and architectural study and not a
configuration study.
c. The Space Station life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are therefore very
rough order of magnitude (ROM) and are intended for option comparisons
only.
d. The Space Station LCC estimates are generated from a parametric model
using generic very ROM input.
e. The economic benefits analysis will be conducted parametrically.
f. Costs are estimated for the entire Space Station architecture including
government costs.
g. Annual funding requirements are provided both for specific elements as
well as the total NASA budget level.
3.2 PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS.
Because the objective of this study is to primarily address the architecture
and evolution of a Space Station program, only a minimum amount of configura-
tion detail has been generated. The definitive data that were generated to
permit ROM cost estimates to be generated for program comparisons are there-
fore of a highly generic nature. This section presents the program descrip-
tions for those options studied. It includes the WBS identified mission
payloads and a description of the station elements, architecture, and
evolutionary options.
3.2.1 WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE. The WBS is a comprehensive breakdown of all
total program life cycle elements categorized or sorted into several levels of
hardware and task or function-oriented end items. The WBS serves to identify
all of the cost elements to be included in the cost analysis task. This WBS
contains all of the hardware and tasks associated with Phase C/D development
and test, fabrication of the flight hardware, and the activities incurred
during the placement flight, servicing flights, and mission operations. It
serves as the basic format for cost reporting and programmatic data.
The WBS used for the Space Station elements is based on the infrastructure
shown in Figure 3-3. These WBS elements and their structure are designed to
be applicable to each of the major phases of the program, namely, development,
production, and operations. Because some of the WBS elements are obviously
not applicable to all of the phases, zero costs are incurred for such .elements
and the element is ignored as costs are subsequently recorded and accumulated.
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The nonrecurring or development portion of Phase C/D includes the one-time
tasks and hardware to design and test the Space Station system. It includes
the required design and analysis for all ground and flight hardware, including
structural analysis, stress, dynamics, thermal, mass properties, etc. This
nonrecurring category includes component development and test through com-
ponent qualification, as well as all component development test hardware.
This phase also includes all software development. In addition, this phase
includes: system engineering and integration; system level test hardware and
system test; GSE design, development test, and manufacture; facilities; and
overall program management and administration.
The production portion of Phase C/D (unit cost estimate) includes all tasks
and hardware necessary to provide one complete set of flight hardware equip-
ment. It includes all material and component procurement, parts fabrication,
and hardware refurbishment, subassembly, and final assembly. In addition,
this category includes the required quality control/inspection task, an
acceptance test procedure for sell-off to the customer, and program management
and administration activities accomplished during the manufacturing process.
The operations phase includes all flight vehicle preparation, launch, and
on-orbit operations associated with the Space Station system. It includes all
ground support operations, STS transportation, and flight operations for
placement and servicing, and the mission operations (ground) activities
themselves, including mission control, data handling, support, etc., together
with program management and administration during the operations period. It
is assumed that the Shuttle transportation costs include all Shuttle-related
activities such as on-line payload installation, mission operations center
activities, flight crew costs, and other common ground operations/mission
operations and activities and optimal services.
3.2.2 SYSTEM DEFINITION
3.2.2.1 Mission Payloads. A full discussion on the identification and
selection of the mission payloads identified and considered in this study is
in Volume II, Book 1, Sections 3 and 4. The full baseline mission set
selected for the cost analysis is presented in Table 3-2 together with an
estimate of the development time, scheduled start date to meet the identified
IOC date, and the payload mass. Those payloads that will be attached to the
station proper are also identified. Cost estimates of this mission set,
including both the full set and station attached only, were then made; the
results are discussed in Section 3.3.3. .
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 1 of 9)
Mission
Development Baseline
Duration Scheduled •
(Years) Start Date
Pay load Station
Mass Attached
(Kilograms) Payload
• SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS MISSIONS
ASTROPHYSICS
Astronomy
0000 Starlab 4
0001 Large Deployable Reflector 4
0002 Far UV Spectroscopy
Explorer 3
0003 Very Long Baseline Inter-
ferometry 3
0004 Space Telescope , 4
0005 Shuttle IR Telescope Facility 4
High Energy
0030 Gamma Ray Observatory 3
0031 High Throughput Mission 4
0032 Large Area Modular Array 4
0033 Advanced X-ray Astro-
physics Facility 5
0034 High Resolution X and
Gamma Ray Spectrometer 4
0035 High Energy Isotope Experi-
ment 3
0036 Spectra of Cosmic Ray
Nuclei 3
0037 Transition Radiation and
lonization Colorimeter 2
0038 X-ray Timing Explorer 3
Solar Physics
0060 Solar Internal Dynamics
Mission 3
0061 Solar Corona Diagnostics
Mission 3
0062 Advanced Solar Observatory 5
1992
1998
1989
1995
1992
1990
1988
1999
1994
1991
1993
1997
1996
1996
1990
3280
55000
1360
342
11600
7018
11000
10000
9516
10267
1768
2800
3082
5750
1000
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1991
1993
1995
4540
1800
11130
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 2 of 9)
Development Baseline Payload Station
Duration Scheduled Mass Attached
Mission (Years) Start Date (Kilograms) Payload
• SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS MISSIONS (Contd)
EARTH AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION
Planetary Observations
0103 Mars Geochemistry/
Climatology Orbiter 4 1992 5600
0104 Mars Aeronomy Orbiter 4 1992 5600
0105 Venus Atmosphere Probe 4 1993 6000
0106 Lunar Geochemistry Orbiter 4 1993 480
0107 Titan Probe 4 1995 960
0108 Saturn Orbiter 5 1997 1800
0109 Mars Lander 5 1997 1700
0110 Saturn Probe 5 1997 2170
Solar System Missions
0121 Comet T2 Rendezvous 4 1992 2200
0122 Main-Belt Asteroid Rendez-
vous 4 1992 2700
0123 Comet HMP Sample Return 5 1994 1200
0124 Near-Earth Asteroid Rendez-
vous 4 1997 1170
Earth Dynamics
No payload elements identified in this Discipline
Crustal Motion
0151 Detection and Monitoring of
Episodal Events 4 . 1998 3500
0152 Geoscience-Crustal Dynamics
Studies 3 1992 185
Geopotential Fields
0161 Earth Science Research-
Geophysical Investigation 3 1998 400
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 3 of 9)
Mission
Development Baseline
Duration Scheduled-
(Years) Start Date
Payload Station
Mass Attached
(Kilograms) Payload
SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS MISSIONS (Contd)
Earth Resources
0171 Renewable Resources -
Earth Science Research 4
0172 Operational Land Systems 4
0173 Shuttle Active Microwave
Experiment (SAMEX-C) 4
0174 Earth Obs Instrument Devel
(Microwave Tech) 3
0175 Earth Obs Instrument Devel
(Extra Visible & RF) 3
0176 EO Sensor/Technique /
Analysis /Automated
System Development 4
0177 Geoscience-Geology Remote
Sensing 4
0179 Imaging Radar for Earth
Resources Inventory &
Monitoring 4
0180 Freeflying Imaging Radar
Experiment (FIREX) 3
0181 Z - Continuous Coverage 4
0182 Z-Hydrologic Cycle Priority 4
0183 Z-Special Coverage 4
0184 Z-Continuous and Special
Coverage 4
ENVIRONMENTAL OBSERVATIONS
We at her / dim ate
0201 Satellite Doppler Meteorologi-
cal Radar Tech Development 4
0202 Meteorology Instrument Group
Development Payload 3
0203 Lightning Mapper 3
0204 Geosynchronous Microwave
Sounder 4
1996
1990
1992
1991
1994
1992
1990
1996
1992
1996
1998
2000
2002
540
540
2000
200
1000
2000
540
2000
600
8578
8708
18821
14260
X
X
X
X
X
1999
1993
1998
1999
2600
1170
900
5850
X
X
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 4 of 9)
Development
Duration
Mission (Years)
• SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS
0205 Meteorology Instrument
0206 Geostationary Opnl. Env.
Satellite (GOES) Follow-on
0207 TIROS Follow-on
Ocean
0221 Ocean Instrument Payload
(OIP)
0221 Ocean Instrument Payload
(OIP)
0222 Ocean Topography Experi-
ment (TOPEX)
Solar Terrestrial
0241 Earth Radiation Budget
Experiment (ERBE)
0242 Incoherent Scatter Radar
0242 Incoherent Scatter Radar
0243 Topside Digital lonosonde/HF
Radar
0243 Topside Digital Inosonde/HF
Radar
0244 Solar Terrestrial Observatory-
Manned
0245 Space Plasma Physics Payload -
-Manned-
0246 Solar Terrestrial Observatory-
Unmanned
0247 Space Plasma Physics Payload-
Unnianned
MISSIONS
3
4
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
5
3
5
3
Baseline
Scheduled
Start Date
(Contd)
1995
1994
1992
1994
1998
1988
1991
1996
1998
1997
1999
2000
1998
1994
1992 .
Payload Station
Mass Attached
(Kilograms) Payload
430
500
2000
480
480
1600
55
1000 X
1000
500
500
16500
3183
7314
3183
Atmospheric Research
0261 High Resolution Doppler
Imager (HRDI)
0262 Measurement of Air Pollution
from Satellites (MAPS)
2
2
3-11
1990
1990
76
100
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 5 of 9)
Mission
Development Baseline Payload Station
Duration Scheduled Mass Attached
(Years) Start Date (Kilograms) Payload
SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS MISSIONS (Contd)
0263 CO 2 LIDAR for Atmospheric
Measurements
0264 LIDAR Facility
0265 Upper Atmosphere Research
Payload-Development
0266 WINDSAT
0267 Upper Atmosphere Research
P ay load-O pe rational
LIFE SCIENCES
3
2
4
3
1998
1992
1994
1995
1994
4000
1900
2500
2260
1108
X
Biological Science
0300 Human Research Lab. 5
0301 Animal and Plant Research
Lab. 5
Operational Medicine
0322 EVA Performance and
Productivity 3
Life Support
0340 H2/O2/N2 Regenerative
Systems 4
0341 CELSS Experimental Systems 4
0342 Dedicated CELSS Module 5
0343 CELSS Pallet 4
Materials Processing
0400 Research and Development
Facility
0401 R&D/Proof of Concept
Facility
1990
1990
7300
8500
1990 270
1991
1992
1996
1996
1280
2625
10500
1300
X
X
X
X
X
X
4
4
1990
1994
1736
3224
X
X
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 6 of 9)
Mission
Development Baseline
Duration Scheduled •
(Years) Start Date
Pay load Station
Mass Attached
(Kilograms) Payload
• COMMERCIAL MISSIONS
EARTH AND OCEAN OBSERVATIONS
1000 Geological Reconnaissance
1001 Remote Atmospheric
Sensing
1002 Worldwide Cotton Acreage
and Production
1003 Petro/Mineral Experiment
COMMUNICATIONS
1100 Small Communication Satellite
1101 Medium Communication
Satellite
1102 Large Communication
Satellite
1103 Experimental Geo Platform
1104 Operational Geo Platform
1106 Large Deployable Antenna
1107 RFI Measurements
1108 Laser Communications
1109 Open Envelope Tube
1110 Spaceborne Interferometer
1111 Millimeter Wave Propagation
MATERIALS PROCESSING
1200 Pilot - Biological Processing
Facility 3
1201 Pilot - Containerless Process-
ing Facility 3
1202 Pilot - Furnace Processing
Facility 3
1203 Commercial - Biological
Processing Facility
1204 Commercial - Containerless
Processing Facility
1990
1990
1990
650
650
N/A
1990
1990
1994
1990
1994
1992
1994
1991
1993
1995
1991
816
2041
2313
5450
5450
500
50
140
157
60
40
1992
1994
1994
1995
1997
1050
3900
4452
2100
5700
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 7 of 9)
Development Baseline Payload Station
Duration Scheduled • Mass Attached
Mission (Years) Start Date (Kilograms) Payload
• COMMERCIAL MISSIONS (Contd)
1205 Commercial - Furnace
Processing Facility 1997 6325 X
1206 Electrophoresis Free-Flying 1996 9987
1207 Electropheretic Separation 1990 300 X
1208 Crystal Growth 1992 N/A X
1209 Metal Clusters and Crystal
Growth 1990 100 X
1210 Enzyme Production and
Separation 1990 N/A X
1211 Silicon Crystals 1990 300 X
1212 Heat Resistant Alloys 1997 5000
1213 Chemical Reactions 1990 N/A X
1214 Space Isothermal Furnace
System (SIFS) 1990 N/A X
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
1300 Radiation Hardened
Computer 1990 50 X
1301 Full-Body Teleoperator 1995 300 X
1302 Gamma Ray Astronomy 1990 2000
1303 Plants in Controlled Env
Life Support Systems
(CELSS) 1990 N/A X
1304 Controlled Environment Life
Support Systems (CELSS) 1996 1500 X
1305 Communication_Satellite
Service/Handling 1992 N/A X
• TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
MATERIALS & STRUCTURES
2001 Strain and Acoustic Sensors 2 1990 50 X
2002 Spacecraft Materials
Technology 2 1991 150 X
2003 Materials and Coatings 2 1991 250 X
2004 Thermal Shape Control 2 1993 1000 X
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 8 of 9)
Development
Duration
Mission (Years)
• TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
2005 Dynamics of Flimsy
Structures
2006 Active Optics Technology
2007 Large Structures
Technology
ENERGY CONVERSION
2101 Low -Cost Modular Solar
Systems
2103 Ion Effects on LEO Power
Systems
2104 Large Solar Concentrator
2105 Solar Pumped Lasers
2106 Laser /Electric Energy
Conversion
2107 Solar Sustained Plasmas
2108 Space Nuclear Reactor
(Contd)
2
4
5
2
2
3
3
2
2
8
Baseline
Scheduled
Start Date
1994
1994
2002
1991
1992
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
Payload
Mass
(Kilograms)
1000
10000
100000
30
. 500
5000
200
500
2000
2500
Station
Attached
Payload
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
COMPUTER SCIENCE & ELECTRONICS
2201 Attitude Control - System
Identification Experiment
2202 Attitude Control - Adaptive
Control Experiment
2203 Attitude Control - Distri-
buted Control Experiment
2204 Advanced Adaptive Control
Technology Demonstration
PROPULSION
2301 Controller Acceleration
Propulsion Test
2302 Laser Propulsion Test
3
2
2
4
2
3
1994
1994
1995
1990
1994
1996
100
100
100
500
45
100
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Table 3-2. Baseline Mission Set (Sheet 9 of 9)
Development Baseline Payload
Duration Scheduled - Mass
Mission (Years) Start Date (Kilograms)
Station
Attached
Payload
• TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (Contd)
CONTROL & HUMAN FACTORS
2401 Manipulator Controls
Technology
2402 Advanced EVA Technology
SPACE STATION SYSTEMS 8
2501 Liquid Droplet Radiator
2502 Advanced Control Device
2503 Space Component Lifetime
Technology
2504 OTV Payload Handling
2505 Payload Servicing and
Repair
2506 OTV Propellant Transfer
& Storage
2507 OTV Propellant Liquification
2508 OTV Docking & Berthing
2509 OTV Maintenance
2510 Tethered Dynamics
Technology
FLUID & THERMAL PHYSICS
2601 Space Mfg. Lightweight
Heat Pumps
• OPERATIONS
4000 Manned GEO Sortie
4001 Manned GEO Support
Module
3
4
. OPERATIONS
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
, PHYSICS AND
2
6
6
1991
1990
1996
1994
1990
1992
1992
1991
1991
1991
1992
1995
CHEMISTRY
1992
1999
2002
600
500
1000
400
300
2000
500
2000
1000
5900
3000
3000
1000
4535
8160
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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3.2.2.2 Space Station. The Space Station architecture and evolutionary
options have been generally defined and are discussed in some detail in
Volume II, Book 2. The elements of our "all up" space station concept are
shown in Figure 3-4. The evolution for the baseline station is also shown in
Figure 3-5.
The following four basic options have been examined:
a. A single research station
b. A single space based OTV operations station
c. Two stations - one research and one a space based OTV operations station
d. A single station combining research and a space based OTV operations
station
The element quantities associated with each of these options are shown in
Table 3-3.
The parametric model used to generate program cost estimates requires
definition input at the subsystem level. It was necessary, therefore, to
develop description, weight, and performance information for each station
element at this level. These data are presented in Table 3-4 for the research
station and Table 3-5 for the operations capability portion. These input data
are necessarily very ROM because of their generic nature. Because of the
utilization of much of the hardware across various modules, a commonality
factor representing percentage of a new design is also identified, subsystem
by subsystem, for each module.
The time phasing of the baseline concept is presented in Figure 3-6.
3.2.2.3 Other Program Elements.
The principal additional elements of the baseline station concept are the
SBOTV and a shuttle derived ET tanker concept. These are illustrated in
Figures 3-7 and 3-8 respectively. '
The baseline STS traffic model developed for the selected scenario is shown in
Table 3-6. This traffic model was used to develop STS operations funding
shown in Section 4.
3.3 PROGRAM OPTION COST ESTIMATES
3.3.1 SPACE STATION ELEMENT COSTS. Using the parametric cost model and the
generic subsystem input data, ROM costs have been developed for each of the
architecture elements. The cost estimate of a typical element, the General
Purpose module, is shown in Table 3-7. It gives the input, the nonrecurring
(development) cost, and the unit production cost associated with each of the
subsystems and the wraparound cost elements. These subsystem level estimates
were made for each of the major station modules or elements.
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HABITAT
MODULE AIRLOCK r MISSIONMODULES
LOGISTICS MODULE
OPERATIONS/UTILITY
MODULE
•SOLAR ARRAYS
EARLY ARCHITECTURE (1990)
30033258-81
MAINTENANCE
MODULE
.HABITAT .MISSION
/MODULE /MODULE
i—i r^i t—i F-I rr\
MODULE w
^pnRTA
MODULE/ MISSION
MODULE
INTERMEDIATE ARCHITECTURE (1995)
MISSION
MODULE
MAINTENANCE
MODULE
30033258-83
LATE ARCHITECTURE (1998) 266.592-329
Figure 3-5. Evolution of Baseline Space Station Architecture
3-19
GDC-ASP-83-004
Table 3-3. Space Station Module Quantity
Module/Item
General purpose
Habitability
Mission
Logistics
Passageway
External booms
RMS
General purpose
Habitability
Mission
Logistics
Maintenance
Hangar
Propellant storage
Passageway
External booms I
External booms II
RMS
Research Station SBOTV
Research + SBOTV Operations Operations
Station Station Station .
1 1
2 2
5 5
3 3
2 2
4 4
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 3
2 2
2 2
4 4
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
Baseline
Combined Research
+ SBOTV Operations
Station
1
2
6
6
2
4
1
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
30033258-113
266.592-330
3.3.2. SPACE STATION PROGRAM COSTS. The nonrecurring (development) and unit
production costs for each of the principal scenarios estimated are shown in
Tables 3-8 through 3-11. They are:
a. A research station only with an IOC in 1990 growing to full capability by
1996.
b. An operations only station that will accommodate TMS and space based OTV
operations starting in 1994.
c. Two independent stations, one research and one operations.
d. A combined research and operations station.
The latter option is referred to in this volume as the baseline concept. The
required availability of the elements of each of these options are shown in
Tables 3-12 through 3-15. The resulting costs are then shown in Tables 3-8
through 3-11, which also show module quantities and include all commonality
effects according to the development sequence. The associated government
costs are also included.
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Space assembled concept
Advantages
• Free from Shuttle constraints (size, loads)
 j
• Reusable (lower cost)
• Modularity (mix & match capability)
Key issues
• Long-term space exposure
• Orbital integration, servicing
• Efficiency (low weight, high Isp)
• Low-cost operations (propellant delivery to LEO)
• Deployment & retrieval
• Future payloads & mission characteristics
Technology needs
• Lightweight (thin gage) tanks
• Lightweight (composite) structure
• Lightweight/high temperature aerobrake materials
• Long life/space maintainability engine (low weight, high Isp
• Cryo'genic propellant management — thermal control
(MLI insulation, mixing, venting), propellant
acquisition gaging
• Meteoroid & space debris protection
• Redundant, fault-tolerant, hardened avionics'
• Auto rendezvous/docking
• Payload interface
• Avionics
Modular propellant
tanks
2 or 4 tanks
per mission
Aft cargo
carrier concept
Adv engine
Fixed or deployable
aerobrake 180432793-1 03 A266.592-334
Figure 3-7. Space-Based OTV Concepts
The total nonrecurring and production costs for these four options are
summarized in Table 3-16. The expenditure of funds for the research station
(Case A) at IOC in 1990 is $5.5 billion with full capability expenditure of
$6.3 billion. The operations station cost is $7.7 billion (Case B); however,
much of the capability for the research station is included. Therefore,
a combined station, the baseline (Case D), will cost only $1.8 billion
additional. From the alternate viewpoint, with an early research .capability
and a later operations capability, the operation cost increment is about
$3.2 billion. The cost of two independent stations is about $9.9 billion.
3.3.3 MISSION PAYLOAD SET FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. A major portion of this
study effort has been devoted to the collection, identification, and
validation of current and future mission requirements covering the entire
spectrum of disciplines and desired accommodations. This effort has been
documented in Volume II, Book 1 (and its Appendix) of this report. It is
readily apparent that cost and funding are key parameters in the evaluation of
raw requirement sets and in the establishment of a realistic integrated
mission set to serve as a basis for Space Station implementation architecture.
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Table 3-6. STS Traffic Model -
Year 90 91 92 93
NASA '
Commercial
DoD
Total
10
11
14
35
7
11
14
32
12
15
12
39
14
12
16
42
Combined Space Station Program
94 95 96 97 98 99 00
14"
12
17
43
14
•10
13
37
13
8
13
34
5
12
15
32
16
0
20
36
6
7
12
25
6
10
16
32
30033258-118
266.592-336
Table 3-7. Space Station Preliminary Cost Estimate (1984
MODULE — GENERAL PURPOSE
Cost
Element
Size -
Parameter
Flight vehicle
Structure (PRI)
Structures (SEC)
Tooling
Thermal control
ACS/GN&C avionics
ACS AMCD
RCS
EPS solar array
EPS batteries
EPS cond & dist
Comm/data mgmt
Cont & displays
EC/LSS
Crew accommodations
Flight software
Subtotal
16093.6
881.8
28659.8
881.8
5000.0
11023.0
20.0
2.6
1543.2
606.3
10361.6
4850.1
440.9
200000.0
Development
Cost
159.68
13.08
40.48
56.76
46.21
13.26
42.17
43.06
4.17
33.44
71.63
45.78
212.11
54.98
103.60
940.41
Unit
Cost
28.32
2.08
38.61
13.60
2.67
19.57
26.11
3.04
11.20
12.39
20.37
23.31
1.48
202.75
IA&CO
Sustain eng
SE&I
System test
Test article
Test operations
GSE
Initial spares
Program management
141.06
457.66
366.71
90.94
188.08
60.83
125.16
24.33
17.03
17.09
Total 1913.21 261.21 30033258-120
266.592-337
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Table 3-8. Research Station
Cost (1984 $M)
GP Module
Habitat Module
Mission Module
Logistic Module
Passageway
External Booms
RMS
Power
Total
Gov't
Grand Total
Dev
1913
619
350
330
280
100
20
-
3612
903
4515
Unit
261
125
123
63
55
10
10
26
6316
Qty
1
2
5
3
2
4
1
8
Production
261
250
615
189
110
40
10
208
1683
118
1801
Table 3-9. SBOTV Operations Station
Cost (1984 $M)
GP Module
Habitat Module
Mission Module
Logistic Module
Maintenance Module
Hangar Module
Propellant Module
Passageway
External Structure I
~*~ " External "Structure II
RMS
Power
Total
Grand Total
Dev
1913
619
350
330
345
248
595
148
151
75
20
-
4794
1199
5993
Unit
261
125
123
63
114
39
70
60
40
20
10
26
7673
Qty
1
1
1
3
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
1
Production
261
125
123
189
228
78
280
120
80
40
20
26
1570
110
1680
•
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Table 3-10. Research Station and SBOTV Operations Station
Dev Unit Qty Production
Research Station
SBOTV Operating Station
GP Module
Habitability Module
Mission Module
Logistic Module
Maintenance Module
Hangar Module
Propellant Module
Passageway
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
Total
Gov11
Research Station
Grand Total
4515 1801
-
-
-
-
345
248
595
148
151
75
-
-
1562
391
1953
6468
261
125
123
63
114
39
70
60
40
20
10
26
1
1
1
3
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
1
261
125
123
189
228
78
280
120
80
40
20
26
1570
110
1680
3481
9949
Tn order to provide first-cut "ballpark" cost and funding information for
these evaluations, a simplified cost-estimating methodology was developed. A
parametric approach that uses a single, cost estimating relationship (CER) to
determine program acquisition costs (development and production of one unit)
was chosen. The proper coefficients for the CER were calibrated using cost
estimates of existing and planned mission payloads. The CER is adjusted for
each payload cost estimate by using complexity and commonality factors. The
mission payloads are grouped according to technology areas and complexities,
with each group such as optical imaging, general scientific, planetary, etc.
assigned a complexity factor. Each payload is assigned another factor based
on its commonality with other payloads within the group. Theaddition of
operating costs, calculated as a percentage of program acquisition costs,
completes the cost development procedure.
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Table 3-11. Research and SBOTV Operations (Combined) Station
Dev
Grand Total
Unit Qty
9506
Production
GP Module
Habitat Module
Mission Module
Logistic Module
External Booms
Maintenance Module
Hangar Module
Propellant Module
Passageway I
Passageway II
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
Total
1913
619
350
330
100
345
248
595
280
148
151
75
20
I_
5174
1294
6468
261
125
123
63
10
114
39
70
54
60
40
20
10
26
1
2
6
6
4
2
2
4
2
2
2
2
3
8
261
250
738
378
40
228
78
280
108
120
80
40
30 .
208
2839
199
3038
Table 3-12. Research Space Station Element Availability Requirements
Module IOC Growth
General Purpose
Habitat
Mission
Logistic
Extetinal Booms
Maintenance
Hangar
Propellant
Passageway I
Passageway II
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
94
91/93/94
94
92/94/96
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Table 3-13. SBOTV Operations Space Station Element Availability Requirements
Module IOC Growth
General Purpose
Habitat
Mission
Logistic
External Booms
Maintenance
Hangar
Propellant
Passageway I
Passageway II
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
94
94
94
94
93
93
93
94
94
94
94
94
96
96
94/95/96
96
96
96
Table 3-14. Research Then SBOTV Operations Space Stations Element
Availability Requirements
Module IOC Growth
General Purpose
Habitat
Mission
•Logistic
External Booms
Maintenance
Hangar
Propellant
Passageway I
Passageway II
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
90/94
90/94
90/94
90/94
90
93
93
93
90
94
94
94
90/94
90/94
94
91/93/94
96
96
94/95/96
94
96
96
96
92/94/96
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Table 3-15. Baseline Combined Space Station Element Availability Requirements
Module IOC Growth
General Purpose
Habitat
Mission
Logistic
External Booms
Maintenance
Hangar
Propel lant
Passageway I
Passageway II
External Structure I
External Structure II
RMS
Power
90
90
90
90
90
93
93
93
90
94
93
93
90
90
-.
94
91/93/94/96
94
96
96
94/95/96
94
96
96
93/96
92/94/96
Table 3-16. Preliminary Space Station Program Cost Summary
Case Cost (FY84 M$)
A
B
C
Research station (to IOC)
Research station
SBOTV operations station
Research station, then
SBOTV operations station
Combined SBOTV operations
& research station
5,485
6,316
7,673
9,949
9,506
Once these costs are developed, a computerized phased-funding model is used to
individully spread the costs of each payload and then sum them by discipline.
Figure 3-9 graphically displays the funding profile of the full baseline
mission set together with the projected NASA budget for experiment payloads
and spacecraft contained as line items in the FY 1983 NASA budget. This
baseline set, previously listed in Table 3-2, includes free flyer, planetary,
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station-attached, and platform payloads. All commercial mission payloads are
assumed to fund themselves, with the exception of the pilot Materials
Processing mission payloads, which are assumed to be partially funded by
NASA. As can be seen,' Astrophysics and Planetary Exploration account for the
majority of the baseline mission set funding, especially in the early years of
the program. Budgetary constraints may limit the number of missions flown.
If the current funding level remains constant, only about one-third of those
mission payloads included in the baseline mission set can fly as scheduled.
Funding
(FY84 B$)
Projected
budget
Life sciences
Environmental observations
Materials
processing
Solid earth observations
Technology
development
Manned GEO
issions
1985 1990 1995
Fiscal year
2000
30033258-95
266.592-33S
Figure 3-9. Funding Requirements - Full Mission Payload Set
Figure 3-10 shows the funding profile for those mission payloads to be flown
in the Space Station attached mode. • Accommodation of all the station-attached
payloads identified in the baseline mission set would require approximately
$1 billion per year in the peak-funding years of 1991 and 1992. This is about
one-third of,the peak-year funding amount needed to accommodate the.total
baseline mission set. Astrophysics is again a major cost contributor;
however, Technology Development accounts for the largest percentage of the
total station-attached mission set cost.
The funding profiles are shown for each of the disciplines of the full
user information mission set (total missions identified) in Figures 3-11
through 3-20 and from the baseline (revised and integrated) mission set in
Figures 3-21 through 3-28.
These profiles include the current NASA budget and 1981-1987 projection and a
line of 5% growth from the average (1981^ 1987).
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Figure 3-10. Funding Requirements - Mission Payload Set (Station-Attached)
5000
MANNEDGEO
MISSIONS
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
MATERIAL
PROCESSING
LIFE SCIENCES
ENVIRONMENTAL
OBSERVATIONS
SOLID EARTHOBSERVATIONS
EXPLORATION
PROJECTED
BUDGET
! ASTROPHYSICS
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993
YEAR
1996 1999
Figure 3-11. User Information Mission Set Funding
by Discipline
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Figure 3-12. User Information Mission Set Funding - Total Program
Excluding Planetary Exploration
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Figure 3-13. User Information Mission Set Funding - Astrophysics
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Figure 3-14. User Information Mission Set Funding - Planetary Exploration
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Figure 3-15. User Information Mission Set Funding - Solid Earth Observations
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Figure 3-16. User Information Mission Set Funding - Environmental
Observations
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Figure 3-17. User Information Mission Set Funding - Life Sciences
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Figure 3-18. User Information Mission Set Funding - Materials Processing
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Figure 3-19. User Information Mission Set Funding - Technology Development
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Figure 3-20. User Information Mission Set Funding - Space Operations -
Manned GEO Mission
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Figure 3-21. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Astrophysics
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Figure 3-22. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Planetary Exploration
400
300
S 200
SO
o
o
100
0
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
YEAR
266.592-352
Figure 3-23. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Solid Earth Observations
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Figure 3-24. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Environmental Observations
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Figure 3-25. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Life Sciences
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Figure 3-26. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Materials Processing
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Figure 3-27. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Technology Development
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Figure 3-28. Baseline Mission Set Funding - Space Operations —
Manned GEO Missions
3.3.4 PROGRAM FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. After Space Station development,
hardware, and operations costs have been developed, they serve as input to the
phased-funding model used previously for the mission set. The Space Station
program funding profile is then combined with the station-attached mission set
profile as shown in Figure 3-29 for the research station program. The Space
Station development and hardware costs consist of about 40% of the total.
$15 billion research station program cost over the first 15 years. The NASA
budget would require a peak-year funding requirement of almost $3 billion in
1989 for an initial research station operational in 1990. Once the station is
fully operational, annual costs drop to about $500 million.
A combined research and operations Space Station would cost about 50% more to
build and develop than the initial research station, and a small amount more
per year to operate, as shown in Figure 3-30. The additional capability
represented by the space-based OTV and a propellant transfer tanker would add
an additional 30% to the cost of the development and hardware costs of the
program. The peak-year funding requirement, however, remains at almost
$3 billion because of the evolutionary phase-in process of the operational
portion of the station. Total funding requirements over the 15-year span are
40% higher for the combined station than for the initial research station.
Figures 3-31 and 3-32 show the effect of the respective Space Station programs
on the NASA budget. The NASA base includes funding for STS development, all
Aeronautical Research and Technology, construction of facilities, and manage-
ment and administration (R&PM), etc.
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Figure 3-29. Research Space Station Program Funding Profile
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Figure 3-30. Combined Research and Operations Space Station Program
Funding Profile
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Figure 3-31. NASA Budget Profile (Research Station and
Station-Attached Payloads)
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Figure 3-32. NASA Budget Profile (Baseline Station and
Station-Attached Payloads)
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The Shuttle flight operations portion consists of the net cost to NASA after
reimbursements from commercial and DoD users in accordance with the STS
traffic model shown in Table 3-6. Funding for fiscal years 1983-1987 is taken
from the FY 1983 NASA budget, while funding for 1988-1989 is calculated under
the assumption that the flight rates in these years will be the same as that
in 1990.
New programs include a Shuttle-based TMS, a fifth orbiter, two space
platforms, and construction of ground facilities.
The Space Station funding includes development and production of hardware and
ground and flight operating costs, while the SBOTV and tanker funding includes
two space-based OTVs and two proplellant transfer tankers. The station-
attached mission set is used as a representative mission set, to show total
station-related costs for comparative purposes. Both Space Station program
funding profiles reveal peak-year funding under $8 billion. The major funding
difference between the two programs occurs in the early 1990s, when the
operational capability is phased in. During these years, annual funding with
the baseline station program is under $6.5 billion, while funding with the
research station is about $5 billion per year. Both programs show an annual
funding level of about $5 billion in the out years.
Figures 3-33 and 3-34 show the budgetary effects of including all missions
identified in the baseline mission set. Peak-year funding exceeds $8 billion
under either program, while out-year funding levels off at $6 billion. Acutal
NASA funding of experiements and spacecraft will probably lie somewhere
between the current funding level and the level necessary to support the full
baseline mission set.
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Figure 3-33. NASA Budget Profile (Research Station and Full Mission Set)
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Figure 3-34. NASA Budget Profile (Baseline Station and Full Mission Set)
3.3.5 ECONOMICS BENEFITS CASH FLOW. Cost and benefits may be examined from
the viewpoint of a classical cash flow problem. Examining these economics
benefits "cash flow" can be instructive even though all of the economic bene-
fits are obviously not necessarily available as actual revenues since many are
in the form of cost savings or value added. Nevertheless, this information
will provide an indication of the break-even period in terms of the global
economic point of view and is certainly useful for comparative purposes.
The first analysis, an undiscounted cash flow comparison of the baseline (or
combined) station to either a research station or a SBOTV station alone, is
shown in Figure 3-35. Although negative cash flow for the research station is
less than $6.5 billion, the payback period is over 30 years. With an
additional $3.5 billion negative cash flow for the SBOTV station, the payback
period is reduced to just over 17 years. The baseline combined station
requires a maximum negative cumulative cash flow of $11 billion and has a
payback period of 16.7 years.
Figure 3-36 shows a comparison of the cash flows of the three station options
discounted at 7%, historically an average nominal discount rate. The SBOTV
station cash flows were shifted four years so that all cash flows would be
discounted back to the same base year, 1984.
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Figure 3-35. Economic Benefits Cash Flow, Undiscounted
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Figure 3-36. Economic Benefits Cash Flow, Discounted 7%
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Based on near-term economics alone, a SBOTV station returns more on the
investment than the other stations. However as noted earlier, the long-term
benefits of a research station can be relatively unlimited. The combined
station can give both the near-term benefits of the SBOTV operations and the
long-term benefits of space research without requiring a great deal more
funding.
Figure 3-37 shows the cash flows of the baseline combined space station and a
combined station that evolves from a SBOTV operations station in 1990 to a
station including research in 1994 (i.e., reversing the order of develop-
ment). This approach to the combined station provides the revenues of the
SBOTV operations in the early years and the addition of the research portion
in 1994. This approach cuts almost two years from the payback period of the
baseline station. Figure 3-38 shows that the maximum cumulative discounted
cash flow delta between the two combined-station scenarios is negligible and
the net present values are within $500 million. The economic factors are from
this point of view, not conclusive. The schedules of the OTV, tanker, and
technology demonstrations, however, need to be examined in detail to determine
the feasibility of the 1990 IOC for the space-based OTV.
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Figure 3-37. Economic Benefits Cash Flow, Undiscounted
(Early Space Based OTV Availability)
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SECTION 4
PROGRAMMATICS AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Exploration of options for partnership between the government and industry in
a Space Station program was a major study task and is outlined in Figure 4-1.
Analysis of government requirements and private sector investment criteria
provided the foundation for development of program alternatives designed to
meet public and private requirements. Joint Endeavor Agreements and formation
of a "Space Development Corporation" were shown to have potential for attract-
ing private investment in a Space Station enterprise. The Space Station
Prospectus (Appendix I) was developed to demonstrate how an even greater
degree of industry involvement might be achieved.
4.2 SPACE STATION INVESTMENT CRITERIA
The economic benefits and costs described in the previous two sections are
important not only in assessing the value of a Space Station, but also in
determining who should pay for such a facility. As our activities in space
have evolved from purely exploratory and security-oriented programs to more
diverse projects involving commercial interests, fundamental investment
criteria have changed. Unlike major undertakings of the past, such as Project
Apollo and Skylab, the Space Station program will probably be heavily influ-
enced by economic and commercial interests from its inception. The Space
Shuttle, which was designed partly in consideration of its commercial
potential, differed from Apollo and Skylab in this regard, but economic and
commercial factors appear likely to exert much greater influence on'Space
Station development.
Of most obvious concern is the impact of economic factors on Space Station
design. In the extreme, a Space Station program unbounded by any economic
constraints would result in the establishment of a facility quite different
from what real-world conditions would create. Economic concerns of far
greater subtlety, however, can also have a profound impact on design
strategy. A shift in emphasis from low-cost to high-return, for example,
could dictate a complete reversal in the prioritization of the Space Station
architectural elements, as illustrated in Figure 4-2. Since past Space
Station studies have emphasized technological achievability and low initial
cost, the relatively complex and costly space-based OTV function has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a later, lower-priority Space Station development.
Hence it has been generally assumed that the initial Space Station will be a
relatively modest research and production facility. If near-term economic
return becomes the chief objective, however, then the potentially lucrative
OTV function has to be considered an early, high priority goal.
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Figure 4-1. Progratnmati.es/Bu8iness Opportunity Assessment
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Figure 4-2. Impact of Economic Considerations on Space Station
Decision Process
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Introduction of economic considerations dealing with commercial utilization
raises an additional issue that is of fundamental interest: How to divide
Space Station costs and benefits among government and industry partners.
Planning criteria that typically characterize public programs must be modified
to account for private-sector interests, so a joint public-private Space
Station program could differ substantially from one that is strictly public in
nature.
4.2.1 GOVERNMENT (PUBLIC SECTOR) REQUIREMENTS. As discussed in the previous
chapter, government economic planning criteria are influenced primarily by
fiscal considerations, i.e., budgetary constraints. For this reason economic
decisions are shaped more by cost factors than by economic benefits, which
explains in part the prevailing emphasis on affordable systems. The promise
of economic payback is not a major issue, perhaps because the government
cannot realize an economic return on its projects, with possibly the sole
exception of taxation. Instead, the value of government projects is usually
measured in noneconomic terms such as social benefit, with occasional refer-
ence to gross economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment, or GNP.
In the absence of a clear-cut profit motive, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish what determines an acceptable funding profile for a given
program. This is especially true of space projects, which are not directly
utilitarian, as in the case of highways, nor humanitarian, such as social
^welfare programs. The social benefits of the space program are more commonly
linked with ideals that are less tangible (and less universally accepted),
such as national prestige, scientific gain, or technological spin-offs.
Economic analysis has had a limited role in developing these types of
programs - limited to assuring that program costs do not exceed certain
envelopes of acceptability. These boundary conditions on cost are generally
established by noneconomic considerations, although, as mentioned above, the
impact of a space project on the economy as a whole is occasionally on
a-priofi consideration. Econometric studies that demonstrate a multiplier
effect in stimulation of the economy by space expenditures are sometimes
presented in defense of the space effort in general, but rarely provide
insight into the value of specific projects.
If future national space projects such as the Space Station are to be
evaluated according to their economic benefits or commercial potential, the
government must resolve several key problems. As was illustrated in
Figure__4-2, a primary concern is the impact of this, change in emphasis on
Space Station design strategy. To the extent that demands for economic
benefits diverge from more traditional requirements, the government will need
to revise its evaluation criteria and perhaps change its expectations
regarding costs, social benefits, and user accommodations. If, for example,
the space-based OTV function were developed early for its economic and
commercial potential, the resulting Space Station program would probably have
a higher cost, a more narrow range of social benefits (although their
magnitude could be great), and would support OTV users above all others.
Hence an emphasis on economic return could be somewhat inconsistent with
NASA's desire for a low-cost, multipurpose space facility.
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A second difficulty alluded to earlier is that the government cannot realize
an economic return on its Space Station, complicating the quest for economic
benefits. When these benefits take the form of cost savings on future civil
operations, the government can accrue a direct economic advantage. But cost
savings and performance advances that represent prof it. potential do not
typically drive government projects. If an OTV, for example, can provide a
launch service for $10 million, and, has a market value of $100 million, this
represents less of an incentive (to develop an OTV) for the government than
for an entrepreneur entitled to profit from such a venture. To convert this
profit potential into support for a Space Station program, the government
needs to develop practical and legal means of transforming latent private
sector interest into active industry involvement.
This leads to a third problem, because the government, as a nonprofit institu-
tion, lacks the expertise of the private sector in developing commercial
opportunities an generating economic returns. The drawbacks of an economic-
return/commercial-oriented Space Station program would be amplified by the
government's inability to escape the bureaucratic constraints of the public
sector. In personnel management, contracting, and marketing, the government
has to abide by rules of practice that were established for protection of the
public interest and not profit maximization. Significant changes in the way
the government does business may be required if economic return becomes a
major objective of a national Space Station program.
4.2.2 INDUSTRY (PRIVATE-SECTOR) REQUIREMENTS. Just as the government is
constrained by its orientation as a public institution, private industry is
limited by its particular requirements in its ability to support Space Station
development. A Space Station program, even if aimed primarily at generating
economic returns and commercial interest, would represent a very challenging
business opportunity. Despite its promise of significant economic benefits,
the Space Station presents investment problems of special concern, based on
nearly every standard criterion used by industry to evaluate potential
projects. If its Space Station program is to succeed in attracting and
maintaining private-sector interest and support, NASA must understand and
address these business considerations.
In evaluating any business opportunity, the bottom line, of course, is
profitability. But profit encompasses a fairly wide spectrum of investment
considerations, such as the seven key ones listed in Table 4-1. Private
sector requirements for participation in a Space Station venture would be
analyzed in terms of these criteria,.since any potential commercial Space
Station user or provider would conduct a business opportunity assessment based
on these parameters.
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The first two categories listed in Table 4-1, investment level and investment
horizon, refer to the size and duration of the capital outlay
required for entry into a business venture. The higher the investment level,
the greater the cost to investors of participation; and the greater
the investment horizon, the longer the investors must wait to recoup their
investment. This latter function, investment horizon (or payback period) is
important because of the time-value of money, which is measured in terras of
present value. The further into the future any income stream is realized, the
lower its present value due to the impact of interest rates. The present
value (PV) of an income stream is calculated as
n
PV - - Xi
i=0
where Xi is the amount of money received in year n, the number of years from
the present in which the income is earned, and r is the prevailing interest
rate between the present and year n. In recent years, the present value has
been a particularly significant business consideration, due to the rise of
interest rates during the 1970s. The higher the interest rate, the lower the
present value of any given income stream. An income of $100 received 10 years
in the future has a present value of about $60 if the interest rate is 5%, but
if the interest rate is 10%, the present value drops under $40.
Table 4-1. Primary Commercial Investment Considerations
Investment
a. Investment level
b. Investment horizon
c. Investment recovery
Risk
a. Technical risk
b. Market rish
c. Financial risk
d. Institutional risk
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Investment level and investment horizon are especially important to consider
in evaluating Space Station commercial opportunities, since such a program
would entail unusually severe requirements in both areas. As detailed in
Section 3, the total investment requirement for establishment of a manned
Space Station is in the billions of dollars, and would, require as many as
10 years for completion. By contrast, the typical venture capital investment
is $1 to $2 million, with an investment horizon-of three to five years. *•
The third business consideration listed in Table 4-1, investment recovery,
refers to the revenue-generating potential of an investment. In this regard,
the Space Station fares favorably, since the potential economic benefits of a
Space Station, as described in Section 2 of the volume, are indeed
considerable. These potential benefits are sufficiently impressive that they
might outweigh the prohibitive investment level and payback period factors,
except for the existence of substantial risk in such a venture. With regard
to the four types of risk listed in Table 4-1: technical, market, financial,
and institutional risk, the Space Station poses significant barriers to
private investment.
Technical risk is the risk involved in creating or providing a new or untried
good or service. Technical risk is characterized by the fundamental question,
"Will it work?", and in the case of high technology projects such as the Space
Station, this question can be pervasive. Although NASA's Skylab program
provided a great deal of basic knowledge and essentially proved that a Space
Station is technologically feasible, a new Space Station program would raise a
completely new set of technical uncertainties. This is particularly true in
the area of commercial utilization, where dependence on advanced technologies
(such as the space-based OTV) would be heavy.
Market risk refers to the uncertainties involved in selling a product or
service, and is the demand-side counterpart to supply-side technical risk.
Market risk is based on such factors as price sensitivities, product distribu-
tion, competition, and advertising, and these conditions are usually measured
by some sort of market analysis prior to any major investment. The Study of
Space Station Needs, Attributes, and Architectural Options is in part a Space
Station market analysis, and has revealed a great deal of market risk asso-
ciated with such a venture. Since most organizations do not plan more than
four or five years ahead, at least not to any great detail, it is exceedingly
difficult to predict user demand for a Space Station that will not be opera-
tional for 10 years or more. This problem is intensified by the fact that
Space Station services and products have inherently limited market appeal, due
to their probable high cost and uncertainties regarding their availability.
These conclusions were verified by industry responses to GDC's "Space Station
User Brochure."
^Simon, M.C., "Private Financing and Operation of a Space Station:
Investment Requirements, Risk, Government Support and Other Primary Business
and Management Considerations", NASA CR-169357, September 1982.
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Market risk is particularly significant in the area of materials processing in
space (MPS). Despite the long-term potential of MPS, there is a tremendous
problem involved in interesting potential customers in a technology that
remains in an infant state of development, whose benefits from a Space Station
are uncertain, and whose products must have values on the order of $10,000 to
$100,000 per pound in order to be cost effective. It is largely due to the
impact of market risk that the launch of communications satellites via space-
based OTV, and not MPS, appears the most promising commercial use of a Space
Station. Despite its prohibitive investment requirements and technical risk,
the OTV addresses the only proven, mature market for space utilization: the
communications industry.
Financial risk pertains to investment level and payback period, and increases
directly with the magnitude of these factors. The large up-front investment
that would be required before any Space Station operations could be initiated
poses a significant financial risk; in general, the larger the commitment of
resources prior to revenue generation, the greater the financial risk. Many
business ventures permit a gradual buildup of investment as sales and revenue
increase, but the Space Station does not appear likely to offer an opportunity
to "boot-strap" operations in this manner. Again, this is particularly evi-
dent in Space Station commercial uses. The OTV would require a multibillion
dollar investment in launch vehicles, support facilities, and technology
development for facilities and operations, before a single dollar in launch
service revenue could be generated.
Institutional risk encompasses a broad variety of uncertainties regarding
organizational and logistical factors, and is of particular concern in a Space
Station program because of the involvement of government. Considerations that
fall under the categorization of institutional risk include availability of
Shuttle flights, Shuttle costs, government support, military requirements,
taxes, economic conditions such as inflation and interest rates, and legal
rulings. In addition to being an important and complex factor, institutional
risk is significant in that the government has considerable power to influence
its impact on commercial opportunities. NASA's joint-endeavor program, which
offers guaranteed Shuttle flights and other services to companies that are
willing to explore new markets for space products, is one means the government
has available for reducing institutional risk. Other more general government
policies and actions, such as research and development tax credits, environ-
mental and safety regulations, and international agreements, can play a sig-
nificant role in reducing the institutional risk of a Space Station venture to
acceptable levels.
Despite its particularly important role in influencing institutional risk, the
government must be aware of all of these investment and risk considerations if
it is to successfully involve the private sector in the Space Station
program. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, partnership
between the government and industry can be effective in addressing nearly all
of these business factors, but only if the government develops a Space Station
program with these matters under consideration. Similarly, the government
must bear in mind its mandate to serve the public interest, and ensure that
its efforts to generate commercial interest in the Space Station do not
compromise its own requirements.
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4.3 OPTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP
For the government, the institutional challenge of developing a Space Station
program that meets both public and private requirements is nearly as great as
the technological problems that must be overcome. Government attempts at
encouraging private sector involvement in large projects has historically had
mixed results, and raises basic questions about the government's role in the
economy. The Space Station cannot be properly defined, without determining
the rights and responsibilities of the private and public sector participants
in such a program.
4.3.1 THE SPACE STATION AS A SEMIPRIVATE GOOD. The easiest way to resolve
the issue of private versus public participation in a Space Station venture
would probably be to build the Space Station much as previous major NASA
programs have been implemented, i.e., as a public good where the private
sector role is limited to that of contractor to the government. In this
simplest of scenarios, the government assumes all risks inherent in such an
enterprise, with all benefits of the program treated as public.
Although this option remains attractive for its simplicity, it does not
address the major issue facing NASA today: that the government has been
reluctant to foot the entire bill for a Space Station, at least up until the
present time. With strong national sentiment for limiting the government's
role in the economy, and for deriving practical benefits from those programs
the government is involved in, it appears that industry needs to assume a more
active role in Space Station development if such a program is to be initi-
ated. Private-sector involvement is seen to offer several advantages: it
reduces the government's financial burden, ensures efficiency usually asso-
ciated with private ventures, increases the likelihood of achieving a higher
market sensitivity in Space Station services, and gives industry a greater
incentive to develop.a system whose benefits will be real and lasting.
Although these ideals may seem optimistic, they are at the root of capitalist
theory, which presumably is as applicable to Space Station development as to
any other program for which private investment is feasible.
Is private investment in a Space Station feasible? The attractiveness of the
Space Station to industry is obviously limited, or some company would already
be well on its way to developing such a facility. The Space Station hence
sits on a median ground - the government is not eager to sponsor it as a
public good, nor is the private sector willing to develop it as a private
resource^ This does not necessarily indicate that the Space Station is not a
worthwhile venture, but it does mean that the Space Station, to be established
in the near future, will most likely be developed as a joint public-private,
or semiprivate good.
4-8
GDC-ASP-83-004
Semiprivate goods are Chose commodities with economic and social value, but
whose attractiveness to the private sector is diminished by certain barriers.
Such goods are provided through government-industry partnership, with the
government usually providing the initiative by offering assistance in reducing
barriers to industry involvement. Through a process of ."controlled privatiza-
tion" the government enacts programs that address investment considerations
such as those discussed in the previous section. The privatization model in
Figure 4-3 gives a conceptual view of this process. Public, private, and
semiprivate goods are shown as functions of their demand and investment
attractiveness. Public goods have the lowest combination of demand and
investment attractiveness, which is why they are not provided by private
industry.
In Figure 4-3, controlled privatization is conceptually depicted as an
increase in investment attractiveness brought about by government support,
which encourages some level of private investment and changes a public good to
a semiprivate good. This shift is shown as an upward shift of the privatiza-
tion curve, rather than an outward one, since government support is not -aimed
at increasing demand for a good, but at influencing supply-side investment
considerations. Investment level, payback period, and risk can all be
addressed through various government actions, forcing the shift of public
goods into the realm of semiprivate goods. The objective of the government in
such cases should be to offer just enough assistance to achieve the develop-
ment of the semiprivate good or service; private-sector contribution is thus
maximized. This is the case in Figure 4-3, where just enough government
support is offered to encourage creation of a semiprivate good, causing a
shift from curve AA to curve BB. For the given demand D*, the amount of
government support necessary to raise investment attractiveness from I* to I1
is the minimum public commitment needed to create this semiprivate good.
Creation of semiprivate goods through government manipulation of investment
conditions has many precedents in American history. Perhaps most prominent is
the example of the railroad industry, where government land grants and sub-
sidies were offered as incentives for private development of a national
railway system. Such government intervention can be highly effective in
encouraging private investment, as was amply demonstrated in the case Of the
railroads, although this support does have its perils, as evidenced by the
railroad industry's continued dependence on public support. These hidden
costs and dangers of government support must be addressed, as well as the
effectiveness of the government in influencing investment considerations, in
evaluating the government's role in Space Station commercialization.
4.3.2 SPACE STATION COMMERCIALIZATION: GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES. The
government has a number of options that it can consider in planning for
transformation of space development from a public to a semiprivate good.
These various strategies influence the investment considerations detailed in
the preceding section in different ways and their expected impact on these
factors can provide a basis for predicting their effectiveness in encouraging
private-sector involvement in a Space Station program.
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Figure 4-3. The Privatization Model
One set of options available to the government can be categorized as govern-
ment incentives, where the government provides some stimulus to precipitate
private investment, but with the private sector assuming primary responsi-
bility for program management. Government incentives can be divided into
three categories - financial incentives, logistical incentives, and market
incentives - each having a different impact on investment considerations.
Table 4-2 summarizes the general characteristics of these types of incentives
and their major benefits and costs.^
Financial Incentives may play a key role in Space Station development,
although direct cash subsidies from the government are unlikely. Research and
development tax credits, however, are a more subtle and politically palatable
form of financial incentives that are already being exploited in the formation
of other space ventures. Proposals have also been offered for creation of a
Space Bank that would make federally-subsidized low-interest loans available
to investors wishing to undertake space ventures. Tax credits and, to a
lesser extent, loans could be effective in reducing the financial liability
and investment level requirements for Space Station investment, but would do
little to mitigate the great risks that would be involved in such an
enterprise. - . - , . -
Logistical incentives are currently employed in NASA's joint-endeavor program,
where NASA-subsidized Shuttle flights are used as an incentive for companies
to develop commercial space hardware. Agreements of this sort are effective
in reducing institutional risk, since they demonstrate a willingness on the
part of the government to work closely with private organizations toward a
common goal. Logistical incentives could encourage use of Space Station
facilities by private companies once a Space Station is established, but may
not in themselves convince industry to invest in development of costly Space
Station elements.
^Reprinted from Simon, M.C. "Analysis of Government's Role in
Commercialization of Space Technology", c 1982 General Dynamics Corp.
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Table 4-2. Government Incentives
Benefits Costs
Financial
Government offers financial
incentives to encourage
investment in space; e.g.,
guaranteed loans, tax credits, or
cash subsidies.
Logistical
Government offers free or
reduced-cost transportation or
other services as an inducement
to private investment.
Market
Government guarantees or
"creates" a market by agreeing
to purchase space products or
services at an agreed-upon price.
Highly effective in reducing
investment level requirements
and financial risk. Costs to
government and benefits to
industry are relatively simple to
quantify.
Allows government to use its
resources to develop systems
(e.g., Space Shuttle) over which
the government can maintain
control and that show a return on
taxpayer investment.
Minimizes risk to government
.since public resources are not
expended until program is
completed successfully and final
products or services are
delivered.
Often present political problems
since financial aid is highly visible
and is frequently granted to
private sector long before
projected returns are evident.
Not as effective in stimulating
private sector interest as cash
assistance and dependent upon
government's ability to provide
services on schedule for agreed
cost.
Does not reduce investment level
or investment horizon for private
investors and usually requires
long-term government com-
mitments, often requiring special
legislative action.
18102618-7
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Market incentives might provide a forceful supplement to logistical incentives
in encouraging investment in development, as well as use, of Space Station
capabilities. Market incentives were the primary force behind NASA's tracking
and data relay satellite (TDRS) project with Spacecom, where NASA agreed to
lease TDRS services from Spacecom in exchange for Spacecom's commitment to
develop the TDRS system. Although this program does have its critics, it has
been successful in creating a commercial opportunity and providing a needed
resource for NASA. Market incentives are also being considered for use in
NASA's joint-endeavor program. A typical Space Station application might be
for NASA to agree to lease time on a laboratory module, from a private
organization willing to invest in development of the lab.
4.JJ.3 SPACE STATION COMMERCIALIZATION: GOVERNMENT TASK SHARING. A second
category of government support for commercialization, which can be charac-
terized as government task sharing, could have applications in development of
a Space Station as a semiprivate good. Government task sharing entails a
greater degree of government involvement than government incentives, entrust-
ing the public sector with the major responsibility for program management and
direction. Government task sharing can similarly be segregated into three
separate categories: developmental task sharing, preoperational task sharing,
and elemental task sharing. Table 4-3 summarizes some of the key
characteristics of these three types of government task sharing.•*
3See footnote 2.
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Table 4-3. Government Task Sharing
Developmental
Government performs necessary
R&D to demonstrate technical
and programmatic concepts;
hardware is purchased and
assembled privately.
Pre-Operational
Government develops and builds
systems and transfers ownership
and/or control to private sector
after demonstrating operational
capabilities.
Elemental
Government develops and builds
core system elements and per-
mits private companies to
develop other components to add
to main system.
Benefits
Allows agencies such as NASA
to perform basic R&D functions
while greatly reducing private
sector financial commitments and
technical risks.
Greatly reduces all aspects of pri-
vate sector risk and investment
requirements, while giving
government greatest control over
system development and
production.
Parallel development can offer
the most equitable means of task
sharing, also affords government
and private sector firil control
over system development.
Costs
Can present difficulties in distin-
guishing "R&D" from "produc-
tion" and could result in tech-
nology development that is not
optimized for private sector pro-
duction and operation.
Entails greatest cost and liability
to government, offering none of
the advantages of private-sector
development or production.
Private participants dependent
upon government to provide core
system elements on schedule;
can also create technical and
programmatic compatibility
problems.
 18io26i8-8
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Developmental task sharing is frequently a factor in the commercialization of
high technology, where government-supported'research and development is often
made available to industry when business applications become feasible. An
example is the nuclear power industry, where government research in nuclear
energy is made available to utility companies willing to invest in the hard-
ware necessary for commercial development of nuclear power. In the space
program, technology spin-offs are another example of developmental task shar-
ing that is not aimed at any one particular project. A more planned and
specific approach to developmental task sharing could be used to encourage
private investment in a Space Station, since by sponsoring research and
development the government could greatly reduce the cost of building and
operating Space Station facilities.
If private operation of Space Station facilities is a major goal, then
preoperational task sharing could be the most effective means of achieving
commercialization, although it requires the greatest commitment of public
resources. Since.a frequent argument against a NASA Space Station is that the
government would have to make a long-term budget commitment to Space Station
operations, preoperational task sharing could be attractive to the public
sector despite its requirement that the government bear essentially all devel-
opment and production costs. The government would retain control over the
ultimate design of the facility, perhaps helping to ensure the establishment
of a Space Station consistent with the public's interest. As discussed in
Table 4-3, however, preoperational task sharing provides none of the benefits
of private-sector development or production.
4-12
GDC-ASP-83-004
A more balanced approach to Space Station privatization might be provided by
elemental task sharing, wherein the government could develop a Space Station
core facility and permit private companies to attach elements dedicated to
their particular commercial interests. This approach also has important
drawbacks (see Table 4-3), but offers a straightforward.means for dividing
Space Station development, production, and operating responsibilities among
government and industry program participants. Elemental task sharing also
lends itself well to combinations with the government incentive approaches to
controlled privatization, and could, as discussed in Section 4.4, form the
centerpiece of a government-led program to address the major private-sector
Space Station investment considerations.
4.4 SPACE STATION PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION
The impediments to private investment in a Space Station venture are suffi-
ciently high that government leadership in such a program is a practical
necessity. Although there are people within government who believe the Space
Station program should be exclusively a public enterprise, apparently there
have not been enough to get such a project approved. So, despite the obvious
need for government leadership in developing a Space Station, the private
sector will have to play a prominent role in such a program. This is the
fundamental reason for the emphasis on economic benefits in this study volume,
and for the analysis in the previous two sections of government and industry
investment requirements and partnership options. These can form the basis for
a programmatic strategy that combines traditional space program funding
methods with a new, commercial-oriented management approach.
4.4.1 COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIP OPTIONS. The government
incentives and government task sharing options introduced in Section 4-3 each
address different private investment considerations. Table 4-4 shows the
relative effectiveness of these options in influencing the seven key invest-
ment criteria discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The government task
sharing options have a generally higher impact on business considerations,
particularly in the areas of investment level and financial risk.
Preoperational task sharing is the most effective option overall, with a high
impact on five of the seven investment considerations, and is particularly
effective in reducing risk. Government incentives do not have as strong an
impact in general as the task sharing options, but market incentives is the
only option in either category that has an appreciable impact on investment
recovery or market risk. Logistical incentives is an attractive-option too,
because it has precedents in NASA's joint-endeavor program and a high impact
on institutional risk.
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Table 4-4. Impact of Government-Industry Partnership Options
on Key Investment Considerations
Investment
Considera-
tion In-
Partner- N. Invest- Invest- Invest- Tech- stitu-
ship N. ment ment ment nical Market Financial tional
Option >v Level Horizon Recovery Risk Risk Risk Risk
Government Incentives
Financial High Mod Low Low Low High Low
Incentives
Logistical Mod Mod Low Mod Low Mod High
Incentives
Market Incentives Low Low High Low High Mod Mod
Government Task-
Sharing
Developmental
Task-Sharing
Pre-Operational
Task Sharing
Elemental Task-
Sharing
High
High
High
Mod
High
Mod
Low
Low
Low
Mod
High
Mod
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
Low
High
Mod
An effective government-industry Space Station program should contain elements
of several of these partnership options, so all business considerations can be
addressed and to take advantage of the particular benefits each option has to
offer. A combination of preoperational task sharing and market incentives
would have a high impact on all seven investment criteria, but preoperational
task sharing entails the greatest cost to the government so its use should be
moderate. Developmental and elemental task sharing could provide an equitable
means of supplementing a limited use of preoperational task sharing.
Logistical incentives should be utilized for the advantages listed above.
The only option that should be avoided if possible is financial incentives,
since it presents particularly sensitive political problems and has adequate
substitutes in the other optionsT ------
4.4.2 A SPACE STATION PROGRAM STRATEGY UTILIZING GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY
PARTNERSHIP OPTIONS. A first step in developing a Space Station program
strategy that takes full advantages of the various government-industry
partnership options is to subdivide the Space Station program into separate
tasks. Figure 4-4 shows the Space Station program as separated into two
time phases, development and operations, and two task divisions, core and
elements. The five partnership options considered are shown according to
their applicability in these task divisions.
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Figure 4-4. Space Station Task Division
The Space Station core is defined as a housekeeping or utility section that
provides basic resources such as power, data management, and life support to
the various Space Station users. The elements are defined as the specific
operational units that are dedicated to particular uses and that derive their
utility services from the core. Space Station elements could include a
materials processing facility, life science labs, and an OTV base. In this
analysis, development is defined as all work done prior to operations, and
includes initial assembly of the Space Station.
Figure 4-4 shows that the government task sharing options are more applicable
to Space Station development than operations; developmental and preoperational
task sharing are employed in development of the utility core, and elemental
task sharing in development of the elements. In development of the core,
preoperational task sharing will be_moderated to the extent that.private ..„„
investment can be encouraged. If the government must develop and assemble the
entire core, then any subsequent private-sector involvement in core operations
would be indicative of preoperational task sharing. If, on the other extreme,
the government needed only to perform research and development, with private
purchase and assembly of the core, then the situation could be characterized
as developmental task sharing. The actual situation would probably be in
between these two extremes. Operation of both the core and the elements is
achieved through logistical and market incentives.
4-15
GDC-ASP-83-004
In a program scenario utilizing these partnership options, the government
would act quite differently than it would in pursuing a more traditional
acquisition strategy. NASA would undertake two activities in parallel:
development of the utility core and the development of an initial set of
elements to be integrated with the core. Figure b-5 shows this parallel
activity, with NASA effectively providing seed money for development of the
core and, at the same time, coordinating development of elements through
joint-endeavor agreements.
SDC
(8)
Seed money
NASA
Joint-endeavor
agreement
(2)
(5)
Space station
user
30033258-122
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Figure 4-5. Space Station: Functional Responsibilities
A programmatic strategy of this type would achieve two major objectives:
maximizing private investment in Space Station development and ensuring a
Space Station that would be operated privately. The Space Station core would
be operated by a Space Development Corporation (SDC), which, as illustrated in
Flow (1) of Figure 4-5, would contract with NASA to operate the utility core
with private funds if NASA develops the core. NASA could develop the core
(Flow (2)) through more-or-less conventional means, and the SDC would prepare
for operating the core once established by NASA. The SDC might be a partner-
ship of aerospace and/or investment firms, and could be established in
response to a NASA invitation to operate the Space Station Core.
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NASA's parallel activity, as shown in Flow (3), would be to actively solicit
joint-endeavor proposals from aerospace firms interested in becoming Space
Station providers. The resulting joint-endeavor agreements (JEAs) would
establish a number of Space Station providers, each one responsible for
developing and operating a particular element (Flow (4)), with government
support furnished through the JEA. By soliciting competitive joint-endeavor
proposals, NASA could ensure the greatest possible private-sector commitment
to invest in development and operation of these elements. The JEAs would be
characterized by.the government incentives approach, with logistical and
market incentives used to diminish the barriers to private investment in Space
Station elements.
The SDC would furnish utility services for the Space Station elements
(Flow (5)), which would be operated by the providers for Space Station users
of these elements, as shown in Flow (6). The users of the elements would
reimburse the providers (Flow (7)), who would in turn reimburse the SDC for
utility services (Flow (8)). As a hypothetical example, Company A, a Space
Station provider, might develop and operate a materials processing module,
receiving joint-endeavor support from NASA in the way of free Shuttle flights
and a NASA guarantee to be a customer for an agreed level of use of the
facility. Company B, a Space Station user, would lease the materials
processing capabilities and reimburse Company A for these services. Company A
would then reimburse the SDC for the power and data management required to run
the processing facility. As illustrated in Figure 4-6, the SDC might be a
limited partnership involving aerospace firms, investment firms, and perhaps
even some of the small emerging space commpanies that are attempting to
commercialize various space systems.
As a first step in establishing this type of Space Station program, NASA would
need to establish a Space Station program office capable of performing four
key tasks:
a. Publicizing the various opportunities for companies to become involved in
the Space Station program. This activity might include distribution of
the "Invitation to Operate" for stimulating the organization of a Space
Development Corporation (SDC), and distribution of a "Request for
Joint-Endeavor Proposals" to companies interested in developing and
operating Space Station elements.
b. Negotiating with firms for core operations and ultimate selection of a SDC
to operate the core. .
c. Development of the utility core, with cooperation from the SDC to the
extent necessary to enable the SDC to operate the core.
d. Negotiating with firms that submit joint-endeavor proposals for
development and operation of Space Station elements, and subsequent
approval of joint-endeavor agreements.
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Figure 4-6. SDC Organization Option
Aerospace firms (and all other industrial companies) would have four different
options for participation in this type of program:
a. As partners in the core-operating SDC.
b. As Space Station providers, developing and operating elements through
joint-endeavor agreements with NASA.
c. As contractors to NASA in developing the utility core.
d. As Space Station users, leasing services from Space Station providers.
Such a program could probably be established, but many legal and institutional
i88uje8__wouild_haye.__tp.Jbe_re8plved,__8uch_ as the antitrust implications of the
SDC. It is not clear how attractive a business opportunity operation of the
core and elements would be, but, by establishing this sort of program, the
government would give companies an incentive to devote their own resources to
evaluating the attractiveness of investing in the Space Station. Based on the
potential economic benefits of the Space Station, and the possibilities for
government support through a variety of governmment-industry partnership
options, it seems possible that this concept or some similar programmatic
strategy could succeed.
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SECTION 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal conclusions resulting from the analysis conducted during this
study are presented in Table 5-1.
Recommendations for additional near term analysis in the economic benefits and
cost analysis area are listed in Table 5-2.
Table 5-1. Economic Benefits and Cost Analysis Conclusions
• The space-based OTV function offers substantial near-term
economic benefits
• The research & production and the satellite servicing functions
also offer some near-term economic benefits, great long-term
• The initial recommended research space station cost will be
about S5.5B at IOC & S6.3B at full capability
• The SBOTV function incremental cost is about $4.5B. The
SBOTV & the propellent tanker will cost about $2.7B
• The combined space station break-even in terms of economic
benefits occurs about 2004
• Several options exist for creating partnership between
government & industry in a space station program
• Potentially attractive business opportunities have been
identified in the development of several key space station
capabilities
30033258-116
266.592-376
Table 5-2. Recommended Near-Term Economic Analyses
Refine & continue to develop current cost/benefit projections
Conduct space station & SBOTV operations cost & user charge
analyses
Develop cost modeling for total mission payload set (including
free-flyers, etc)
Identify & estimate funding available from other than NASA
users (amount, timing, investment reimbursement, etc)
30033258-115
266.592-377
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APPENDIX I
SPACE STATION PROSPECTUS
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APPENDIX I
SPACE STATION PROSPECTUS
The Space Station Prospectus was developed to show how a Space Station might
be developed as a private enterprise. The prospectus is also designed to
provide an effective means for NASA to market Space Station investment
opportunities within the private sector. The prospectus announces a
fictitious stock offering for a hypothetical corporation, "Consolidated Space
Enterprises," which would form a number of subsidiary companies to develop and
operate Space Station systems and elements. Although the prospectus is
fictitious, it contains factual technical and economic data developed during
the Space Station study, and its Business Plan and Financial Analysis show
significant profit potential in such a venture.
1-1
GDC-ASP-83-004
PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS DATED AUGUST 1, 1985
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Consolidated Space Enterprises, Inc.
300,000 Shares of Common Stock
Consolidated Space Enterprises, Inc., is a new industrial corporation. The Company plans
eventually to develop, build, and operate a variety of facilities and systems in space for the
purpose of providing services and products on a commercial basis to private sector customers,
academic institutions, and government agencies, both in the United States and abroad. Taken
collectively, the facilities and systems the Company plans to operate would constitute a Space
Station system. The Company believes that these facilities and systems can be developed,
built, and operated in a building-block fashion, with each element implemented only when ex-
pected commercial revenues justify the investment risk. The Company plans to form a series
of subsidiary companies, each with separate public offerings of shares, as each element, in the
Company's opinion, becomes a reasonable commercial venture. During the first year after the
effective date of this offering, the Company will conduct further studies to develop its com-
mercial development plans and will attempt to organize as its first subsidiary the Space Power
Company to provide additional electrical power to the Space Shuttle and other spacecraft by
developing, building, and operating a free-flying power module in low-Earth orbit. See "The
Company," "Commercial Development of Space," "The Company's Strategy for Commercial
Space Development," and "Space Power Company."
NOTE: WHILE THIS PROSPECTUS IS FICTITIOUS AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF "CONSOLI-
DATED SPACE ENTERPRISES," THE TECHNICAL DETAILS AND THE ECONOMIC ANALYSES
CONTAINED HEREIN ARE BASED ON THE FINAL REPORT ON THE STUDY OF SPACE STA-
TION NEEDS, ATTRIBUTES, AND ARCHITECTURAL OPTIONS ISSUED BY GENERAL
DYNAMICS CONVAIR DIVISION. APRIL 22. 1983.
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THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION PASSED UPON THE
ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY REPRESENTATION
TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
This prospectus should be read and retained for future reference.
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Offering
Price
Brokers' and
Dealers'
Commissions
Proceeds to
the Company*
Per share
Total
$10.00
$3,000,000
'Before deducting expenses payable by the Company, estimated at $
CONSOLIDATED SPACE ENTERPRISES, INC.
San Diego, California
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SYNOPSIS
Shares of the Common Stock of Consolidated Space Enterprises, Inc. (the "Company") are
offered to the public, directly and through selected dealers, at $10.00 per share. The minimum
purchase in this offering is 100 shares. See "The Company," "Capitalization and Description
of Common Stock," and "Public Offering."
Prior to the date of this offering, there has been no public market for the Company's Com-
mon Stock. After this offering, the Common Stock will be traded in the over-the-counter
market See "The Company."
The Company plans eventually to develop, build, and operate a variety of facilities and
systems in space for the purpose of providing services and products on a commercial basis to
private sector customers, academic institutions, and government agencies, both in the United
States and abroad. The Company believes that these facilities and systems can be developed,
built, and operated on a commercial basis, with each element implemented only when expected
commercial revenues justify the investment risk. The Company plans to form a series of sub-
sidiary companies, each with separate public offerings of shares, as each element becomes a
reasonable commercial venture. The Company will retain a significant fraction (10 to 50%) of
the shares offered at the time of formation of each subsidiary. Existing other corporations in
related ground-based industries will be invited to join the Company as large shareholders at
the time of formation of each subsidiary.
Although the Company has no operating history, it plans to undertake a program for com-
mercial development of space for which the economic magnitude and technical complexity —
in toto — are very large in comparison with most private enterprise undertakings. Many tech-
nological, political, and economic uncertainties lie between the Company's present activities
and profitability, and an investment in the Company should be considered to be highly specu-
lative. See "The Company," "Commercial Development of Space," and "The Company's
Strategy for Commercial Space Development" under "Business Plan."
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THE COMPANY
Consolidated Space Enterprises, Inc. .(the "Company") was incorporated in the state of
Delaware on July 20, 1985.
The Company plans eventually to develop, build, and operate a variety of facilities in space
for the purpose of providing services and products on a commercial basis to private sector cus-
tomers, academic institutions, and government agencies, both in the United States and abroad.
Taken collectively, the facilities and systems the Company plans to build and operate would
constitute a Space Station system such as has been studied extensively by NASA and a num-
ber of aerospace companies under contract to NASA or to the Department of Defense during
the last twenty to thirty years. (Eight parallel studies on Space Station Needs, Attributes, and
Architectural Options were performed under NASA and Department of Defense sponsorship
in 1982-1983 by Boeing Aerospace Company, General Dynamics Convair Division, Grumman
Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Martin Marietta Denver
Aerospace Corporation, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Rockwell International
Corporation, and TRW Inc.)
The Company believes that the facilities and systems comprising the Space Station System
can be developed, built, and operated in a building-block fashion, with each element implemen-
ted only when expected commercial revenues justify the investment risk. See "The Company's
Strategy for Commercial Space Development." The Company plans to form a series of subsidi-
ary companies, each with separate public offerings of shares, as each element, in the Company's
opinion, becomes a reasonable commercial venture. See "Space Station Company Profiles"
under "Business Plan." The Company plans to retain a significant fraction (in the range of 10
to 50%) of the shares offered at the time of formation of each subsidiary. Existing other cor-
porations in related ground-based industries will be invited to join the Company as large
shareholders at the time of formation of each subsidiary.
Nothing will preclude other companies from entering the field of commercial operations in
space in a manner directly competitive with the Company. The Company anticipates, however,
that its expertise and its priority in the field will provide the competitive edge necessary for
the high degree of profitability expected for the investment risks involved. In some cases,
entry of other companies into a particular type of services before the Company believes those
services to be economically attractive may preclude the Company for a period of time entering
that marketplace. For this reason, there can be no assurance that the Company will form all of
the subsidiary companies described in—Space Station Company Profiles" under "Business
Plan."
If the Company succeeds in carrying through all of its commercial development program, a
total investment of $5 billion to $10 billion may be required over the next ten to fifteen years.
According to the General Dynamics Convair Division final report on Space Station Needs,
Attributes, and Architectural Options, earnings on that investment may be $1 billion to $2
billion annually. While cooperative efforts with government agencies may reduce the total
capital requirements, there is no assurance that the total capital required to carry out the Com-
pany's commercial development program can be raised or that income will ever be high enough
for the Company or its subsidiaries to be profitable. Many technological, political, and eco-
nomic uncertainties lie between the Company's present activities and profitability, and an in-
vestment in the Company should be considered as highly speculative.
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During the first year after the effective date of this offering, the Company will conduct fur-
ther studies to develop its commercial development plans and will attempt to organize as its
first subsidiary the Space Power Company to provide electrical power on a commercial basis to
the Space Shuttle and other spacecraft by developing building, and operating a free-flying
Power Module in low-Earth orbit. See "Space Power Company "-under "Space Station Com-
pany Profiles."
There has not previously been any market for the Common Stock of the Company. The
Common Stock is not listed on any stock exchange and there can be no assurance of the extent
or even the existence of an over-the-counter market for the Common Stock.
The Company is not now offering the Common Stock in connection with "Keogh Plans,"
"Individual Retirement Accounts," or any other retirement plan.
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE
The development of commercial uses of space began in 1963 when the United States Con-
gress chartered the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) for the purpose of
creating and operating a satellite communications system on a worldwide basis. Commercial
operations in space began in 1965 with the launch of COMSAT's Early Bird communications
satellite into geostationary orbit (GEO).
Since then, numerous studies conducted by NASA, by aerospace companies, and by univer-
sities have shown the eventual feasibility (both technically and economically) of an enormous
diversity of commercial opportunities in space. Many industrial processes can theoretically be
performed more efficiently in space than on the surface of the Earth. Some of these processes
have been tested experimentally in orbit aboard Sky lab, during the joint American-Soviet
Apollo-Soyuz flight, aboard Soviet Soyuz and Salyut flights, and aboard the Space Shuttle. A
constant supply of full-strength solar energy, near-zero gravity, and very high vacuum are
readily accessible in low-Earth orbit (LEO). Unobstructed view of large portions of the Earth
in a very short period of time offers the opportunity for rapid and inexpensive geological pros-
pecting, crop assessment, resource management, and environmental monitoring. Possibilities
for much of this technology have already been developed by NASA in the Landsat (Earth Re-
sources Satellite) program and by private firms specializing in the image processing and inter-
pretation of space-based remote sensing data.
_ Further possibilities include the conversion of solar energy in space into forms suitable for
transmission to the surface of the Earth (either by microwave or laser.beams) for use on Earth
as electrical power or as a source of synthetic fuels, and the eventual mining of raw materials
from the Moon and the asteroids for use in space and on Earth.
The commercial development of space has been enhanced by the development and operation
of the Space Shuttle, which has reduced the cost of transportation from the surface of the
Earth to low-Earth orbit and has increased the size and mass of cargos which can be delivered
to orbit. The development and construction of the various facilities and systems making up a
Space Station is expected to enhance the possibilities for commercial operations in space still
further, and it is by providing those facilities and by vigorously marketing those facilities that
the Company intends to achieve a high level of profitability.
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The commercial possibilities presently foreseen in space and the role that Space Station
facilities would play in development of these commercial ventures are described in greater
detail below.
Information Services
Information services in space comprise communications satellites, remote sensing satellites,
navigation satellites, and geolocation satellites. At the present time, most communications
satellites, whether operated commercially or by the military services, are placed in geostation-
ary orbit (GEO) some 22,300 miles above the Earth's equator. At that altitude, the period of
revolution about the Earth is 24 hours, the same as the period for the Earth itself to rotate
about its axis, so that a satellite placed there appears to be fixed in the sky, providing a con-
stant link between any pair of points on Earth in view of the satellite. With present day tech-
nologies for the electronic systems aboard a large communications satellite such as the INTEL-
SAT-VI series, the communications capacity of the satellite is sufficiently large to generate
revenues of up to $10 million per month. During the ten year period from 1986 through 1995, it
is anticipated that the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), and domestic U.S. telecomu-
nications companies will place into operation new satellite capacity equivalent to 50 to 100
INTELSAT-VI spacecraft. Military communications satellites, of comparable size, may be
launched in similar numbers during the same period.
Remote sensing satellites include weather satellites, both in GEO and in lower altitude
orbits; military satellites in GEO to provide early warning of rocket and missile launches; mili-
tary reconnanissance and ocean surveillance satellites in LEO; and Earth resources satellites
such as LANDSAT in LEO. The numbers of such satellites to be launched during the next ten
years will depend very strongly on the commercial viability of the Earth resources satellites,
which is highly uncertain at the present time for institutional, technological, and political
reasons.
Navigation satellites at the present time are operated only by the military services in high
Earth orbits, but it is possible that a separate system may be developed for civilian air naviga-
tion. A total of up to 18 satellites may be launched for the military Global Positioning Satellite
system by 1995.
Very large platforms placed in GEO which could interrogate small transponders aboard
ground vehicles, aircraft, surface vessels, or very high value packages could locate such items
almost anywhere on Earth within 300 feet. With a sufficient number of-users for such a
geolocation service, a modest charge for each interrogation (about $10) would make this ser-
vice commercially viable. At the present time, the Company is unaware of any firm plans by
any company or government agency to develop, build, and operate such satellites.
Cumulatively, revenues from information services in space are estimated to exceed $10
billion per year by 1990, rising to about $100 billion per year around the turn of the century,
according to a study on space industrialization performed by Science Applications, Inc., for
NASA in 1977-1978.
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Space Products
A great deal of research has been conducted on the subject of materials processing in space
(MPS), taking advantage of the near-zero gravity environment — occasionally coupled with the
accessibility of very high vacuum and very low or very high temperatures using either shades
or solar concentrators — to fabricate products or materials of very high value per pound. In
order to be commercially successful, such products or materials must be either better or
cheaper than Earth-made equivalents, or must be entirely novel, offering functions which can-
not be achieved with Earth-based processes.
At the present time, NASA has undertaken a joint endeavor with McDonnell Douglas
Astronautics Company and Johnson and Johnson, Inc. to develop equipment to provide elec-
trophoretic separation of proprietary biological substances hi a series of flights aboard the
Space Shuttle. It is anticipated that a production facility which can be carried into space
aboard the Space Shuttle and, perhaps, attached to a Space Station permanently will result
from this program, yielding commercial quantities of several different biological and phar-
maceutical substances of far greater purity than can be produced on the Earth.
Other possibilities include semiconductor materials, high grade optical glasses, very high
strength fibers, high performance magnetic materials, and new ceramic materials for special-
ized applications on Earth.
With further maturity of the Space Shuttle system, complemented by permanent facilities
in LEO for human habitation, assembly and construction of large platforms will becom feasi-
ble, platforms far larger and heavier than can be launched aboard a single Space Shuttle flight.
Large platforms could provide much more versatile and capable communications systems than
are presently possible, as well as new services such as geolocation.
Space Transportation
The Space Shuttle is designed to carry cargoes and people from the surface of the Earth to
low-Earth orbit (up to about 500 miles altitude) and back. As discussed above, many of the
most profitable Space Shuttle payloads must be placed in GEO. Thus, some kind of propulsion
system is needed to transfer these payloads from LEO to higher orbits, often with a change in
inclination of the plane of the orbit as well. At the present time, this transfer is accomplished
with expendable systems. Significant reductions in the cost of placing satellites hi GEO and
other high-Earth orbits will eventually be achieved by using reusable orbital transfer vehicles
(QTVs). The^establishment of„permanent facilities in LEO to refuel, maintain, and launch
OTVs will reduce the cost of placing satellites hi GEO still further.
Repair, refurbishment, and upgrading of satellites from permanent facilities in LEO is
anticipated to be feasible by the early 1990s. Transportation of repair equipment (or of the
satellites themselves) between such permanent facilities and the operating orbital locations of
the satellites to be repaired will require use of a teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS), a self-
propelled remotely controllable industrial robot, as well as OTVs.
Should the construction and placement of very large platforms in high-Earth orbit (in-
cluding GEO) become economically attractive, orbital transfer vehicles (OTVs) of much larger
payload capacity will be required. These may depend on continuous low thrust propulsion
systems such as electric ion engines instead of chemical rocket engines, in order to reduce the
quantity of propellants required to deliver a given cargo.
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Other Services in Orbit
In the early stages of the commercial development of space, the principal opportunities
(such as communications satellites) have been oriented to providing services to customers on
the Earth. As the scale of commercial activities in space increase, however, new opportunities
for providing support services to customers in space will emerge. These services will include
energy supply, repair and construction services, fuel supply for space transportation, and liv-
ing accommodations for workers in space.
Electrical power on board the Space Shuttle is provided by a combination of electric storage
batteries and fuel cells, which produce electricity from the chemical interaction of hydrogen
and oxygen to produce water. Some portion of the payload capacity of the Space Shuttle is
devoted to the chemicals consumed by the fuel cells and to tanks containing those chemicals.
The capacity of the Space Shuttle to accomplish any tasks on orbit which require significant
levels of energy consumption is thereby limited. One or more free-flying power modules (con-
sisting of large arrays of photovoltaic cells, storage batteries, and power conditioning equip-
ment) permanently placed in low-Earth orbits would significantly enhance the capability of the
Space Shuttle for on-orbit construction and for materials processing in space. The Space Shut-
tle would rendezvous with such a power module and "plug in" its electrical supply system to
the power module. Such a power module could also be the initial building block and an indis-
pensable element of a Space Station.
Assembly and construction of large satellites; final checkout of satellites in LEO before
transfer to higher orbits; and repair, refurbishment, and upgrading of satellites and space
vehicles in orbit offer significant potential for increasing the longevity and capabilities of
space systems and thus for reducing their net cost. Such services could be provided more
effectively with permanent facilities in orbit.
Transportation systems in space (e.g., OTV, TMS) require refueling hi LEO to achieve the
advantages of resuability. Fuel can be delivered from the surface of the Earth to LEO by
dedicating space in the cargo bay of the Space Shuttle, but delivery costs could be significantly
reduced by a number of alternatives. The mam engines of the Space Shuttle use liquid oxygen
and liquid hydrogen from the External Tank (ET). At the present time, the ET is separated
from the Space Shuttle Orbiter just before the Or biter obtains full orbital speed. The ET then
falls back into the atmosphere to disintegrate over remote regions of the Indian Ocean after
launch from Cape Canaveral. The ET could, however, be carried into orbit, where a substantial
quantity of residual propellants (about 5 tons) could be recovered for use by orbital transporta-
tion, systems. Development and construction of hardware to recover cryogenic propellants
from the ET, to provide long term storage of these propellants and to refuel space vehicles
should thus proceed hand-in-hand with development and construction of the OTV.
The need to have human beings in space to perform the increasingly extensive and complex
activities discussed thus far is expected to increase rapidly despite advances in robotics and
remotely-operated machinery. While the Space Shuttle, supplemented by a power module, pro-
vides living accommodations for small crews in space for up to 3 or 4 weeks, it would be
economically inefficient to tie up the Orbiter for use in this manner. Permanent living accom-
modations and work bases in LEO for space workers are thus expected to become economically
attractive by about 1990.
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Longer Term Possibilities
The virtually continuous availability of full intensity sunlight, unattenuated by the Earth's
atmosphere, in GEO, has focused considerable attention to the Solar Power Satellite (SPS) con-
cept. Dr. Peter E. Glaser first proposed the concept in a scientific journal in 1968, and was
issued a patent in December 1973. In the SPS scheme, large photovoltaic arrays or mirrors
focusing sunlight into a boiler to drive a turbogenerator would produce very large quantities of
electrical power which would then be converted into microwave energy or laser energy for
transmission to receiver stations on the Earth. Incoming beams would then be converted back
into electricity or into chemical fuels for distribution and use by conventional means. The con-
cept was studied extensively by NASA, the Department of Energy, and a large number of
aerospace contractors and university and think tank researchers. Gross revenues for such
systems could reach $200 to $500 billion annually by the second or third decade of the next
century.
As an alternative to bringing up all the components and the assembly equipment from
Earth, Dr. Gerard K. O'Neill proposed in 1975 that SPSs be built primarily from raw materials
mined on the Moon. Since the Moon's gravity is weaker than the Earth's, much less energy
(and thus less cost) is needed to lift the same mass from the Moon than from the Earth. A sub-
sequent study performed by General Dynamics Convair Division in 1978-1979 on Lunar
Resources Utilization validated this basic concept, showing that more than 90% of the mass
required for each SPS could be obtained from the Moon.
In 1976, Dr. Brian F. O'Leary proposed that the raw materials for building SPSs could be
obtained at still lower energy cost from near-Earth asteroids. He has further proposed that
strategic metals (titanium, chronium, nickel, cobalt, platinum iridium, rhodium, and palladium,
to name a few) could be obtained from the asteroids in significant quantities by about the turn
of the century. Other asteroidal materials (including water, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen)
could eventually be used hi large greenhouse-like structures in space to raise agricultural crops
on a very large scale for delivery back to Earth.
Obtaining raw materials from non-terrestrial sources (whether from the Moon, from the
asteroids, or from the moons of other planets of the solar system) would eventually permit con-
struction of very large habitats in free space ("space colonies") for very large human popula-
tions, extending the total fabric of human civilization and commerce beyond the biosphere of
the Earth and out into the solar system.
The Role of the Space Station ,.
The Space Station has become widely regarded as the "next logical step" in America's
Space Program. Establishment of a permanent manned base in low Earth orbit will comple-
ment the Space Shuttle system, and will open up a wide range of commercial and scientific
opportunities. It will play a pivotal role in the commercial development of space, since it is dif-
ficult to envision a major space initiative which would not benefit substantially from the
availability of a manned Space Station. The attractiveness of the Space Station as a business
venture is based largely on its utility to such a broad base of potential users.
The greatest near-term Space Station business opportunity will be in the rapidly-expanding
space transportation industry. A mature and growing market for the launch of payloads into
high-energy orbits, i.e., beyond the range of the Shuttle Orbiter is well established. As a stag-
GDC-ASP-83-004
ing base for the transfer of payloads from the Orbiter to these higher orbits, the Space Station
will revolutionize space transportation. A space-based orbital transfer vehicle (OTV), main-
tained and serviced at the Space Station will deliver satellites to their desired orbits at a far
lower cost than any foreseeable competitor. By redesigning payloads to maximize the advan-
tages of the OTV, a communications satellite which now costs-over $100 million to launch
could be launched by the Shuttle-OTV combination for as little as $10 Trillion Based on
estimates of the future market for launch services, the OTV will have a profit potential (net
economic benefit) of over $1 billion per year by the mid-1990s.
The OTV will be used primarily for the launch of commercial communciations satellites.
The communications industry will also provide a market for the use of the Space Station as a
test base for advanced communications technologies, which could result in the development of
such products as portable "wristwatch telephones". The wristwatch telephone concept devel-
oped by the Aerospace Corporation in 1977 has a market potential which could exceed $15
billion per year, by the turn of the century, and could be operational by the early 1990s.
Another major user of Space Station technology development capabilities will be U.S. govern-
ment agencies which will also provide a firm market for the many technology development and
scientific missions which a Space Station will accommodate.
Science and applications disciplines which will benefit from the Space Station include astro-
physics, Earth and planetary observations, life sciences, and materials processing in space.
The NASA market for these services can be expected to be supplemented by foreign govern-
ment users, and, as Space Satation costs decline, industrial and academic researchers. Of par-
ticular interest is the Space Station's potential business in materials processing in space
(MPS). Production of certain high-value products, such as Pharmaceuticals and crystals, can
be improved dramatically hi the zero-gravity environment of space. Several companies have
already surged forward in the commercialization of this infant MPS technology, including
McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics Company and Johnson and Johnson who have teamed up to
develop an automated space facility for commercial pharmaceutical production. If this project
is successful, McDonnell-Douglas and Johnson and Johnson will be potential Space Station
users as early as 1988.
Servicing and repair of satellites from the Space Station represent another promising
business opportunity. Missions to service satellites which would not be cost-effective if launched
via the Shuttle, could be staged from the Space Station profitably. Use of a Space Station-
based teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS), a remote-controlled device for retrieving
and/or servicing satellites, has a market potential of nearly half a billion dollars per year.
When Space Station operations mature (by the mid-to-late 1990s), the Space station will
serve as the focal point for expansion of space industries. Lunar mining and asteroid retrieval,
for provision of non-terrestrial raw materials, will be greatly facilitated by the availability of a
space-based transportation system in Earth-orbit. The technology of materials processing in
space developed on the Space Staton will seed the establishment of large space factories for
processing of these raw materials. Advancements hi the technology of large space structures,
also made possible by the Space Station, will permit the assembly of space systems such as
Solar Power Satellites and permanent space settlements. Eventually, many polluting indus-
tries could be removed from Earth and relocated in space. The industrial firms which partici-
pate in Space Station development will be the first to benefit from these large-scale space man-
unfacturing enterprises.
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BUSINESS PLAN
The company believes that the facilities and systems comprising a Space Station system
can be developed, built, and operated in a building-block fashion, with each element imple-
mented only when expected commercial revenues justify the investment risk.
The company plans to form a series of subsidiary companies, each with separate public
offerings of shares, as each element, in the company's opinion, becomes a reasonable commer-
cial venture. The company has developed a Space Station development scenario which its
founders believe is reasonable, based on both the technical and the economic considerations
which such a project would involve.
The Company's Strategy for Commercial Space Development
The company plans to expedite the industrial development of space, and ensure its own
leading role in creation of commercial opportunities in space, through a comprehensive invest-
ment plan for financing the elements of the first manned Space Station. The company will form
ten subsidiary Space Station companies, each of which shall develop and market a particular
set of Space Station services. The company will serve as general partner in each of the ten sub-
sidiaries, retaining ownership of ten to fifty percent of each company's stock. The remaining
shares of each company will be offered to other industrial firms and the general public. Indus-
trial firms which have production or service capabilities compatible with Space Station devel-
opment requirements can be expected to invest in the company or companies whose Space Sta-
tion activities correspond to these interests. Utility firms, for example, may have a particular
interest in investing in Space Power Company, which will develop and operate the Space Sta-
tion power system.
The ten Space Station companies are as follows:
1. Space Transport Company
2. Space Repair Company
3. Space Research Company
4. Space Products Company
5. Space Service Company
6. Space Fuel Company
7. Space Hotel Company
8. Space Power Company
9. Space Phone Company
10. Space Systems Company
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The first four companies will develop and provide services directly to Space Station cus-
tomers. Space Transport Company will develop and operate the space-based OTV; Space
Repair Company will service satellites; Space Research Company will perform technology
development, science and applications; and Space Products Company will manage space pro-
duction (materials processing in space). These four companies will contract for support ser-
vices from Space Service Company, which will be responsible for technical maintenance and
servicing of major Space Station systems, and Space Fuel Company, which will deliver pro-
pellants to the Space Station for sale to the various Space Station companies. All of the Space
Station companies will contract for the services of the three "housekeeping" companies: Space
Station systems- integration will be the responsibility of Space Systems Company, a special
wholly-owned subsidiary of The Company.
Some of the Space Station companies, such as Space Transport Company and Space Ser-
vice Company, will have strong commercial markets from the outset. Other companies, par-
ticularly Space Research Company and Space Phone Company, will depend to varous degrees
on partnership with the United States government, which will have a continuing interest in the
Space Station and may be a major customer for its services. Various options for government-
industry partnership in a Space Station enterprise are discussed in the final report of General
Dynamics Corporation's Study of Space Station Needs, Attributes and Architectural Options,
presented to NASA in 1983. This document is also the source of the economic and cost data
contained in this prospectus.
The interaction of the Space Station companies is illustrated in the figure below. House-
keeping services are represented by arrows labelled "H", support services by arrows labelled
"S", and services to commercial and government customers by arrows labelled "P". Space
Systems Company, not shown, will prevent operational conflicts among hardware owned by
the various Space Station companies and charge the nine independent companies for its
services.
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SPACE STATION COMPANY PROFILES
Following are business profiles of the nine independent Space Station companies. Each pro-
file discusses the particular company's major business considerations and market prospects,
and concludes with an assessment of the investment opportunity. It should be restated that
the technical and economic data contained in these profiles are derived from the aforemen-
tioned General Dynamics Space Station study. The concluding Business Plan Summary pro-
vides an overall financial picture of the Space Station, and illustrates the relative attractive-
ness of the various ventures which the company intends to initiate.
Space Transport Company
I. Concept
Space Transport Company shall develop, construct, and operate systems for the transpor-
tation of cargo from the Space Station to final orbital destinations beyond the range of the
Space Shuttle. The transportation system will consist of a fleet of chemical-propulsion orbital
transfer vehicles (OTVs), which will be fully reusable and maintained at the Space Station by
the Space Service Company. The initial OTV will be an unmanned vehicle capable of transport-
ing about 11,000 pounds of pay load from the low-Earth orbit Space Station to geosynchronus
orbit. Advanced OTVs will transport personnel and cargo throughout the Earth-Moon system
and beyond, in support of lunar and interplanetary missions.
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II. Market
The initial market for OTV services will be delivery of commercial communications
satellites to geosynchronous orbit (GEO); as many as thirty such satellites may be launched
each year during the 1990s. Whereas current expendable launch systems cost from $30 million
to $150 million for delivery of a single communications satellite to GEO, the OTV should pro-
vide launch services at a total cost of $10-20 million per satellite launched. The market for
Space Transport Company is well established; estimates of launch service revenue during the
1990s range from $10 billion to $20 billion. The commercial satellite market will be augmented
by demands for launch of science and national security payloads, and the ultimate develop-
ment of deep-space operations such as lunar mining and asteroid retrieval.
III. Investment Requirements
Development of a fleet of space-based OTVs is estimated to cost about $1.5 billion.
Development of OTV support facilities will cost considerably more, but most of these costs
should be borne by the Space Fuel Company and the Space Service Company. OTV operating
costs are estimated at about $30-40 million per mission, depending on the payload and destina-
tion, much of which consists of the costs of OTV propellants to be purchased from Space Fuel
Company.
IV. Business Arrangements
The activities of Space Transport Company will include development and testing of the
space-based OTV, in coordination with the other companies whose support services will be
required. OTV operations will require payload transfer from the Space Shuttle to the OTV,
ground and space monitoring of each OTV flight, checkout of the OTV after every mission,
with periodic repairs and maintenance of the OTVs between missions. Space Transport Com-
pany will carry out launch service agreements directly with its government and industry
customers, and will itself be a customer for several Space Station services. Space Transport
Company will need to purchase OTV propellants from Space Fuel Company, OTV repair ser-
vices from Space Service Company, living accommodations for personnel from Space Hotel
Company, and communications from Space Phone Company.
V. Business Assessment
Space Transport Company represents one of the most attractive investment opportunities
within the Space Station system. The OTV economic advantage over current launch systems
is substantial, and the market for launch services is large, firm, and growing. The economic
benefit the OTV over alternative systems is estimated at over $1 billion annually, and Space
Transport Company's share of this profit potential should be sufficient to provide a strong
return on the investment in development of the OTV capability. Owing to the overall signifi-
cance of the QTV function to the Space Station program, significant government support for
OTV development should be available, though it should not be necessary, assuming OTV-
related development costs can be shared equitably among the Space Station companies involved
with the OTV.
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Space Repair Company
I. Concept
Space Repair company shall develop and operate the teleoperator maneuvering system
(TMS), unmanned servicing module (USM), and other equipment for performing satellite ser-
vicing and other tasks related to the maintenance, repair, and upgrading of orbital assets.
Whenever possible, satellite servicing missions will be unmanned and performed "in-situ" at
the location of the serviced asset. Most serviced satellites will be within the operating range of
the Space Station-based TMS, i.e., within 600 miles in altitude or eight degrees in orbital inclin-
ation of the Space Station. Satellites will occasionally be retrieved and brought to the Space
Station for servicing, and for about ten percent of servicing missions Space Repair Company
will need to coordinate with Space Transport Company for utilization of the space-based OTV.
II. Market
Satellite servicing should develop into a $350 million per year market by the mid-1990s,
requiring an average of about twenty servicing missions annually. Approximately one-third of
these missions are expected to be for scheduled maintenance, with servicing missions for repair
of unplanned malfunctions occurring about twice as frequently. Primary consumers will be
science and applications customers whose satellites are expected to be more attractive for ser-
vicing than commercial satellites based on such factors as satellite value, location, and reliabil-
ity. Space Repair Company will interact directly with the customer community, and will in
turn contract with other Space Station companies for support of satellite servicing operations.
III. Investment Requirements
Capital investment requirements for establishment of Space Repair Company's satellite
servicing capability should be approximately $200 million, with a majority of this outlay
devoted to development of the TMS and USM. A small portion of the investment will be for
development and production of the tools which Space Repair Company will need, and for modi-
fications to the Space Station to permit the occasional return of satellites to the Space Station
for servicing tasks which cannot be performed in-situ.
IV. Business Arrangements
-, Space Repair Company will contract with Space Service Company for TMS storage and
assistance in TMS maintenance, and will purchase TMS propellant replenishments for its cus-
tomers from Space Fuel Company. Space Repair Company will also depend on Space Phone
Company, for communications support during servicing missions. Among its customers, who
will primarily be science and applications customers, will be Space Research Company and
Space Products Company, who may utilize Space Repair Company for the servicing of mission-
peculiar equipment on space platforms and free flyers.
V. Business Assessment
Space Repair Company represents an attractive business opportunity due to its relatively
modest capital investment requirements, which (at $200 million) is the lowest of the Space Sta-
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tion companies. The profit potential of satellite servicing is estimated at about S240 million an-
nually, and Space Repair Company need only realize one-sixth of this potential for it to remain
a profitable venture. Space Repair Company's share of this profit, after account for fees to its
contractors and economic benefits to its customers, should remain in the 30-40% range, so this
venture appears to be an attractive opportunity with a relatively low level of financial risk.
Space Research Company
I. Concept
Space Research Company shall develop and operate Space Station elements for the support
of technology development, science, and applications research. These elements will include
laboratories such as life science modules, which will be part of the primary Space Station struc-
ture, and unmanned free flyers and platforms which will support observatories and experi-
ments in a space environment uninfluenced by manned operations. Space Research Company
will also be involved in the staging of interplanetary missions from the Space Station, and may
eventually work with Space Transport Company to develop manned orbital transfer vehicles.
II. Market
Space Research Company will be involved in every discipline of space science and applica-
tions except materials processing in space, which will be handled by Space Products Company.
Aside from its commercial remote sensing customers, Space Research Company's clientele will
initially consist primarily of NASA and other tj.S. government and foreign researchers. Space
Research Company will generally not develop mission-peculiar equipment, but will instead
operate generic Space Station facilities, such as experiment modules and free flyers, which will
support a variety of missions. Science and applications users will lease this equipment from
Space Research Company, and will have the option of using Space Research Company's trained
mission specialists or providing their own crew support. As the cost of doing research in space
declines, commercial utilization of Space Research Company's services and facilities should in-
crease, but based on past experience it is a safe assumption that government and government-
supported users will comprise the bulk of Space Research Company's early market.
III. Captial Investment
Capital investment in the various mission modules and platforms which will support
science and applications customers could range from $1 billion to $2 billion, depending on the
extent of the facilities and the accommodations on these facilities for supporting specific mis-
sion tasks. With a mission module development cost of about $350 million, and a unit cost of
about S125 million per module, an initial research capability could be provided for as little as
$500 million. It is anticipated, however, that the early Space Station configuration, which will
emphasize science and applications, will require as many as five mission modules for science
and applications, and a number of free flyers and platforms which will be monitored and ser-
viced from the Space Station. Of particular interest is not only the size of the investment re-
quired for this level of activity, but also its timing. A good deal of the Space Station's tech-
nology development, science, and applications capabilities need to be in place by the early
1990s, so that commercial and operational missions which are dependent on technology devel-
opment can commence on schedule.
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IV. Business Arrangements
Owing to the magnitude and timing of its capital investment and its reliance on
government-sponsored research for sales, Space Research Company will require active support
from the government throughout its initial investment period and early operations. Space
Research Company will be one of the most dependent of the Space Station companies on
government involvement; this is to be expected because of the public nature of space science
and applications research. The U.S. government and foreign governments will probably com-
prise over 90 percent of Space Research Company's market throughout the 1990s. Space
Research Company will rely heavily upon support from the other Space Station companies,
particularly Space Repair Company (for servicing of free flyers) and the housekeeping com-
panies (for power, data management, and support of Space Research Company's crew).
V. Business Assessment
Space Research company will be a profitable venture only with government market
guarantees, at a minimum, and perhaps may require support from the government in develop-
ment of Space Station research facilities. Space Research Company may in fact assume the
role of an operating authority, with the primary financial responsibility for development fall-
ing to the government. Survival of Space Research Company as a self-sustaining commercial
entity in the long-term is possible, but will almost certainly require a great deal of government
support at the outset.
Space Products Company
I. Concept
Space Products Company shall develop, construct, and operate Space Station facilities for
experimental and commercial materials processing in space (MPS). These will include free fly-
ing and attached modules with production facilities (e.g., furnaces, separation apparata, etc),
which benefit from the zero-gravity environment of space and the availability of manned
presence on the Space Station. Space Products Company may ultimately participate in the
development of large space manufacturing systems consisting of lunar and/or asteroidal min-
ing facilities and deep-space factories capable of processing hundreds of thousands of tons of
raw materials annually.
II. Market
Zero-gravity has been shown to offer advantages in the production of alloys, glasses and
ceramics, electronics materials, and biological materials. Electronics materials (e.g., crystals).
and biological materials (e.g., pharmaceuticals) seem to offer the greatest commercial poten-
tial, due to their high value per unit weight — some enzymes, for example, have market values
in excess of $50 million per pound. Since MPS is a new technology, however, more research is
needed before the real value of space processing can be fully known. It is, therefore, impossible
to predict the size of Space Products Company's market, a market that may in the early years
of Space Station activity include a good deal of government-sponsored research. The potential
of commercial MPS seems great nonetheless; NASA is currently supporting through a Joint-
Endeavor Agreement a project aimed at commercial pharmaceutical production in space by
the late 1980s. The industry partners in this agreement (McDonnell-Douglas and Johnson and
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Johnson) have committed tens of millions of dollars to the project already, and the process
they are developing, continuous-flow electrophoresis, is aimed at producing by the early 1990s
up to $6 billion worth of space-processed material annually. Estimates of the ultimate value of
MPS range as high as S50 billion per year.
III. Investment Requirements
Development and construction of Space Station materials processing facilities is estimated
to cost $500 million to $1 billion. If MPS technology develops sufficiently over the next 3 to 5
years, development of Space Station MPS facilities may become attractive purely on the basis
of expected commercial utilization. Otherwise, government partnership with industry may
provide the most practical means of developing an initial Space Station MPS capability. In
this latter case, MPS would represent one of the science and applications disciplines that
NASA would support as its share of Space Station development. Government assistance in
developing MPS facilities, and/or government market guarantees, could supplement a matur-
ing commercial market by reducing the investment required and the risk required for Space
Products Company to establish commercial space processing operations.
IV. Business Arrangements
Space Products Company will be one of the two Space Station companies most dependent
on partnership with the government, unless commercial MPS develops as an industry very
rapidly over the next few years. Despite its great long-term profit potential, Space Products
Company may require substantial government support in development of MPS facilities as a
pre-requisite for establishing itself as the commercial operator of Space Station materials proc-
essing facilities. Like its counterpart, Space Research Company, Space Products Company
may have the government as its major early customer. Like the companies servicing commer-
cial users (Space Transport Company and Space Repair Company), Space Products Company
will contract with Space Station housekeeping companies for utility services, with particular
dependence on Space Power Company, since MPS is very power-consuming.
V. Business Assessment
Space Products Company will have great long-term growth potential; but unless commer-
cial MPS develops rapidly during the mid-1980s, it will be dependent on partnership with the
government in order for its development of any early MPS capability on Space Station to be
financially attractive. The alternative is for Space Products Company to enter the market at a
later^date, relegating early,MPS activities to Space Research Company as one of. its
government-supported science and applications activities. The long-term profit potential of
Space Products company, however, as a possible leader in the establishment of large-scale
space manufacturing is tremendous.
Space Service Company
I. Concept
Space Service Company shall develop and operate facilities for maintenance and servicing
of major Space Station systems and shall maintain a service crew on board the Space Station
whose time will be leased by Space Service Company for a broad variety of service-related
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tasks. Primary responsibilities of Space Service Company will include development and opera-
tion of maintenance and servicing facilities for orbital transfer vehicles (OTVs) and the
teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS), and periodic technical support for servicing of the
Space Station power, data management, and life support systems.
II. Market
As its primary responsibility will be to maintain and service the fleet of reusable OTVs, the
market for Space Service Company will be governed chiefly by the demand for geosynchronous
placement of communications and other payloads. Its share of the $1 billion per year profit
potential of the OTV will be supplemented by income from maintenance of the TMS, and sup-
port to other Space Station companies in servicing the critical systems that provide Space Sta-
tion utilities. Space Service Company will probably maintain the largest contingent of perma-
nent Space Station crew members (two to four) whose daily tasks will ensure smooth
housekeeping operations and prompt treatment of technical problems.
III. Investment Requirements
Space Service Company will develop and operate those Space Station facilities dedicated to
storage and servicing of the OTVs and TMS, excluding the propellant storage and transfer
system, which will be provided by Space Fuel Company. Space Service Company will also train
and employ Space Station crew members who will be responsible for Space Station housekeep-
ing (power, data management, and life support systems) and periodic assistance in maintaining
Space Station transportation and servicing capabilities. Capital outlay for OTV and TMS sup-
port facilities will represent the majority of Space Service Company's investment, comprising
about $900 million out of a total $1 billion capital budget.
IV. Business Arrangements
Space Service Company will have little direct contact with Space Station customers, work-
ing instead as a supplier to the housekeeping companies (Space Power, Space Phone, and
Space Hotel) which will rely entirely on Space Service'Company's crew for maintenance of their
systems. Space Service Company shall also contract its services to most of the other Space
Station companies, particularly Space Transport Company (for OTV maintenance), and Space
Repair Company (TMS maintenance). Space Service Company will not purchase OTV or TMS
spares, but will assist crew members from Space Transport Company and Spare Repair Com-
pany in OTV and TMS refurbishing tasks, as well as OTV and TMS operations, when
necessary. Space Service Companywill uvturn be a consumerof. services from the housekeep-
ing companies for crew accommodations and power for its servicing equipment.
V. Business Assessment
Space Service Company's large capital investment in OTV and TMS service facilities is
backed by the high profit potential of geosynchronous launch and satellite servicing missions,
which should provide an income to Space Service Company in the hundreds of millions of
dollars annually. Space Service Company will have the additional business base of leasing its
crew members' labor to the housekeeping companies at a probable profit (above what Space
Service Company will pay Space Hotel Company for their accommodations) of §10 million per
man-year.
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Space Fuel Company
I. Concept
Space Fuel Company shall have the specific task of developing-and operating the propellant
delivery, storage, and transfer systems for provision of cryogenic and hydrazine propellants to
the Space Station companies which require such fuel for transportation and attitude control
systems. Primary responsibilities of Space Fuel Company will be to develop and operate a
tanker launch vehicle for propellant delivery to LEO, tanks and reliquefaction apparatus for
propellant storage at LEO, and pumps and pipelines for propellant transfer to consumers. A
tanker could be developed by reconfiguration of hardware presently used in the Space Shuttle
system. If recovery of residual propellants from the Shuttle ET on regular STS missions
becomes practical, Space Fuel Company will develop and operate equipment for Shuttle pro-
pellant recovery or will purchase propellant from whichever authority (e.g., NASA) undertakes
such recovery operations.
II. Market
The primary market for Space Fuel Company will be the sale of OTV propellant (hydrogen-
oxygen) to Space Transport Company for OTV fuel, which should provide a revenue base of
$500 million on sales of about 500,000 pounds of fuel annually. Sale of hydrazine fuel to Space
Repair Company (for TMS fuel), to Space Research Company and Space Products Company
(for space platform control), and to Space Service Company (for Space Station control) should
augment the OTV propellant market by approximately 20 percent. Space Fuel Company may
also provide fuel to Space Power Company for replenishment of fuel cells used in Space Station
power generation.
III. Investment Requirements
Space Fuel Company's investment in propellant delivery, storage, and transfer systems
should be in the $2 billion range. Government assistance in development of the Shuttle-derived
tanker (estimated development cost: $1.2 billion) could reduce this investment requirement
significantly. One option for government partnership hi this activity is for NASA to not only
develop but also to operate the tanker, selling its propellants to Space Fuel Company, whose
primary responsibility in this case would be storage and distribution of propellants. Space Fuel
Company might ulimately team up with Space Products Company to establish space process-
ing facilities for extraction of propellants from nonterrrestrial (e.g., lunar) materials.
IV. Business Arrangements
Space Fuel Company shall operate primarily as a supplier to those Space Station com-
panies, most notably Space Transport Company, which require on-orbit propellant. Its only
direct contact with users will be in the provision of hydrazine fuel for replenishment of reaction
control systems on serviced satellites, although this fuel could be provided to users through
Space Repair Company. Space Fuel Company will capture a share of the SI billion per year
OTV profit potential by selling propellant to Space Transport Company at a high profit rate.
Although the SI billion OTV benefit is based on a propellant price of $500 per pound, the
economic advantage of the OTV would be reduced by only about 20 percent if the propellant
price were to rise to $1000 per pound. At this price, Space Fuel Company could thus be pro-
fitable without destroying the profitability of Space Transport Company.
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V. Business Assessment
With propellant sales to Space Transport Company (for OTV use) at $1000 per pound, and
to Space Repair Company (for the TMS) at $500 per pound, Space Fuel Company would earn
annual profits of $400 million, a sound return on its investment even though its expected
development costs are the highest of the Space Station companies. With revenue from other
sales and the possibility of government partnership in development of propellant delivery
systems. Space Fuel Company could generate even greater profits, or alternatively, sell fuel at
a lower price. Development of a system for recovery of residual propellants from Shuttle ET
during STS missions could also enhance Space Fuel Company's business prospects. Space
Fuel Company, however, would not seem to be dependent on such favorable technical or pro-
grammatic developments, since the market should bear a propellant price sufficient for invest-
ment recovery and a substantial rate of return.
Space Hotel Company
I. Concept
Space Hotel Company shall develop and operate systems and elements for the support and
comfort of Space Station crew members. These will include primarily habitat modules and
their interior furnishings, and the Space Station life support system which will provide for the
physiological needs of Space Station residents. The initial life support system will depend on
frequent (about 90-day) Shuttle resupply missions for replenishment of crew consumables,
such as food, water, and oxygen, but may eventually evolve into a partially or fully closed-loop
environmental control/life support system (CELSS) capable of supporting life on board the
Space Station with much larger resupply intervals.
II. Market
Space Hotel Company will provide its services for all temporary and permanent inhabitants
of the Space Station and will most likely charge one basic hotel fee on a per-person basis. The
Space Station initially will have a crew of at least four to eight people and is expected to
expand to a crew of twelve or more by the end of the 1990s. It is expected that all of the Space
Station companies, with the exception of the three housekeeping companies, will have at least
one full-time crew member on the Space Station with certain companies, such as Space Service
Company and Space Research Company, having two or three full-time residents. Space Hotel
Company may have one full-time resident, whose major responsibilities would be the prepara-
tion x»f meals and housecleaning. Alternatively, Space Service Company personnel may be
hired for maintenance of habitat modules and life support.
III. Capital Investment
Development of a Space Station habitat module would require an estimated $600 million
investment, with an additional production cost of about $125 million per module. An initial
open-loop life support system would be included in this cost, but would entail operating costs
of $200 to $300 million annually. The predominant component of these operating costs would
be transportation of consumables to the Space Station, giving a substantial economic incen-
tive for development of a closed-loop life support system for reduction of resupply re-
quirements. Such a system would cost about $400 million to develop and install, but would
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eventually save up to S350 million per year in resupply costs. Investment requirements tor
Space Hotel Company could be strongly influenced by government regulations and safety re-
quirements pertaining to man-rated (habitable) space systems, so Space Hotel Company would
need to work closely with NASA toward mutually acceptable cost/safety requirement
tradeoffs.
IV. Business Arrangements
Space Hotel Company will probably have the simplest business arrangement of the ten
Space Station companies, renting its "room and board" to each^of the Space Station com-
panies with crew members and to customers who send people to work on the Station. Govern-
ment agencies may frequently send mission specialists to work with Space Research Company
on science and applications projects; Space Hotel Company might offer "guest rates" for those
who remain on board for relatively short periods. Otherwise, Space Hotel Company can charge
a flat monthly or annual rate to the Space Station companies and customers who maintain
crew personnel in orbit. Rent for one person would probably be in the range of $2 to $4 million
per month. Space Hotel Company may contract with Space Service Company for maintenance
of its habitats and life support system (dependent on whether Space Hotel Company maintains
its own crew) and will buy power and data management services from the other two housekeep-
ing companies.
V. Business Assessment
If Space Hotel Company can charge each of its customers $2 to $4 million per month for
rent, it can probably earn a good return on its investment and exist as a self-sustaining com-
mercial entity. If the market will not bear a rental price this high, Space Hotel Company may
need to engage in partnership with the government to reduce investment requirements. Based
on the potential economic value of such operations as OTV launch services and satellite servic-
ing, Space Hotel Company should be able to obtain rental fees considerably higher than this
range at least for crew members engaged in these activities. Crew costs for other missions will
probably not be a major factor, so business prospects for Space Hotel Company presently
seem good.
Space Power Company
I. Concept
Space Power Company shall develop, construct, and operate systems for the provision of
power"to all orbiting assets which'require such power to fulfill their mission tasks. Primary
power systems will consist of solar cell arrays, with concentrators to reduce the solar cell area
required. Fuel cells, batteries, or flywheels may be used for backup power and energy storage.
Ultimately, nuclear power systems may be required for certain mission requirements.
II. Market
Initial Space Station power requirements during the early 1990s suggest the need for a
20-25 kW power system, increasing to a 100-150 kW capability by the end of the decade. The
two primary users of on-orbit power will be materials processing in space (MPS) and the closed-
cyle environmental control/life-support system (CELSS), both of which can be expected to
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evolve to full capability during the mid-to-late 1990s. MPS and CELSS are attractive market
candidates; MPS is expected to develop into a multi-billion dollar industry, and CELSS will
represent a cost improvement over open-loop life-support systems of over $300 million annually.
Business opportunities prior to construction of a Space Station include development of a
10-25 kW power extension system for enhancement of Space Shuttle capabilities and provision
of power for unmanned "free flyers." Both markets could develop by the late 1980s. Long-term
market possibilities include development of megawatt-range power systems for large-scale
space processing and nuclear power plants for lunar mining operations, and gigawatt-scale
solar power satellites for delivery of energy to Earth. Early versions of such advanced systems
may be required within 20 to 25 years.
III. Investment Requirements
Development costs of a power extension system for Space Shuttle are estimated at about
$100 million, with an additional $200 million investment required for expansion to meet Space
Station power requirements. Operations costs are estimated at $10 million per year. Long-term
power system developments represent costs in the multi-billion dollar range, with potential
revenues of similar magnitude.
IV. Business Arrangements
Space Power Company will operate fairly autonomously with respect to the other Space
Station companies and will sell power to virtually all of the other companies just as utility com-
panies sell power to industrial firms on Earth. Primary consumers of Space Station power will
be Space Products Company, which will require power in the 20-40 kW range for MPS, and
Space Hotel Company, which will operate the habitat life support systems. Space Shuttle
users may provide an early market for Space Power Company services, and Earth-based utility
companies may eventually purchase power transmitted from space by satellite power systems
operated by Space Power Company. Periodic maintenance of the power system on the Space
Station may require occasional servicing from Space Service Company.
V. Business Assessment
Average power consumption among Space Station users during the 1990s should total
about 1 million kilowatt-hours per year. By charging a utility rate of $100/kW-hr, Space Power
Company should be able to cover operating expenses (which should be relatively small) and
earn a good return on its capital investment in the Space Station powersystem. Space Power
Company's position will be enhanced by the reliance of all Space Station companies on its
power for servicing their customers and by Space Power Company's relative independence
from the other companies' support services.
Space Phone Company
I. Concept
Space Phone Company shall develop and operate Space Station data management and com-
munications systems and lease such services to the other Space Station companies. These
systems will include the Space Station computer system for monitoring critical subsystems
and processing of mission data and communications systems for transmission of information
between Earth and the space communications network.
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II. Market
Data management requirements will be driven almost entirely by the requirements of
Space Research Company and Space Products Company to satisfy their science and applica-
tions customers. Astrophysics and Earth and planetary exploration will consume over 99 per-
cent of the Space Station's information management capacity with materials processing in
space representing the only other significant requirement. The commercial market for Space
Phone Company services will be heavily influenced by the development of commercial remote
sensing and space processing activities, a difficult market to evaluate but with substantial
growth potential. Routine housekeeping data requirements will be relatively minor but will
provide a steady usage in an otherwise volatile market.
III. Investment Requirements
Development of Space Station information processing and data management/communica-
tions systems will require an investment of approximately $350 million in system hardware
and $100 million in software. Operations costs should be relatively low, but recovery of Space
Phone Company's investment could require a considerable use fee for data management ser-
vices. If commercial remote sensing develops into a strong market, it may be capable of pro-
viding most of the $50 to $100 million in annual revenue which Space Phone Company will
require for investment recovery. Otherwise, Space Phone Company will probably be one of the
three or four Space Station companies engaged in partnership with the government for
development of Space Station facilities.
IV. Business Arrangements
As one of the three Space-Station housekeeping companies, Space Phone Company will con-
duct most of its business as a supplier to the other Space Station companies requiring data
management services. Space Phone Company will not maintain a permanent crew, contracting
with Space Service Company for maintenance of its on-board computer, tracking, and com-
munications systems. If remote sensing develops as a strong commercial industry, Space
Phone Company may sell data management services directly to commercial customers but will
probably provide these services through Space Research Company, which will handle a vast
majority of Space Phone Company's business. Government partnership with Space Phone
Company in developing these services may be desirable.
V. Business Assessment
Space Phone Company's viability as a self-sustaining commercial enterprise is largely
dependent upon development of a strong remote sensing industry. Even if remote sensing does
provide a firm market, however, some form of government partnership with Space Phone Com-
pany may be necessary for this housekeeping function to develop into a profitable business.
Although the total capital investment required, at under half a billion dollars, is one of the
smallest of any of the Space Station companies, the revenue-generating potential and market
characteristics of data management services do not seem to have the payback potential to
attract significant private investment without some degree of government support. If Space
Phone Company can expand beyond its Space Station housekeeping function, however, then
its long-term profit potential is immense. Space Phone Company would have a certain
technical and competitive advantage in the development of advanced communications
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systems, such as the wristwatch telephone concept described earlier, with a multi-billion dollar
potential market. With possibilities such as this, Space Phone Company could in the long term
become a leader in the commercial use of space.
Business Plan Summary
The table on the following page ("Space Station Financial Summary") lists the ten Space
Station companies and provides rough estimates of the key investment and return factors
which determine their viability. Space Systems Company data have been omitted, as this will
be a special subsidiary of the Company whose major function will be to resolve technical issues
among the Space Station companies rather than development of a commercial market.
This Financial Summary dramatically illustrates the impressive business potential of the
Space Station enterprise. The Company's subsidiaries have a combined net income of $1.87
billion annually on sales of $3.87 billion per year. Six of the nine subsidiaries are profitable
without any government support; and with rapid growth of MPS technology (whereas none
was assumed), at least eight, if not all nine of the companies, could be profitable. Four of the
companies yield an annual return on investment of thrity percent or greater. Altogether, $9
billion is invested in the Space Station project; and with the given assumptions, less than $2
billion would have to be contributed by the government (or $440 million annually in market
guarantees) to ensure the viability of all Space Station companies.
This summary is based on mature Space Station operations for a mid-to-late 1990s
timeframe. Gradual buildup of the Space Station is possible as discussed earlier. The Company
intends to start up each subsidiary as its market develops. A hypothetical time-phasing of
Space Station development is as follows:
1988 — Space Power Company establishes Shuttle power extension
system
1990 — Space Hotel Company, Space Phone Company establish initial
manned capability, Space Research Company adds first science
modules
1992 — Space Repair Company initiates TMS operations, Space Service
Company begins developing OTV base, Space Systems Company
begins systems integration tasks
1993 -^ Space Transport Company begins OTV test flights, Space Fuel
Company begins propellant delivery/recovery operations, Space
Products Company begins space processing
1994 to — Growth of all operations
2000
This is only an example; Space Station development could in fact proceed quite differently.
Space Products Company could establish MPS operations much earlier, perhaps by developing
unmanned free flyers for attachment to the Space Power Company system before the initiation
of manned operations. Other variations are possible. The Company will ensure that market
conditions and investor interest responsibly govern the evolution of the Space Station and the
22
GDC-ASP-83-004
Company's subsidiaries. The corporate officials of the Company firmly believe, however, that
regardless of the development scenario, the Space Station organizational and financial situa-
tion by the end of the next decade will fulfill the expectations of this prospectus. However, the
need for "general purpose" Space Station facilities not discussed in this document could add
$2 billion to the total cost of the venture. Although the government would logically play a role
in development of such facilities, their costs might be shared in part or in full by the Space Sta-
tion companies, representing an investment requirement not included in the Financial Sum-
mary. Conversely, it should be noted that the cost data contained in this document are based
on standard aerospace industry cost estimating methods. Commercial production of Space
Station elements could result in substantial reductions in these costs, offsetting any additional
general purpose costs and perhaps further enhancing the attractiveness and profitability of
the Company's venture.
Space Station Financial Summary
Space Transport Company
Space Repair Company
Space Research Company
Space Products Company
Space Service Company
Space Fuel Company
Space Hotel Company
Space Power Company
Space Phone Company
Space Systems Company
Total
^Average
Capitol
1 nvQstmont
(SM)
1500
200
1500
1000
1000
2000
1000
300
500
—
9000
Operating
Costs
(Annual)
(*M)
750
280
100
100
200
250
300
10
10
—
2000
Operating
Revenue
(Annual)
(*M)
1400
350
300
50
400
600
600
100
20
—
3870
Net
Income
(Annual)
(«A)
650
70
200
-50
200
400
300
90
10
—
1870
Return on
Investment ROI
(ROI) Shortfall
0.43 0
0.35 -
0.13 0.07
-0.05 0.25
0.20 -
0.20 -
0.30 -
0.30 -
0.02 0.18
— —
0.21* -
Government Requirement
Option B:
Option A: Market
Investment Guarantee
($M) (SM)
0
0
500
1000
0
0
0
0
450
—
1950
0
100
250
0
0
0
0
90
—
440
GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
The Company plans, through the formation of a series of subsidiary companies, to develop,
build, and operate most or all of the space systems which taken collectively would comprise a
Space Station system. Many of these planned activities are in areas which have been con-
sidered to require government support or even government ownership and operation. The
Company believes that most, if not all, of the elements of a Space Station system can be
developed, built, and operated in the private sector by treating each element as a separate com-
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mercial venture which will commence development only when, in the Company's judgment,
each element becomes economically attractive.
To the extent that government participation in the development of technologies or hard-
ware is feasible politically and fiscally, the Company will seek the.active participation of agen-
cies of the U.S. government. In certain cases in which the government appears to be a natural
customer (or even the principal customer) for services which can be provided by Space Station
elements, the Company and its subsidiaries will seek contractual arrangements to provide
guaranteed minimum use by the government of those services just as the earliest airline com-
panies in the United States contracted with the Post Office for airmail delivery services.
Many foreign corporations and government agencies are also expected to become
customers of the Company or its subsidiaries, as similar capabilities are not expected to be
available on a commercial basis from any sources outside the United States. The possible
benefits to the United States' international balance of payments will provide additional
justification for some degree of participation by the U.S. government in the investment and/or
the operating costs of Space Station elements.
MANAGEMENT
The names and addresses of the officers and directors of the Company and their principal
occupations during the past five years and certain other significant activities are given below:
Name and Address Office Held
Otto 0. Steinbronn Chairman
Michael C. Simon President
Joseph R. Bain
J. Peter Vajk
Executive Vice President
Senior Vice President
Principal Occupations During
Past 5 Years and Certain Other Activities
Space Station Project Manager
General Dynamics Convair Division
Space Systems Engineering-Economist
General Dynamics Convair Division
Director, Strategic Planning — Space
General Dynamics Convair Division
Senior Scientist
Science Applications, Inc.
John G. Bodle
Robert E. Bradley
Warren G. Hardy
Ed J. Hujsak
Charles L. Hyde
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
Tom L. Kessler
John W. Maloney
James D. Peterson
Gordon R. Stone
Sam L. Wagner
Director
Director
Director
Director
Director
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FEDERAL TAX CONSIDERATIONS
In order to increase the potential profitability of the Company and its subsidiaries and in
order to stimulate commercial exploitation of the space technologies developed by government
and industry hi the United States during the last three decades, the Company intends to seek
legislation exempting profits on operations in space from federal corporate income taxes until
1995, after which a gradually rising portion of such profits would become liable to taxation
with no special treatment after 2005. There can be no assurance that the Company will be suc-
cessful in securing such favorable legislation. The effect of such legislation would be to
increase the net profitability of the Company and of its subsidiaries. Such legislation would not
reduce the level of investment required for each venture planned by the Company, but it may
reduce the cost of capital which the Company or its subsidiaries may from time to time have to
borrow.
CAPITALIZATION AND DESCRIPTION OF COMMON STOCK
The Capitalization of the Company, as of the date of this Prospectus, and as adjusted to
reflect the sale of the Shares offered hereby, is as follows:
Authorized Outstanding As Adjusted
Shares of Common Stock
($0.10 par value) 5,000,000 0 300,000
The Company has authorized Common Stock consisting of 5,000,000 shares of the par
value of $0.10 each, all of which are of one class and have equal rights as to voting, dividends
and liquidation. All shares when issued hi this offering will be fully paid and nonassessable.
Shares have no pre-emptive, conversion or redemption rights and are freely transferable.
The voting rights of the shares are noncumulative, which means that the holders of more
than 50 percent of the shares voting for the election of directors can elect 100 percent of the
directors if they choose to do so; and in such event, the holders of the remaining less than 50
percent of the shares voting for the election of directors will not be able to elect any person or
persons to the Board of Directors.
The rights of the holders of shares may not be modified by a vote of less than a majority of
the shares outstanding.
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CSE
PUBLIC OFFERING
Consolidated Space Enterprises, Inc., is offering 300,000 Shares of its Common Stock to the public at
$10.00 per share. The minimum purchase in this offering is 100 shares. This is the first of the series of
stock offerings described under "The Company's Strategy for Commercial Space Development" in the
part of this Prospectus headed "Business Plan."
The Company is selling the Shares through selected broker-dealers who will receive a commission of
S0.70 per share. In some states the Company is itself acting as a broker-dealer and in those states it will
also sell the Shares directly. The Company is soliciting indications of interest from prospective buyers
and will advise the broker-dealers thereof on the date of the offering.
No dealer, salesman, or other person has been authorized to give any information or to make any
representation, other than those contained in this Prospectus; and, if given or made, such information or
representation must not be relied upon as having been authorized by the Company. This Prospectus does
not constitute an offer by the Company in any jurisdiction to any person to whom it is unlawful for the
Company to make such offer in such jurisdiction.
The Company may file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a Registration Statement
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933 with respect to the Company
and to the Common Stock of the Company offered hereby. This Prospectus does not contain all of the
information set forth hi the Registration Statement, certain parts of which are omitted in accordance
with Rules and Regulations of the Commission. Additional copies of this prospectus and related informa-
tion may be obtained by writing to Mr. Otto O. Steinbronn or Mr. Michael C. Simon, General Dynamics
Convair Division, Space Station Project, Mail Zone 21-9530, P.O. Box 85357, San Diego, California
92138.
Until December 31,1985, all dealers effecting transactions in the Common Stock, whether or not par-
ticipating in this distribution, may be required to deliver a Prospectus. This is in addition to the obliga-
tion of dealers to deliver a Prospectus when acting as underwriters and with respect to their unsold
allotments or subscriptions.
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